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INTRODUCTION
Current First Amendment analysis lacks a coherent view of speech in
the professions. Classic cases address the street-comer orator, lone pam-
phleteer, newspaper editor, broadcaster, cable operator, public employee,
grant recipient, vendor, corporation, and, most recently, Internet content
provider. And an abundance of theory accompanies these speakers along
the way. Although some of these actors may be professionals, both theory
and practice generally meet their roles as members of a profession with si-
lence. Despite the century-old recognition of the regulation of professions,
we still have, for example, no paradigm for the First Amendment rights of
attorneys, physicians, or financial advisers when they communicate with
their clients.
Unlike the street-comer speaker, who addresses whomever walks by
about whatever is on the speaker's mind, a professional fulfills a more de-
fined social role by offering specific knowledge and expertise to an audi-
ence that deliberately seeks access to such information and often to the pro-
fessional's judgment about a particular issue. Clients seeking a
professional's counsel expect the professional to adhere to this social role,
and professionals generally hold themselves out as doing so. In this sense,
professional and client share a predefined relationship that runs far deeper
than the relationship between pedestrians and soapbox orators who share the
same physical space. The communication in the latter case is generally de-
termined only by the ensuing conversation, whereas that in the former case
is understood as bearing certain regularities that transcend any particular
dialogue. For example, although members of any given learned profession
may differ in their individual judgments about particular issues, their role as
professionals traditionally implies their subscription to a body of knowledge
that is shared among their peers. A learned professional mediates between
an open, often formal and structured system of learning and the client's de-
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sire to draw upon it to make personal life choices. A professional thus
straddles both the public and private realms by adhering to a defined social
role while assisting individuals in making personal choices based on the
cumulative knowledge of the profession.
The function and scope of government regulation mirrors the social role
of professionals. The State may ensure professionals' faithfulness to the
public aspects of their calling, but it may not usurp their role or determine
independently the bodies of knowledge that may be accessed or the individ-
ual judgments that may be rendered in a given case. Government regulation
thus plays a complementary role in maintaining the profession by reflecting
and implementing this balance between the public and the private. In part
nurtured by, and in part protected from, government regulation, professions
serve a vital informational function in our society because they promise citi-
zens access to a realm of shared knowledge that is neither state propaganda
nor private fancy.
The Supreme Court has only once issued a holding expressly confront-
ing the First Amendment protection of professional speech. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,1 a decision not generally thought of as a First
Amendment case, the Court addressed a state requirement that physicians
pass along certain information to their patients about the gestational age of
the fetus and social services that may function as alternatives to abortion. In
upholding the regulation, the lead opinion, authored by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, noted:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are impli-
cated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information man-
dated by the State here.
2
The passage tells us that physicians enjoy First Amendment rights, but
provides little guidance about the weight given to the First Amendment in-
terests involved. The application of Wooley would demand a compelling
governmental interest to overcome the physician's First Amendment rights,
or at least a substantial interest that was unrelated to the content of the
speech.3 It would require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to that in-
1 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2 Id. at 884.
3 See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-17 (striking down a state's requirement that noncommer-
cial license plates bear the motto "Live Free or Die" on the grounds that easy identification of
passenger vehicles could have been achieved by more narrow means and that promoting ap-
preciation of history, individualism, and state pride was insufficient to outweigh the individ-
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terest as well.4 The passage cited from Whalen, on the other hand, would
appear to import only the basic due process limitations on nonspeech regu-
lations of professionals.5 To fuse these two models in a shorthand formula-
tion provides little indication of how to resolve any professional's First
Amendment claim other than the precise one at issue in Casey. It does sug-
gest, however, that the State sometimes may coerce a person, whose choice
to remain silent would otherwise be protected from state interference by the
First Amendment, to speak when the communication takes place in the
context of a professional relationship with a client. Casey thus would ap-
pear to point to the conclusion that, in some respects, a professional's rights
under the First Amendment are diminished as compared to those of, for ex-
ample, the street-comer speaker engaged in a similar conversation.
Even this minimal conclusion, however, seems to run squarely counter
to the tenor of a prior discussion by the Court in which it famously avoided
6the question of professional speech. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld a
Title X rule preventing federally-funded family planning clinics from ad-
vising recipients of services relating to "abortion as a method of family
planning."7 In upholding the administrative interpretation of the statute, the
Court principally reasoned that the government had merely refused to fund,
as part of a federal program promoting a specific government policy, an ac-
tivity of which the government disapproved. The Court nevertheless em-
phasized that it was not suggesting "that funding by the Government, even
when coupled with the freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the
scope of the Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify
Government control over the content of expression." 8 After referring to the
traditional public forum and the government-funded university as arenas of
free expression that the government may not regulate by attaching condi-
tions to grants of property or money, the Court noted that the same might be
true of subsidizing the practice of medicine: "It could be argued by analogy
that traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should
enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation,
even when subsidized by the Government." 9 In other words, the existence
of a "traditional relationship" between the interlocutors might engender spe-
cial protection from selective government funding. The Court found no
ual's countervailing First Amendment right to avoid becoming the conduit for such a mes-
sagel'See id.
5 See Whalen, 429 U.S. 603.
6 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
7 Id. at 180.
8 Id. at 199.
9 Id. at 200.
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need to decide that question in Rust, however, because the restrictions in
question did not "significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient relation-
ship."'10 The Court found that a physician was not required to "represent as
his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold."' Moreover, the Court
held, "the doctor-patient relationship established by the ... program [is not]
sufficiently all-encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of
the patient of comprehensive medical advice."' 12 In short, according to the
Court, the physician in Rust was not acting as a comprehensive professional,
but rather as a limited service provider in a program defined by the govern-
ment.
The Rust majority's recognition, at least in principle, of the protected
status of physician-patient communications, comports with the Court's
judgment elsewhere in the legal and medical contexts that professionals play
a special role in assisting individuals in the exercise of personal autonomy
and the vindication of basic rights. 3 This conclusion, however, counsels
against the simple deduction from the lead opinion in Casey that profes-
sional speech is generally entitled to only "minimal" or "reduced" protec-
tion under the First Amendment. Reading Rust and Casey together, then,
suggests that professional speech is subject to a more complicated balance
of First Amendment protection.
In examining government limitations on professional speech, some
lower courts have occasionally looked to the tests developed by the Su-
preme Court for analyzing commercial speech restrictions. These courts
have, however, done so without delving into why such tests should be appli-
cable in the professional context. A serious consideration of both Casey and
Rust seems to render the comparison curious at first, because the Supreme
Court has historically presented communications between buyer and seller
as occupying a clearly "subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-
ment values,"'14 not a position deserving of any special protection. Conven-




13 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2288-89 (1997) (Souter, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (noting that "the Court [has] recognized that the good physician is
not just a mechanic of the human body whose services have no bearing on a person's moral
choices, but one who does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient," and
that "[this idea of the physician as serving the whole person is a source of the high value tra-
ditionally placed on the medical relationship"); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978)
("Collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment."' (quoting United Transp. Union v.
Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576,585 (1971))).
14 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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mercial speech only to enable listeners to receive valuable "information"
about the market.15 The caselaw presents the constitutional protection of
commercial speech as not born out of true regard for the communicative in-
teraction between a buyer and seller, but as almost a by-product of the real
concern about the important information that just happens to be conveyed in
the course of loud selling tactics. Commercial speech is thus generally pre-
sented as subject only to "limited protection" commensurate with its subor-
dinate informational function.16 On the theory that professional speech is
similarly "less protected" than nonprofessional (and noncommercial)
speech, the analogy to conventional commercial speech doctrine would
surely be plain. The analogy to the conventional conception of commercial
speech becomes strained, however, as soon as professional speech is viewed
as especially valuable and, at times, subject to some form of special protec-
tion.
17
Before dismissing the analogy between commercial and professional
speech, however, one might examine whether the Court's dominant presen-
tation of commercial speech as "subordinate" on the scale of First Amend-
ment values and useful only for the conveyance of "information" to poten-
tial customers might obscure a deeper kinship between the two forms of
communication. Indeed, there has recently been some movement in the po-
sition traditionally occupied by commercial speech in the First Amendment
hierarchy. In several cases the Court may be read as having challenged the
assumption that commercial speech is simply of lesser value than noncom-
mercial speech,18 or that commercial speech can readily be suppressed in the
furtherance of pressing social goals. 19 In 44 Liquormart, for example, in
which the Supreme Court unanimously struck down a restriction on com-
15 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1979) (upholding a state law prohib-
iting optometrists' use of trade names, noting that a trade name "has no intrinsic meaning"
and "conveys no information about the price and nature of the services.., until it acquires
meaning over a period of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the
name and some standard of price or quality" and that any such information about the price and
quality could be communicated directly); see also infra Part II (discussing the Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine in greater detail).
16 See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
17 Cf Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989) (dis-
tinguishing tutoring, legal advice, and medical consultation provided for a fee from commer-
cial speech because the former "do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transac-
tion" and noting that "[s]ome of our most valued forms of fully protected speech are uttered
for a rofit").
See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993)
(striking down a city ordinance that banned commercial, but not noncommercial, newsracks to
promote the safety and aesthetics of public streets).
19 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 515 (1996) (striking down a
ban on price advertising for alcoholic beverages).
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mercial speech, four Justices noted their skepticism of the Supreme Court's
governing framework for commercial speech,20 and a fifth concurred in the
judgment noting that he refused to consider abandoning that framework
only because the parties had not briefed the issue.21 Thus, change in the
commercial speech doctrine is on its way, we just do not yet know what
path it will take.
22
This Article considers the common thread between the Court's ap-
proaches to commercial and professional speech in the hope of developing a
viable theory for the constitutional analysis of each. Drawing on tensions in
the Court's jurisprudence on commercial speech, it will criticize the domi-
nant view of the "subordinate" status of commercial speech as both theo-
retically inadequate and obscuring a deeper connection between commercial
and professional speech. In attempting to make sense of the current up-
heaval in the Court's commercial speech cases as well as the occasionally
assumed analogy between commercial and professional speech, this Article
will elaborate a constitutional approach to both commercial and professional
speech based on the social relationship between the interlocutors.
In cases such as professional speech, this Article argues, the Court re-
frains from applying basic rules that usually govern restrictions on street-
comer speech, such as the rule against content regulation. Instead, the
Court may be understood as attempting to ascertain whether the conversa-
tion between the interlocutors takes place within defined social relationships
and as seeking to afford such speech the constitutional protection necessary
to preserve its particular social function. The core notion of professional
speech will be developed primarily in the context of the learned professions,
such as medicine and law, where professionals have an exceptionally deep
relationship with their clients (including, for example, fiduciary-type obli-
gations). This Article further suggests that other professionals (including
vendors), who stand in a less richly defined communicative relationship
with their interlocutors, may find themselves in a similar situation in which
their speech is subject to both heightened protection and regulation. This
Article puts to one side, inter alia, the questions whether (or under what cir-
20 See id. at 502 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.) ("The special dangers
that attend complete bans on truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech cannot be explained
away by appeals to the 'commonsense distinctions' that exist between commercial and non-
comercial speech."); id. at 528 (Thomas, J., concurring) (refusing to "continu[e] to apply a test
that makes no sense").
21 See id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihe briefs and arguments of the
parties in the present case provide no illumination" of the scope of First Amendment protec-
tions for commercial speech).
22 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of44 Liquormart, 1996 SuP. CT. REv. 123.
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cumstances) the reliance on existing social practices in constitutional adju-
dication is normatively justified and, if such reliance is justified, whether (or
the extent to which) a social practice must be coherent and regular to be
taken into account in the adjudication of constitutional rights.
The principal object of this Article is to reveal and flesh out the manner
in which current constitutional adjudication of First Amendment rights
draws on what is presumed to be the social practice of vendors and of
learned professionals. In other words, because the Court is opposed to ap-
plying an abstracted paradigm of the detached street-coiner speaker (about
whom both listeners and courts know very little), the Court may be seen as
implementing a constitutional theory of bounded speech institutions, based
on its perception of various socially defined relationships between inter-
locutors and, accordingly, rendering contextual judgments about the extent
of government intervention that is both necessary for and compatible with
the preservation of the particular institution. This approach, this Article
notes, is neither unique to the learned professions nor to First Amendment
law but often informs other constitutional judgments that protect individuals
in their relations within recognized social institutions.
To explore these ideas, this Article begins in Part I with a critical re-
view of the development of the Court's governing commercial speech
framework, arguing that the Court's traditional commercial speech doctrine
is in dire need of reform. Parts II and III then turn to the literature on the
Court's doctrine, identifying several major themes in the commentary, dis-
cussing several contributions within each category, and concluding that the
scholarship neither provides a theoretical justification for the Court's domi-
nant approach to commercial speech nor justifies a blanket denial of First
Amendment protection to commercial or professional speech. Part IV sug-
gests a different reading of the Court's decisions in the areas of commercial
and professional speech. This Part explores the existence of a paradigm of
bounded speech institutions, which provide fora for the valuable exchange
of ideas within predefined communicative projects that are fostered by gov-
ernment regulation and subject, at times, to special protection. This Part
will also very briefly discuss the implications of such an approach for two
recent controversies: the regulation of tobacco and liquor advertising and
physicians' recommendations that their patients use illegal drugs, such as
marijuana, to alleviate the symptoms of physical ailments. In closing, this
Article suggests the existence of parallel contextual approaches protecting
individuals in their relationships based on recognized social roles in other
areas of First Amendment law and beyond.
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I. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE IN THE SUPREME COURT
Instead of treating commercial speech as presumptively protected by
the First Amendment, the Court tends to proceed on the theory that any
protection of such speech must be justified. As a basis for First Amendment
protection, the Court has settled on the idea that commercial communica-
tions are valuable to the listener:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow
of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent po-
litical dialogue. Moreover, significant societal interests are served by such
speech. Advertising, though entirely commercial, may often carry information
of import to significant issues of the day. And commercial speech serves to in-
form the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services,
and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system. In short, such speech serves individual and societal interests
in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.
23
Although the speaker is not entirely disqualified from claiming First
Amendment protection under this approach, the justification for the protec-
tion is based not on the expressive liberty of the speaker, but on the impor-
tance of the information to the audience.
24
The focus on an affirmative argument for the protection of commercial
speech was largely the product of historical circumstances surrounding the
doctrine's birth. In 1942, the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen2 5 deter-
mined that the First Amendment categorically did not apply to restrictions
on "purely commercial advertising." The wisdom of suppressing such ad-
vertising was said to be a "matter[] for legislative judgment."26 Even Mr.
Chrestensen's ingenious act of affixing a protest against the legal prohibi-
tion on commercial handbills to the back of his advertising circular could
not bring the First Amendment into play. "If that evasion were successful,
23 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citations omitted).
24 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985) ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech provides, ap-
pellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular information in his
advertising is minimal." (citation omitted)); cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial
speech is based on the informational function of advertising."). This listener-based focus has
recently come under attack. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,
479 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[S]o long as self-interest in providing a supply is as le-
gitimate as the self-interest underlying an informed demand, the law could hardly treat the
advertiser's economic stake as 'utterly without redeeming social importance' and isolate the
consumer's interest as the exclusive touchstone of commercial speech protection.").
316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
26 Id.
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every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets
need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity
from the [prohibition on commercial handbills]. 27 It was this sweeping
ruling that the Court's new commercial speech doctrine would have to set
aside.
The first decisions limiting Chrestensen did so by focusing on whether
the communication involved was indeed "purely" commercial. New York
Times v. Sullivan was simple in this regard. The Court noted that the
NAACP's paid advertisement complaining of civil rights abuses by the
Montgomery, Alabama, police department and seeking financial contribu-
tions to the organization "was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense
in which the word was used in Chrestensen," because the appeal "commu-
nicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested
claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement
whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern." 29 The fact that the advertisement was paid for and sought a finan-
cial contribution did not place it within the Chrestensen category of
speech.30 Although this step away from commercial speech precedent may
have seemed insignificant, by distinguishing Chrestensen based on the pub-
lic interest of the communication at issue, New York Times laid the founda-
tion for the erosion of Chrestensen itself. If a "purely" commercial com-
munication could be said to be of "public interest and concern," 31 New York
Times offered a basis for according First Amendment protection to that
communication as well. In other words, commercial speech would be pro-
tected as long as there was sufficient interest in its content.
The first significant break with Chrestensen along these lines came in
Bigelow v. Virginia,32 which involved an advertisement that clearly pro-
posed a commercial transaction. At issue was a notice in a Virginia news-
paper about the availability of legal abortion services in New York and a
Virginia law prohibiting the advertising because it "encourag[ed] ... the
procuring of [an] abortion." 33 The Court concluded that the announcement
"did more than simply propose a commercial transaction" because it "con-
tained factual material of clear 'public interest,' 34 and, taken as a whole,
27 Id. at 55.
28 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29 Id. at 266.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
33 Id. at 812-13.
34 Id. at 822.
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conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience-
not only readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with
a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of
another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.35
Without addressing whether every conjunction of political and com-
mercial speech would be protected, the Court held that the valuable opinion
and information accompanying this proposal in Bigelow were entitled to
First Amendment protection. The Court further held that because Virginia
had no legitimate interest in shielding its citizens from information about
legal activities beyond its borders and regulatory reach, the State's ban on
the advertising was unconstitutional.36 Thus, for the first time, the Court
held that a legislative prohibition on commercial speech violated the First
Amendment. Much as in New York Times, however, it had done so primar-
ily on the basis of the opinion and information surrounding the proposal,
without deciding whether the same result would obtain if the only item of
interest was the commercial proposal itself.
When the Court finally was confronted with a regulation of a bare-
bones offer to sell certain pharmaceuticals at a specified price in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,37 the
previously adopted distinction between important ancillary information and
important commercial information revealed itself as being extremely weak.
The two-page Chrestensen decision already had been denounced as "casual,
almost offhand,, 38 and the final departure from Chrestensen seemed easily
explained by noting the value to the audience of even this minimal offer to
sell. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun pointed out that, as a general
matter, "the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial informa-
tion ... may be as keen [as], if not keener by far[] than[,] his interest in the
day's most urgent political debate," and noted more specifically that "no
line between publicly 'interesting' or 'important' commercial advertising
and the opposite kind could ever be drawn," because all advertising informs
consumers of "who is producing and selling what product, for what reason,
and at what price." 39 In a democracy and a free-market economy, he con-
cluded, even this minimal amount of information was definitely of public
interest. Chrestensen was, therefore, finally overruled.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 827-28.
37 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976) (holding that a statutory ban on advertising prescription
drug prices could not be justified by a state's interest in upholding "the professionalism of its
licensed pharmacists").
38 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
39 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763, 765.
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Once the Court phrased the value of commercial speech in such con-
crete functional terms, however, it became an almost imperceptible step to
add that the First Amendment would not prevent the government "from in-
suring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as
freely. '40 Thus, the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy assumed, without
finding it necessary to point out, that the consumer would have no interest in
false or misleading proposals to enter into commercial transactions. 41 Hav-
ing focused on the affirmative justification for protecting commercial
speech (which the Court felt required to supply in light of Chrestensen), the
Court ultimately evaded making the affirmative case for regulation. Be-
cause commercial speech was not protected as a prima facie matter, but only
insofar as it conveyed certain valuable information to the consumer, the
Court did not find the need to elaborate on why false or misleading com-
mercial information could be suppressed when false or misleading political
speech could not. Only valuable commercial information was protected and
false or misleading commercial speech simply did not fall within that cate-
gory. Thus, Justice Stevens could summarize succinctly more than twenty
years later:
Virginia Pharmacy Bd. reflected the conclusion that the same interest that sup-
ports regulation of potentially misleading advertising, namely the public's in-
terest in receiving accurate commercial information, also supports an interpre-
tation of the First Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the
dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.
42
According to the governing view, the justifications for protecting and
restricting commercial speech are thus ultimately the same. Because the af-
firmative argument for the protection of commercial speech provides, sub
silentio, a natural justification for regulation, the Court has declined to
elaborate a specific rationale for restricting commercial speech. In Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, it simply noted that "[u]ntruthful speech.., has never
been protected for its own sake," and that "commonsense differences" be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech, that is, that the former is
"more easily verifiable by its disseminator" and "more durable" on account
of the disseminator's economic motivation, account for the diminished
"need to tolerate inaccurate [commercial] statements for fear of silencing
the speaker.
'A3
40 Id. at 771-72.
41 Justice Blackmun did point this out in a later case. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,496 (1996).
43 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24.
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The failure to focus more carefully on the reasons- for regulating com-
mercial speech has stunted the development of the standards that are applied
to analyze such restrictions. In several opinions for the Court after Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, Justice Powell simply appealed to the general notion
that the government may regulate commercial speech because such speech
is incidental to otherwise regulable commercial activity.44 Drawing on
cases involving Securities Exchange Commission rules, the Sherman Act,
and the National Labor Relations Act, he concluded that "the State does not
lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public
whenever speech is a component of that activity."' 5 Without further inquiry
into the nature of, or justification for, the regulation of speech in those con-
texts, he developed the governing framework for the analysis of commercial
speech restrictions by striking a quantitative compromise. Balancing the
government's interests in regulating the underlying activity against the
speech interests that would be recognized if the speech were noncommer-
cial, Justice Powell devised a uniform mode of analysis under which com-
mercial speech is "afforded... a limited measure of protection, commensu-
rate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.
' 6
As most clearly articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission, the now familiar test provides first, that commercial
speech that is false, misleading, or proposes an illegal transaction does not
even pass the threshold of First Amendment protection and may be
banned,47 and second, that the government may impose restrictions on
commercial speech even if the speech is neither misleading nor relates to an
unlawful activity, as long as the restriction is reasonably tailored to, and di-
rectly advances, a "substantial" government interest.48 The test, then, is a
purely quantitative modification of the noncommercial speech test, in that it
simply provides commercial speech "less" protection than its noncommer-
cial counterpart without substantively describing the nature of permissible
regulation of commercial speech.
The Court has frequently applied the test developed in Central Hudson,
including in cases in which the government, going beyond mere prohibition
of false and misleading advertising, had created prophylactic rules to protect
44 See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (stating that "commercial
speech is linked inextricably to commercial activity"); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (noting the "distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech").
45 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
46 Id.
47 See 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980).
48 See id. at 564.
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against the risk that certain kinds of advertising might mislead consumers.
Accordingly, the Court has upheld, for example, a prohibition on in-person
solicitation by lawyers,49 a requirement that lawyers advertising certain fee
schedules disclose potential court fees, 50 and a prohibition on the use of
trade names by optometrists.
51
The Central Hudson standard, however, does not limit the justifications
for restrictions on commercial speech to the prevention of deception. In
Central Hudson itself, for example, the Court struck down New York's ban
on state utilities' promotional advertising for electricity, not because the
policy failed in directly advancing the State's substantial interest in reducing
the demand for electricity,52 but because the complete ban on advertising
was an excessively broad measure to accomplish that goal.5 3 The implica-
tion of the holding was that a narrower regulation suppressing such adver-
tising might have been sustained despite the fact that there was no claim that
the advertising was untruthful or deceptive. Indeed, soon thereafter, in Po-
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the Court
upheld the prohibition of truthful, nondeceptive speech about lawful activity
in order to suppress demand. 54 There, then-Justice Rehnquist, who had dis-
sented in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, wrote for the Court that Puerto Rico
could ban advertising for casino gambling directed at the residents of Puerto
Rico in order to reduce the demand for such gambling by that potential
audience. 55 The Court deemed the legislature's interest in preventing exces-
sive casino gambling by local residents substantial, and found that the re-
striction directly advanced that interest because, as the Court had already
49 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467-68 (holding that lawyers may be disciplined by the state
bar for certain types of in-person client solicitations). Ohralik, written by Justice Powell, was
decided before Central Hudson, but essentially applied the Central Hudson test. See, e.g.,
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (discussing Ohralik throughout as consistent
with Central Hudson).
50 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626,
650-53 (1985) (upholding an Ohio law requiring that potential court costs be disclosed in ad-
vertising for contingent fee cases).
51 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) ("It is clear that the State's interest
in protecting the public from the deceptive and misleading use of trade names is substantial
and well demonstrated."). Friedman, like Ohralik, was written by Justice Powell before Cen-
tral Hudson was decided, but applied essentially the same framework.
52 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568-69 (discussing the validity of the Commission's
argument that an increase in demand for electricity would undermine energy conservation, a
state interest that the court viewed as "substantial").
53 See id. at 569-70 (stating that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional
advertising for electricity would still serve the State's legitimate interest in energy conserva-
tion).
See 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986).
55 See id. at 344.
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held in Central Hudson, there was an '"immediate connection between ad-
vertising and demand.', 5 6 The Court further rejected the notion that a nar-
rower governmental measure to discourage gambling was constitutionally
required, noting that "it is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such
a 'counterspeech' policy would be as effective in reducing the demand for
casino gambling as a restriction on advertising. '5  Although certain aspects
of the holding appear to have since been repudiated by a majority of the
Justices, 58 the Court has since upheld other commercial speech restrictions
imposed for reasons unrelated to the protection of potential consumers from
false or deceptive advertising.
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting, for example, the Court upheld a
federal prohibition on advertising for lotteries by broadcast stations that are
licensed in states where lotteries are illegal.59 Because North Carolina was
a nonlottery state, the Court upheld a regulation that prohibited the North
Carolina broadcaster located close to the state border from advertising Vir-
ginia's state lottery to a mostly Virginian audience. Despite the fact that the
Virginia lottery was, of course, legal in Virginia, and Edge was not adver-
tising the purchase of lottery tickets in North Carolina, the Court upheld the
prohibition. The asserted federal policy was not to protect consumers but to
accommodate competing states' interests in legalizing or proscribing lotter-
ies. This reasoning flatly contradicted the Court's earlier holding in Bige-
low v. Virginia.60 As Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) pointed
out in dissent, after Bigelow one would not have thought it one state's le-
gitimate interest to suppress information about a practice that was legal in
another.61 Central Hudson, however, somehow allowed this interest to be
bootstrapped into legitimacy by invoking the federal government's role as
56 Id. at 342 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569).
57 Id. at 344.
59 After holding that the prohibition survived Central Hudson review, the Court in Po-
sadas noted that, in any event, because Puerto Rico had the power to ban gambling altogether,
it could take the "lesser" step of banning advertising for that activity. See Posadas, 478 U.S.
at 345-46. This greater-includes-the-lesser argument, discussed further in Part III.A infra,
appears to have been subsequently rejected by the Court. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 510 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ.)
(rejecting the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument); id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., & Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (stating that, since Posadas, the Court
has "examined more searchingly" the State's goal in restricting commercial speech); cf Rubin
v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482-83 & n.2 (1995) (rejecting the State's reliance on
Posadas's "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument on the basis that "the Court [in Posadas]
reached this argument only after it had already found that the state regulation survived the
Central Hudson test").
59 See 509 U.S. 418,436 (1993).
60 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
61 See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 437-38.
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mediator between lottery and nonlottery states. In the end, the suppression
of speech was upheld for reasons unrelated to the protection of the con-
sumer.
62
In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,63 the Court similarly did not resort
to a consumer protection rationale in upholding the Florida Bar's rule that
its members must refrain from soliciting accident victims within thirty days
of the accident. Based on evidence that such solicitation was perceived by
some members of the public as an intrusion on their privacy and evidence
that the solicitation led, more generally, to diminished respect for the pro-
fession, the Court held that the rule directly and materially advanced the
Bar's substantial interest in protecting the "flagging reputations of Florida
lawyers."'
64
Not everything survives the Central Hudson test, however. In several
cases since the development of that test, the Court held that some prohibi-
tions were not reasonably tailored or did not directly advance the asserted
governmental interest in preventing fraud and deception. 65 In other cases,
the Court struck down restrictions that were based on a state interest other
than the prevention of fraud or deception because they did not sufficiently
advance a state's asserted goals. In Edenfield v. Fane,66 for example, the
Court held that Florida's interests in protecting the privacy of potential cli-
62 Quite extraordinarily, the Court in Edge also noted in passing that "Congress might
have continued to ban all radio or television lottery advertisements, even by stations in States
that have legalized lotteries." Id. at 428. Any speculation based on this passage as having
established a so-called vice activity exception to commercial speech, however, would appear
to have been put to rest by the Court's subsequent decisions in Coors and 44 Liquormart. See
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 512 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ.)
(rejecting the State's reliance on a "'vice' exception"); Coors, 514 U.S. at 482 n.2 (rejecting
reliance on Edge and Posadas as establishing a vice exception to commercial speech).
63 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
64 Id. at 624.
65 See, e.g., Coors, 514 U.S. at 479-80 (concluding that prohibiting the display of alcohol
content on beer labels did not further the government's substantial interest in preventing
"strength wars" in light of the absence of a similar prohibition in advertising and the existence
of alternative, less-restrictive means of achieving the same result); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of
Bus. & Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1994) (noting that the State did not proffer any evi-
dence that the use of Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner designations
created a risk of deception); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court,
471 U.S. 626, 650-53 (1985) (stating that a broad prophylactic rule against the use of legal
advice and information as well as illustrations in attorney advertising did not advance the
government's stated interest in preventing false and misleading advertising or confusion on
the part of potential clients); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (1983)
(recognizing the State's interest in aiding parental efforts to guide children on birth control but
striking down a ban on contraceptive direct-mail advertising as too broad a measure to ad-
vance that goal).
66 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
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ents of certified public accountants ("CPAs") and in maintaining the inde-
pendence of CPAs, as well as its interest in preventing fraud and over-
reaching, were substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson inquiry, but
the Court struck down the ban on in-person CPA solicitation because Flor-
ida had offered no evidence that the prohibition would directly and materi-
ally advance those goals.
67
Central Hudson's standard has increasingly come under attack. In
Central Hudson itself, Justices Brennan and Blackmun concurred separately
to mark their disagreement with the implication that the suppression of
truthful, nondeceptive speech about a lawful activity was "ever a permissi-
ble way for the State to 'dampen' demand for or use of the product," 68 not-
ing that "[n]o differences between commercial speech and other protected
speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public
conduct through manipulation of the availability of information." 69 Allow-
able restraints, the concurrence noted, are "limited to measures designed to
protect consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales tech-
niques." 70 Justice Blackmun has reiterated that view in numerous concur-
rences and dissents, arguing each time that under the doctrine he helped
launch in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, restrictions on commercial speech
that serve other interests should be subject to conventional First Amendment
71scrutiny.
Although the Court has refrained from adopting Justice Blackmun's
suggested approach, there have been some rumblings of change. The initial
blow against Justice Powell's purely quantitative approach was struck in
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., in which the Court considered
a city ordinance banning the placement on public sidewalks of newsracks
that distribute free magazines consisting mainly of commercial advertising
while allowing newsracks that distribute newspapers. 72 In invalidating thelaw, the Court did not consider whether the ordinance, which was not in-
67 See id. at 767 ("Though we conclude that the Board's asserted interests are substantial,
the Board has failed to demonstrate that its solicitation ban advances those interests.").
68 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
69 Id. at 578 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Blackmun's concurrence).
70 Id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
71 See, e.g., Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 777-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I again disengage
myself from [any claim]... that commercial speech that is free from fraud or duress or the
advocacy of unlawful activity is entitled to only an 'intermediate standard' . . . of protection
under the First Amendment's proscription of any law abridging the freedom of speech."); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) (expressing the same view).
72 See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 415.
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tended to protect consumers from harm due to the content of the handbills,
should accordingly be subject to noncommercial speech standards.73 The
Court presented its decision instead as an application of Central Hudson,
holding that the regulation's distinction between newspapers and commer-
cial handbills was entirely unrelated to the city's asserted interest in aes-
thetics and therefore lacked the reasonable fit required by that test. It did
not suffice for the city to assert that it sought to protect its aesthetic interest
to the maximum extent possible without sacrificing truly important, political
speech. The relatively "low value" of commercial speech, in other words,
could not justify the distinction between permissible and impermissible
newsracks, and the city would have to point to the peculiar attributes of
commercial speech that relate to the city's regulatory interest. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, however, this holding was in clear ten-
sion with a strict interpretation of Central Hudson that commercial speech
was of lower value than noncommercial speech.74 Had the Court truly be-
lieved that commercial speech was of lesser moment, it would be far from
clear that the city could not have preferred noncommercial over commercial
speech in allocating a scarce resource. Thus, although Discovery Network
still professed to play by Central Hudson's rules, it was the first signal of a
possible reconsideration of that doctrine.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, in which the Court struck down
Rhode Island's ban on liquor price advertising, continued the trend. In that
case, four members of the current Court noted their skepticism about ap-
plying the relaxed Central Hudson scrutiny automatically whenever com-
mercial speech is involved.75  Although Justice O'Connor, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Souter and Breyer, voted to invalidate the law
based only on a strict application of Central Hudson,76 Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg, was willing to go fur-
ther and wrote:
The mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does not in and
of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to decisions to
suppress them.
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure
of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent
73 See id. at 416 n.1 I (stating that because the challenged regulation does not survive the
more lenient commercial speech standard, the Court does not need to decide whether the pol-
icy should be "subjected to more exacting review").
74 See id. at 440 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
75 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
76 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
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with the reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech
and therefore justifies less than strict review. However, when a State entirely
prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages
for reasons unrelated to the preservation of the fair bargaining process, there is
far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment
generally demands.
7 -
Thus, although even the Stevens four are still operating under the uni-
form theory of protection and regulation identified earlier, these four Jus-
tices have taken a decisive step away from Justice Powell's quantitative
view of the commercial speech doctrine and towards a qualitative approach
that focuses on the nature of the justification and its relation to the commer-
cial aspect of the speech.7 8 Recently, the Court granted certiorari in a case
in which the lower court upheld a renewed First Amendment challenge to
the same statute that was upheld in Edge.
79
The qualitative approach that appears to be emerging echoes that of two
pre-Central Hudson decisions issued during the term immediately following
Virginia Board of Pharmacy. In the first, Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Willingboro,80 the Court invalidated a township ordinance prohibit-
77 Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted); see also id. at 516 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was the first mem-
ber of the current Court to express his basic agreement with the Brennan/Blackmun position.
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Stevens wrote:
In my judgment... [a] prohibition isjust as unacceptable in a commercial context
as in any other [when] ... it is not supported by the rationales for treating commer-
cial speech differently under the First Amendment: that is, the importance of
avoiding deception and protecting the consumer from inaccurate or incomplete in-
formation in a realm in which the accuracy of speech is generally ascertainable by
the speaker.
Id.; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 83 (1983) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). In this case Justice Stevens wrote:
Any legitimate interests the statute may serve are unrelated to the prevention of
harm to participants in commercial exchanges. Thus, ... I have scrutinized this stat-
ute as in the same manner as I would scrutinize a prohibition on unsolicited mailings
by an organization with absolutely no commercial interest in the subject.
Id.
78 Justice Scalia joined the judgment of the Court while refusing to commit to either
Central Hudson or a more searching review of the legislation. He expressed sympathy with
Justice Thomas's rejection of Central Hudson but withheld judgment on the issue because the
question of abandoning Central Hudson had not been briefed. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at
516 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment).
See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 69 F.3d 1296, 1302 (5th Cir.
1995) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge), vacated and remanded, 519 U.S. 801 (1996),
on remand, 149 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999); cf Valley
Broad. Co. v. United States, 107 F.3d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (striking down the statute
upheld in Edge), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1050 (1997).
431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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ing "For Sale" and "Sold" signs from residential property in an effort to
prevent the flight of white homeowners from the area. After explaining that
the ordinance failed to pass review under Virginia Board of Pharmacy be-
cause there was no evidence of the need for the regulation, Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, pointed out that the "constitutional defect in this ordi-
nance.., is far more basic."81 The township council had passed the ordi-
nance to prevent truthful, nondeceptive information about lawful activities
from reaching local residents because the council believed that residents
would act on such information against the public interest:
The Council's concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of "For
Sale" signs-with offerors communicating offers to offerees-but with the
substance of the information communicated to Willingboro citizens. If dis-
semination of this information can be restricted, then every locality in the
country can suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality, so long as a
plausible claim .can be made that disclosure would cause the recipients of the
information to act "irrationally.
82
The teachings of both Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Justice Bran-
deis's concurrence in Whitney v. California8 3 counseled squarely against
allowing such restrictions. Because nothing about the signs and the coun-
cil's reasoning appeared to limit the justification for such a ban on commer-
cial speech, the ban violated the First Amendment.
In the second case, Carey v. Population Services International,8 4 the
Court was even more explicit in rejecting the application of relaxed com-
mercial speech standards to restrictions that are not based on the com-
mercial aspect of the speech. In that case, the Court examined restric-
tions on the advertising, sale, and distribution of contraceptives to minors,
and struck down a complete advertising ban on the grounds that it violat-
ed the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan rejected
the State's argument that the restriction was justified to protect those
exposed to the ads from embarrassment or offense, or to prevent the
legitimation of sexual activity by young people.85 Justice Brennan review-
ed the restrictions and the State's justifications under traditional First
Amendment standards, citing Cohen v. California86 and Brandenburg v.
8 1 I d. at 96.
82 Id.
83 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
84 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
85 See id. at 701.
86 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (holding that the State may not criminalize public protest
containing expletives).
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Ohio,87 instead of commercial speech cases and, in a footnote, expressly re-
jected the significance of the fact that the restriction targeted speech that
might be considered to be commercial:
[The State] suggest[s] no distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech that would render these discredited arguments meritorious when of-
fered to justify prohibitions on commercial speech. On the contrary, such ar-
guments are clearly directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited
advertising but at the ideas conveyed and form of expression-the core of First
Amendment values.
88
Although neither Carey nor Linmark explains the contours of the pecu-
liarly commercial reasons for regulating commercial speech, these pre-
Central Hudson cases evince a more nuanced approach that has since been
lost. The only time the Court applied the teachings of these cases after
Central Hudson was in a case involving virtually the same facts as Carey.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,89 the Court confronted a prohibi-
tion on direct mailing of contraceptive advertising and stood by its refusal in
Carey "to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial
speech that would render this interest [in shielding recipients from offense]
a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech."90 But as
soon as the Court left the four comers of precedent to examine the State's
second asserted interest in furthering parental control over discussions about
birth control, the Court added the commercial speech standard to the mix.
Although the Court examined the scope of the restriction using such non-
commercial precedents as Butler v. Michigan91 and FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation,92 and ultimately held that the regulation was excessive, it did so only
after concluding that the government had satisfied the requirement that its
interest rise to a "substantial" level.93 Justice Stevens disagreed with this
mixed approach and concurred separately to emphasize that in voting to in-
87 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the State may not punish mere advocacy absent
a showing that the advocacy is "likely to incite" imminent lawless action and is "directed to
inciting" such action).
88 Carey, 431 U.S. at701 n.28.
89 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
90 Id. at 71-72; see also id. at 66-71 (citing noncommercial speech cases to reject the
State's argument that the direct mailings at issue in Bolger differed from the general advertis-
ing in Carey).
91 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957) (striking down a prohibition on "publish[ing materials]
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth" (internal quotations omitted)).
92 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (upholding an FCC sanction based on an afternoon radio
broadcast of "indecent" language).
93 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73.
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validate the restrictions, he had followed Carey and reviewed the case only
under standards applicable to ordinary, noncommercial speech.94
To summarize, the history of First Amendment protection for commer-
cial speech as a retreat from Chrestensen has led to a focus on the affirma-
tive justification for the protection of such speech largely based on the lis-
tener's interests. Although a few early decisions examined whether the
restrictions on commercial speech were justified by the government's spe-
cific interest in protecting consumers from commercial harms, the still-
dominant test devised by the Court is simply a quantitatively-reduced pro-
tection afforded to commercial speech, as compared to noncommercial
speech. Several members of the Court have begun to return to a qualitative
view of commercial speech, according to which government intervention
must be justified by peculiarly "commercial" reasons, but neither these Jus-
tices, nor the early cases that took a similar approach, have fleshed out the
contours of that inquiry or the motivation for assuming that commercial
speech can be restricted more than its noncommercial counterpart. Parts II
and III, therefore, turn to the scholarly work that has examined the justifica-
tions for the restriction, as well as protection, of commercial speech. In dis-
cussing the academic contributions to the debate about commercial speech,
these next two Parts will also include an assessment of the applicability of
these theories to professional speech.
II. FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech has been studied in light of first principles about
the social and legal organization of society. The constitutional protection of
commercial speech has been examined, for example, from the point of view
of law and economics,95 the creation of a common culture,96 political self-
government,97 and personal autonomy.
98
As the following discussion of the scholarship attempts to show, radical
approaches to commercial speech, whereby such speech would lose protec-
tion altogether or be treated just as noncommercial speech, ought to be re-
jected either as flawed even from the point of view of these foundational
approaches or as too remote from current First Amendment practice. The
more modest proposals that have been advanced for the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, on the other hand, frequently fail to
94 See id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95 See infra Part II.A.
96 See infra Part II.B.
97 See infra Part II.C.
98 See infra Part II.D.
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capture a truly distinctive feature of commercial speech and end up proving
applicable to both commercial and noncommercial speech alike, without of-
fering a satisfactory explanation for the Court's different treatment of the
two.
Although these theories were conceived of in the context of the com-
mercial speech debate, it is useful to examine whether they shed any light
on the constitutional protection of professional speech. This Part concludes,
however, that insofar as these contributions might be applied to professional
speech, they would neither justify denying First Amendment protection to
such speech altogether, nor serve as a basis for according it the same treat-
ment as nonprofessional speech, nor provide an explanation for a kind of
mixed approach like the one the Court appears to have pursued so far.
A. Economics
The original motivation for relating the economics of advertising to the
constitutional doctrine of commercial speech had more to do with the treat-
ment of goods than it did with the restriction of ideas. Aaron Director and
Ronald Coase, who first bridged the gap between law and economics in this
area, were principally concerned with criticizing the fact that "[t]he claim
which is made [by mainstream liberal thinkers since John Milton and John
Stuart Mill] for complete laissez faire in the area of discussion is not part of
the main tradition of liberalism in the area of economic life."99 There is lit-
tle basis, they argued, for the assumption that consumers are less knowl-
edgeable about the goods they buy than the ideas they consume, that those
who disseminate ideas are more honest than those who sell goods, or that
the government is less susceptible to interest-group capture when regulating
the market for goods than when regulating the market for ideas."' The pri-
macy of a free exchange of ideas, they claimed, is a historical accident; per-
haps due to the relative complexity of the theory of a free market for goods,
the latter emerged only after the desirability of a free exchange in ideas had
been recognized.10 1 Coase and Director attribute the persistence of the dis-
parity in treatment of goods and ideas to the selfish elitism of "intellectu-
als," who systematically exaggerate the importance of their calling and un-
dervalue trade in goods or services and ignore that, for "the bulk of
mankind[,] ... freedom of choice as owners of resources in choosing within
99 Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1964);
see also R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1977) [hereinafter
Coase, Advertising]; R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.), at 384 (1974) [hereinafter Coase, Market for Goods].
100 See Coase, Advertising, supra note 99, at 2.
101 See Director, supra note 99, at 3.
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available and continually changing opportunities, areas of employment, in-
vestment, and consumption is fully as important as freedom of discussion
and participation in government."' 02 Director and Coase would regulate the
market for goods and the market for ideas by reference to the same princi-
ple, that is, "whether the necessary organization is of a type which can be
arranged on a competitive basis."'
103
Director and Coase did not originally ground this economic argument in
constitutional law and, thus, did not address the First Amendment's specific
textual protection of speech. In his subsequent article, Advertising and Free
Speech, however, Coase sought to make this economic analysis constitu-
tionally relevant by focusing on the Court's treatment of commercial
speech.04 Writing before the Court's decision in Virginia Board of Phar-
macy, Coase found the Court's denial of protection to commercial speech a
convenient vehicle for applying these economic principles. 10 5 Commercial
speech seemed to fall within the literal terms of the First Amendment, and
yet it was accorded less protection than noncommercial speech. Moreover,
the Court's distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech was
essentially derivative of its view that the market for goods needed less pro-
tection from government interference than the exchange of ideas. It simply
held that speech close to the former fell within the government's ability to
regulate the market for goods, while speech close to the latter was privi-
leged. Not only did the line between commercial and noncommercial
speech mirror that drawn between the market for goods and the market for
ideas, but the Constitution, taken literally, appeared to apply on both sides.
Coase begins his defense of commercial speech by noting that individ-
ual autonomy and the reliance on competition in the market for discovery of
the truth, which he sees as the basic values underlying the First Amendment,
would counsel against government regulation in the field of economic ac-
tivity, just as they do in the realm of free speech. Further, he claims that
even the values of self-fulfillment, truth-discovery, public participation in
decision making, and maintenance of a balance between stability and
change would seem to apply with the same force to the market for goods as
102 Id. at 6; see also Coase, Advertising, supra note 99, at 3 (quoting the same).
103 Director, supra note 99, at 2; see Coase, Market for Goods, supra note 99, at 389.
Coase would ultimately apply in both cases the principle that rights should be assigned to
those to whom they are most valuable, which is developed in his seminal article, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See Coase, Advertising, supra note 99, at 32 (argu-
ing that this principle should be used to assign "what are termed personal rights or civil liber-
ties, the kind of activity covered by the First Amendment").
104 See Coase, Advertising, supra note 99.
105 See id. at 15-23.
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they do to the exchange of ideas. 10 6 Thus, advertising, which "tends to
make the [economic] system more competitive"'1 7 and "takes the form of
speech or writing,"'08 should be afforded the same protection as noncom-
mercial speech under the First Amendment. The regulation of "false and
misleading" advertising is, says Coase, antithetical to the First Amendment,
just as an official decision that a political statement is false or has no rea-
sonable basis in fact would be considered inconsistent with free speech val-
ues.
This basic economic approach to commercial speech would have broad-
reaching effects on current First Amendment practice. Government inter-
vention based on market failure would appear to lead to more frequent in-
terventions in the market for ideas than in the market for goods, because, as
Coase himself points out, the property regime that would be required for
speakers to reap the benefits and bear the costs of their speech would be
highly intricate and likely to engender substantial market failure. The rela-
tively greater incidence of consumer ignorance and fraud in the market for
social and political ideas than in that for goods would also lead to more in-
tervention in the former than in the latter.1 9 Thus, commercial speech, in-
sofar as it is associated with the market for goods, would generally receive
greater protection than noncommercial speech. Indeed, Coase nearly says
as much when, for example, he criticizes the courts' allegedly paradoxical
position of prohibiting questionable scientific claims made by manufactur-
ers (whose bias, says Coase, should be well known to the audience) but al-
lowing the same claims when made by an unorthodox scientist (who, ac-
cording to Coase, is far more likely to fool the audience). 1° Similarly, on a
purely economic approach to commercial speech, one would expect distinc-
tions between false advertising for goods involving repeat customers (such
as groceries) and infrequent purchases (such as real estate and car sales).
Because the projected value of the deception to the advertiser must be offset
against the serious potential for diminished future sales to repeat customers,
and because the repeat customers would appear to be more knowledgeable
than the occasional buyer, the former advertiser would be less likely to en-
gender market failure than the latter. Such considerations do not, however,
currently prompt heightened First Amendment protection for the first kind
of falsehood.
106 See id. at 14-15.
107 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 15.
109 See Coase, Market for Goods, supra note 99, at 389-90 (comparing examples of con-
sumer ignorance and fraud in both markets).
110 See Coase, Advertising, supra note 99, at 28-29.
1999]
796 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW - [Vol. 147:771
Richard Posner offers a considerable refinement of this basic economic
approach, suggesting an economic explanation for both the special treatment
of speech and for the lesser protection of commercial speech."' According
to Judge Posner, the economic reason for privileging speech over other ac-
tivities in general is that the social benefit of speech frequently cannot be
captured by its producers. As a result, speech tends to be underproduced
relative to its social value and the government should refrain from imposing
additional disincentives (such as regulations) on the production of speech.
This incentive structure, Posner argues, does not hold true for commercial
speech, because here the speaker generally reaps the benefit of product-
specific speech through the ultimate sale of the product. Hence, commer-
cial speech needs less protection. Much the same might be said of profes-
sional speech. Because the professional's advice tends to be specific to the
client's situation and the professional is paid for rendering his judgment in a
particular case, the speaker will usually reap all the benefits of the speech.
A physician, for example, who for a fee diagnoses a patient with a cold, pre-
sumably reaps all the benefits of having disseminated that information. Un-
like more general information, such a specific judgment will not usually en-
gender further dissemination benefiting third parties who fail to compensate
the speaker for the value derived from that knowledge. Thus, in the case of
professional speech, as in the case of commercial speech, there should be,
according to Posner's theory, no danger of underproduction and no need for
any special, hands-off policy. Posner adds that commercial speech should
be more heavily regulated because commercial claims are more easily veri-
fiable, more likely to result in harm to consumers due to their lack of so-
phistication, and less likely to be corrected by competing speakers.!
3
If we apply Posner's discussion of the robustness of the market for
commercial speech to the social harm, as well as the benefit, occasioned by
such speech, his conclusion favoring greater regulation of commercial or
professional speech becomes less clear. If social harm, as well as benefit, is
considered, and the general incentive model is taken seriously, one must
III See generally Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986). Judge Posner is careful not to suggest an adjustment of free
speech law based on the economic principles he puts forth "[w]ithout a fuller examination of
the background of the first amendment and the principles of constitutional interpretation." Id
at 53.
112 See id. at 22-23, 39-40.
113 See id. at 39-40. Under Posner's approach, speech could be suppressed whenever V +
E < P x LI(I+i)", where Vis the cost of suppressing the targeted speech, E is the cost of legal
error, P is the probability of harm resulting from the speech, L is the magnitude of the harm, n
is the number of temporal periods between the utterance of the speech and the anticipated
harm, and i is an interest or discount rate so that LI(1 +i)" is the present value of the anticipated
future harm. See id. at 8.
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consider not only whether in the noncommercial, nonprofessional sector
beneficial speech is underproduced, but also whether harmful speech is
overproduced. Similarly, in the commercial and professional sectors, one
must consider whether the proper incentives for the healthy production of
beneficial speech might carry over to prevent the overproduction of harmful
speech. A judgment must be made, not about the general externality of
speech, but about the relative overproduction of harm versus the benefit to
choose where to place the government's regulatory thumb.
To perform this calculus, moreover, one must examine the conclusion
that noncommercial, nonprofessional speech is underproduced. Consider,
for example, partisan political speech. Reminiscent of Vincent Blasi's
"checking value" of political speech, 1 4 Judge Posner posits that the most
important aspect of freedom of political speech is not that it is the only way
to determine the truth, but that it confers "the right to disseminate informa-
tion that may affect how people vote in the next election."'' 5 Partisan po-
litical speech thus seems to be the kind of speech that can reap all the social
benefits it bestows and more. Every citizen who hears and believes a given
speaker's partisan speech (whether rightly or wrongly) will be more inclined
to vote for that speaker's party in the next election. The value of the speech
to the author, as with commercial speech, for example, lies not in the audi-
ence's recognition of authorship but in its belief in the propositions pro-
pounded by the speech and subsequent action in conformity with those
ideas.116 As compared to scientific discovery, for example, which absent a
special regime of property rights confers no tangible benefit upon the author
by virtue of the world's recognition of the new discovery (other than the
satisfaction in the progress of science), partisan political speech appears as
robust as commercial speech. The same may hold true for religious prose-
lytizing, where the speaker is concerned not with credit for authorship of the
idea, but with its effective dissemination. The robustness of the markets for
partisan political speech and religious speech undercuts the economic argu-
ment for generally lessened protection of commercial and professional
speech on account of its attendant incentives preventing underproduction.
114 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521 (examining free expression as a valuable check on the abuse of official
power.
1 0. Posner, supra note 111, at 11.
116 Of course, the partisan speaker will want the audience to recognize that Party A is a
party of rascals and that Party B holds virtuous beliefs, but that sort of recognition of author-
ship is no different from recognizing that Brand X is the better sneaker. In both cases, the
benefit is bestowed upon the speaker when the audience acts in accordance with the proposed
idea, regardless of whether the audience knows who was the originator of that idea.
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Nor does a risk of error in distinguishing between false and truthful
commercial or professional speech justify a categorical distinction between
such speech and noncommercial, nonprofessional speech. Whether a state-
ment is made in support of a product or in the course of giving professional
advice, as opposed to in favor of a particular candidate, need not affect the
reliability of proving it false. Broken promises by political candidates
abound, and there can be little question about the ease with which one could
prove at least some of their statements to have been false. Similarly, the
audience's lack of sophistication vel non as a justification for heightened
regulation fails to account for the general disregard of the state of knowl-
edge of the audience in First Amendment law. Although the average con-
sumer is perhaps less sophisticated about scientific claims than are scien-
tists, the dissemination of questionable ideas is not generally restricted
whenever the audience would appear to lack the capacity to assess their
merit. Indeed, citizens who are not scientists must often come to their own
assessments of competing scientific theories that have implications for so-
cial policy and, ultimately, for their voting behavior, such as competing
claims about energy sources, pollution, and technology. The relative so-
phistication of the audience does not control the protection afforded the
noncommercial speaker and should not control that afforded the commercial
speaker either.
As for the correction of misinformation disseminated by a competitor, it
is not clear whether a principled distinction can be drawn between commer-
cial and noncommercial speakers. As Robert Pitofsky has argued, compet-
ing producers do not always have the proper incentives to point out the
misimpressions created by their competitors. 117 Sellers may exert their
117 See generally Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regula-
tion of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661 (1977). One of the chief advocates of market-
based solutions for consumer fraud problems was then-Professor Posner who, in a 1969 study
of the Federal Trade Commission, wrote that
[g]ood preventives against deception are to be found in the incentive of the con-
sumer to exercise reasonable care and common sense in purchasing, in the incentive
of sellers not to antagonize customers, and the incentive of competitors of deceptive
advertisers to give consumers prompt and accurate information in order to correct
any misrepresentation that might cause a substantial diversion of their sales.
Richard A. Posner, Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission,
[July-Sept.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA Special Supp.) No. 427, at 92, 104 (Sept. 16,
1969). Drawing an analogy to political speech, Posner urged that if citizens could be trusted
to sort out political ideas for themselves, consumers similarly ought to be sent out alone into
the world of advertising. See id. To be sure, he acknowledged that only those producers who
stood to gain from attacking their competitors had an incentive to disclose the fraud of others.
Posner, however, argued that most competitors did have such an incentive, even if only due to
the fact that competitive pressures induce participants in industries with a shared blemish to
work towards creating a product that has nothing to hide. See, e.g., id. at 107-08 (arguing that
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market power or collude to deprive consumers of valuable information.
Even in a market with numerous sellers, there is little incentive to disclose
misleading information that either disadvantages all sellers or inures to the
benefit of rivals of the firm investing in the disclosure. Counter-advertising
by a rival firm may lead to lawsuits by the named competitor, government
prosecution for false advertising, or an image backlash by consumers.11 At
the same time, however, a competitor will certainly have a great incentive to
engage in specific counter-advertising that will attract consumers of the
competing product. This phenomenon, however, is not peculiar to commer-
cial speech.
From an economic point of view, a speaker, whether scientist, producer,
professional, or political candidate, would appear to have the incentive to
debunk the myths of a competitor only if the speaker can capture the benefit
of the purported revelation. A political candidate or party would have as
little incentive as a manufacturer would to highlight the failures of a com-
petitor unless doing so would encourage a switch of allegiance on the part
of the audience. To be sure, the field of science is special because proving
someone wrong may in itself bring fame to the challenger, absent the pres-
entation of an alternative theory or solution to a problem. But even here, the
exploration of the competitor's claims will only be worth something to the
challenger whose career is not based on the false assumption as well. In
every speaker's case, then, there must be something like a cross-elasticity of
the audience's demand between what the speaker has to offer and the chal-
lenged assertion of the competitor. The audience must be willing to switch
from the exposed idea to the new idea in a manner that benefits the speaker.
Only then does the speaker have an incentive to debunk the competitor's
myth. Thus, although an economic model along the lines suggested by
Judge Posner could be crafted and perhaps modified to take account of the
additional variables outlined above, such a model might serve the purpose
of examining commercial, professional, and political speech more generally,
but not as a method of distinguishing among them.
in the case of cigarette advertising, competition may force companies to disclose the relation-
ship between smoking and health that those companies naturally try to withhold).
118 See Pitofsky, supra note 117, at 663-67. Accordingly, some argue for the constitu-
tional protection of commercial speech to ensure the robust exchange of information so that
consumers can make informed decisions in commercial as well as political matters. See BURT
NEUBORNE, FREE SPEECH-FREE MARKETS-FREE CHOICE 17-18 (1987) (urging protection
for commercial speech to ensure functioning of economic, as well as political, democracy);
Burt Neubome, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK.
L. REV. 437, 448-53 (1980) (urging greater protection for commercial speech in order to pro-
vide necessary information for political and economic decisions); Martin H. Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (1971) (urging protection for informational advertising).
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B. Culture
The second major theme in commercial speech literature focuses on the
cultural value of commercial and noncommercial speech. Those criticizing
the protection of commercial speech view advertising as a corruption of
culture and therefore as unworthy of protection.11 9 On closer inspection,
this cultural critique may be seen as directed not at commercial speech as
such, but at a form and method of discourse that is not unique to commer-
cial speech. Viewed in this manner, the critique fails to justify categorically
different treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech. The critique
also would not support diminished protection for professional speech be-
cause of the generally rational and substantive style of professional dis-
course.
The standard reply to the cultural critique rejects the latter as precisely
the sort of content-based regulation of speech forbidden by the First
Amendment. 120 The reply, however, accepts traditional regulation of com-
mercial speech for fraud and deception without serious consideration of the
justification for this different treatment of commercial and noncommercial
speech.121 The reply thus ultimately fails to explain the special treatment of
commercial speech or to offer an avenue for the analysis of professional
speech.
"On the eve of the twenty-first century," Collins and Skover write,
"America's marketplace of ideas has largely become a junkyard of com-
modity ideology. '' 122 At fault, in their view, is commercial speech. Early
forms of commercial speech, which featured ads placed by sellers to inform
potential buyers about the price and qualities of the goods, were still in tune
with the ideals of a rational democratic development of cultural values and,
thus, with the values the First Amendment ought to protect. The twentieth
century, however, has seen the rise of lifestyle advertising, which shifted the
focus of the advertisement from information to image. Products are no
longer sold by explaining how they work, but instead by promising "'new
119 See, e.g., RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAvID M. SKOvER, THE DEATH OF DIsCOURSE
(1996); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 697 (1993).
120 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-History of Com-
mercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REv. 747 (1993) [hereinafter Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History
and Pre-History] (arguing that since people value speech differently, preventing First
Amendment protection for "valueless" speech makes little sense); Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990) [hereinafter Koz-
inski & Banner, Who's Afraid?] (arguing that the commercial/noncommercial distinction
makes no sense).
121 See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
122 Collins & Skover, Commerce & Communication, supra note 119, at 707.
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and improved' ways of life" from using goods that are, at bottom, "yester-
day's functional equivalents."' 3 This new form of peddling commodities
appropriates culturally significant people and events, infuses them into a
commercial message, and thereby degrades our cultural values by harness-
ing them for commercial purposes. Advertising has successfully moved in-
dividuals to base their self-understanding on their habits of consumption,
driving the media to focus on providing audiences to advertisers instead of
information to audiences. 24 Finally, this method of influencing individuals
has met with such success that even noncommercial speech, such as politi-
cal campaigns, is beginning to resemble commercial speech.
Collins and Skover harbor little hope for change. First, applying cur-
rent law to police advertising to ensure its truthfulness would be futile in
light of lifestyle advertising's reliance on imagery that essentially has no
truth value.125 Second, the perils of advertising cannot be divorced from
those of capitalism itself, because corruption of the self is as much due to
the power of the profit system as due to our submission to profit's charms.
Thus, not only would the conception of the First Amendment have to be
changed to place mass advertising beyond protection as a matter of law, but
capitalist culture would also have to change as a matter of politics. Collins
and Skover conclude by calling for constitutional candor: "If commercial
communication is safe, it is not because it actually furthers the First
Amendment's traditional values of rational decision-making and self-
realization," but because it protects "speech in the service of selling."
126
Thus, the cultural critique is directed at least as much at capitalism itself
as at our current conception of commercial speech. The alleged corruption
of values that lies at the heart of this objection can take place within and
without the realm of speech. Collins and Skover do not identify any prob-
lematic characteristics of communication that appear to be unique to adver-
tising. The objectionable aspect of advertising is purportedly its seductive-
ness, its imagery, and its lack of informational value. On this view,
ironically, most literature that indulges the reader's imagination about he-
roic deeds of virtuous characters and their resulting fame, personal happi-
ness, or social recognition, ought to be considered with suspicion unless it
provides accurate information about the workings of the world and enables
123 Id. at 723.
124 On the latter point, see generally C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic
Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (1992).
125 See Collins & Skover, Commerce & Communication, supra note 119, at 738-39.
126 Id. at 745.
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the reader to make rational life choices. Homer's Iliad becomes as ques-
tionable as Nike's "Just Do It."'
127
Answering this cultural humanist view are scholars like Burt Neuborne,
Rodney Smolla, Alex Kozinski, and Stuart Banner. Burt Neuborne main-
tains that advertising is both powerful and democratic, and, reminiscent of
Coase and Director, he argues against the cultural elitists' denigration of the
role of advertising in the creation of culture. 28 "As a means of expressing
shared values and a common national ideology," he contends, "advertising
dwarfs any other genre of communication., 129 Rodney Smolla similarly ar-
gues that advertising interprets and digests culture much as literature does,
and that advertising contributes to the transformation of culture just as any
other form of creative expression. Whether such advertising propagates
"a lifestyle, fantasy, ethos, identity, or attitude that happens to be regarded
by most as socially corrosive," Smolla says, does not justify governmental
127 In his pre- Virginia Board of Pharmacy article, Professor Redish conceived of adver-
tising as protected either for its informational value to the consumer or for its artistic expres-
sion on the part of the advertiser. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429
(1971) [hereinafter Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace]. Although he expressed
skepticism about distinguishing among advertising based on its artistic qualities, he thought
"[t]he distinction between informational and persuasional promotion, at least in a broad sense,
would not seem to be an overly difficult one to draw." Id. at 447. Describing the distinction
broadly, he noted: "'Informational' commercial speech is communication that provides ra-
tional enlightenment to the consumer concerning the merits of a product or brand, so that he
may make a more intelligent choice in the marketplace. The more rational information con-
veyed, the more 'informational' the advertising can be considered." Id. Accordingly, courts
should be more or less reluctant to strike a balance in favor of the State's concerns, depending
on whether "the expression conveys significant factual information that will be of real service
to the consumer." Id.; cf. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Pater-
nalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. IN. L. REV. 1205, 1231-35 (1988) (arguing for a
similar distinction). As an initial matter, it would seem difficult to distinguish between per-
suasional and informational advertising. Especially when viewed against the backdrop of to-
day's products and services, the appeal of which to consumers depends on image as well as
more tangible qualities, it would seem that persuasional advertising could only be restricted
on the paternalistic assumption that certain features of a product or service should not be con-
sidered qualities. Perhaps more importantly, however, the exclusion of persuasional adver-
tising from the ambit of the First Amendment is as little justified by this model of speech as
would be the removal of persuasional electioneering. If"rational" self-fulfillment is the goal,
persuasional political speech should be on no better footing than persuasional advertisements.
Indeed, Redish later abandoned this distinction. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630 n.135 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, The Value of Free
Speech] (noting that "recognition of the individual's unencumbered right to make life-
affecting decisions" makes a distinction between informational and persuasional advertising
"unacceptable").
128 See NEUBORNE, supra note 118, at 13,19.
129 Id. at 19.
130 See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 777, 786-87 (1993).
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regulation of advertising any more than it does censorship of other types of
speech.131
The most provocative rebuttal of the cultural criticism of commercial
speech, however, is provided by Kozinski and Banner. 32 Responding to
Collins and Skover, they find it "odd to argue that a particular form of
speech shouldn't receive First Amendment protection solely because that
speech has little value." 133 As did Smolla, they note that "[t]his is exactly
the type of argument the First Amendment should foreclose." 134 Kozinski
and Banner explain the commercial speech doctrine as a historical fluke.135
Due to the uncertainty of incorporation of the First Amendment as a shield
against the states prior to Stromberg v. California,136 the predominant con-
ceptualization of advertising as business, the early First Amendment doc-
trine that held that the speech clause protected only against prior restraints,
and the fact that most regulation of speech occurred at the state level, state
regulation of advertising was framed as implicating only substantive due
process, equal protection, or the commerce clause. 137 Thus, a challenge to a
state law restricting the dissemination of commercial handbills, such as that
brought in Valentine v. Chrestensen, was far from the core of early First
Amendment jurisprudence. In addition, Mr. Chrestensen brought his suit
for freedom to advertise after the New Deal ratification of restrictions on
commerce, readily explaining the casual ruling against the commercial
handbills.
13 8
According to Kozinski and Banner, neither Chrestensen's nor Virginia
Board of Pharmacy's treatment of commercial speech is justified. Indeed,
Kozinski and Banner even challenge the possibility of defining commercial
131 Id. at780-81.
132 See Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History and Pre-History, supra note 120; Kozinski &
Banner, Who's Afraid?, supra note 120, at 628.
133 Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History and Pre-History, supra note 120, at 752.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 754-73.
136 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Stromberg finally noted that it had been "determined [by prior
cases, which had assumed incorporation without deciding it] that the conception of liberty
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free
speech." Id. at 368 (citing Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 371, 373 (1927), and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927));
see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922) (noting in dicta that the Due Process
Clause protects the right "to acquire useful knowledge"). Incorporation of the First Amend-
ment had been expressly ruled out by the Court as late as 1922. See Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions
about 'freedom of speech."').
137 See Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History and Pre-History, supra note 120, at 759-61.
138 See id.
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speech in a meaningful way. The Court's narrow understanding in Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations13 9 of com-
mercial speech as speech that does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction, ' 140 they maintain, does not provide a working definition for the
modem world of communication.14 Nor, they claim, are there ready alter-
natives, since today's commercials take the form of mini-dramas and music
videos, and opine on everything from science, health, and technology to
politics, religion, and constitutional law. Contrary to Collins and Skover,
Kozinski and Banner are drawn to the conclusion that advertising increas-
ingly resembles classic noncommercial speech and that, therefore, it ought
to receive the same degree of protection.
1 42
The cultural debate ultimately leads Professor Smolla to retain an en-
clave of reduced protection for "that subclass of advertising that does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction,"' though he recognizes that it
may be a shrinking realm in the modem world. 43 Smolla uses the cultural
debate to explore the contours of the realm of commercial speech, while lo-
cating the reason for treating commercial speech differently elsewhere.
44
Kozinski, Banner, and Neubome, on the other hand, use the cultural liber-
tarian response to urge abandoning the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech altogether. 45 Yet they do not propose to abandon
the common sense notion that the government may engage in certain forms
of regulation for the protection of consumers. Neubome, for example,
agrees with restrictions on speech that prevent false advertising, 146 noting
that "a consumer has no interest in receiving false information.""' Kozin-
139 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
140 Id. at 385.
141 See Kozinski & Banner, Anti-History andPre-History, supra note 120, at 756-57.
142 See id. at 775.
143 Smolla, supra note 130, at 780 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citation omitted)); see also id. at
782.
144 Smolla ultimately believes that "[b]ecause government has virtually unchecked con-
stitutional power to regulate transactions, government may legitimately claim some special
prerogative to regulate speech about transactions." Id. at 780 (footnotes omitted). With Pro-
fessor Farber, Smolla maintains that "[i]t is only the linkage between commercial speech and
a commercial transaction that gives government the theoretical leverage to presume to regu-
late the speech at all." Id. (citing Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment
Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 374 (1979)). For a discussion of this theory, see infra note 200
and accompanying text.
145 See NEUBORNE, supra note 118, at 17; Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid?, supra
note 120, at 628.
146 See, e.g., NEUBORNE, supra note 118, at 46.
147 Id.; see also, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV. 1080, 1081 n.3 ("Falsehoods and deceptive speech do not
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ski and Banner contend more generally that abandoning the distinction be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech would not change all that
much, 148 because fraud statutes would still be justified by a "governmental
interest [that] is unrelated to the suppression of expression; the seller is free
to say whatever he likes about the product, true or not, as long as he doesn't
induce sales in reliance on what he says. 149
The cultural libertarian reply still leaves us with questions regarding the
different treatment of commercial and professional speech, on the one hand,
and political speech, on the other. For example, the consumer's lack of in-
terest in false commercial information deserves further analysis in light of
the protection of false political speech in which the voter, presumably,
would have no interest either. If a candidate's false and deceptive political
speech to garner votes may not be regulated, it must be something other
than the simple existence of a connected transaction that justifies regulation
in the case of commercial or professional speech. Indeed, with respect to
professional speech, the attendant transaction is no different from the sale
that is connected with the dissemination of a newspaper or a book. And if a
concern about chilling protected speech explains the lack of regulation of
political speech, why are we not similarly concerned about chilling profes-
sional and commercial speech? Finally, with regard to professional speech,
regulation, such as that upheld in Casey, appears to be permissible even ab-
sent a government interest in the prevention of fraud or coercion.
C. Democracy
Perhaps the most prominent challenge to the protection of commercial
speech comes from the political theory of free speech, which finds its clas-
sic articulation in Alexander Meiklejohn's lecture series, Free Speech and
Its Relation to Self-Government, 15 and which was later championed (albeit
in slightly different forms) particularly by Robert Bork and Lillian
BeVier.151 At its core, this vision of the First Amendment sees only speech
contribute to the free flow of information and have long been regulated whether or not the
speech is labeled 'commercial."' (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,49 & n.10 (1961))).
148 See Kozinski & Banner, Who's Afraid?, supra note 120, at 651.
149 Id. Commercial speech, they argue, would thus be treated much like libel. See id. at
651-52.
150 ALEXANDER MEIKLEOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 120 (1948), reprinted in ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONsTrrUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 8 (1960) [hereinafter FREE SPEECH].
151 See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 302 (1978); Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 26 (1971). For
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about issues of political significance as protected under the Constitution. As
will be discussed below, on closer inspection this theory provides an insuf-
ficient basis for the exclusion of commercial (or professional) speech from
the ambit of the First Amendment. The debate about this theory, too, leaves
us without an answer concerning the different treatment of commercial, pro-
fessional, and political speech.
As first explained by Professor Meiklejohn, the political principle of
free speech does not protect any "private right" of the individual, but serves
only to nurture and support the Constitution's central project of government
by the people. In this model, the main focus of protection is on the audi-
ence, that is, on voters who must make up their minds about matters of pub-
lic policy.'5 2 The extension of protection to speech that is not strictly rele-
vant to political decisionmaking, according to Meiklejohn, is a mistake
arising from a confusion of liberty of speech, which is a personal right pro-
tected under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments from undue infringement, with freedom of speech, which is a public,
political right absolutely protected under the First Amendment. 15 3 The pri-
vate liberty of speech, Meiklejohn asserts, is correlated with that of life and
property over which the government has a measure of control, whereas
freedom of speech allows us to engage in public discussion and is correlated
with the freedoms of religion, press, assembly, and petitioning the govern-
ment, which are entirely beyond the government's reach.
54
Commercial speech, according to Meiklejohn, would fall on the private
side of the line. "The constitutional status of a merchant advertising his
wares," Meiklejohn notes in passing, is derived from the vindication of
rights of individual possession and is therefore "utterly different from that
of a citizen who is planning for the general welfare."'155 In short, the First
Amendment protects only the search for political truth:
We listen, not because they desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If
there are arguments against our theory of government, our policies in war or in
similar views of the First Amendment and concomitant rejection of standard protection for
commercial speech, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
103 (1982) and CASS R. SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993).
See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 150, at 26-27, 57, 75 ("The primary
purpose of the First Amendment is... that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand
the issues which bear upon our common life.").
153 See id. at 36-37.
154 See id.
155 Id. at 37.
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peace, we the citizens, the rulers, must hear and consider them for ourselves.
That is the way of public safety. It is the program of self-government.
156
As a result, only "speech which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues
with which voters have to deal" is protected by the First Amendment,
15 7
leaving commercial speech, as well as speech motivated by private financial
gain, open to restriction. 1
8
Meiklejohn later retreated from the severe implications of his theory by
expanding his view of the connection between speech and self-government.
Recognizing that the citizenry could not make informed choices about pub-
lic policy unless voters were educated, Meiklejohn came to read the First
Amendment as extending to "expression within the range of human com-
munications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sen-
sitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and objective judgment
which, so far as possible, a ballot should express."159 As examples of such
expression, Meiklejohn was willing to recognize not only public discussions
of public issues, but also education, philosophy, and the sciences, as well as
literature and the arts more generally. 6  This shift acknowledged that even
on a political theory of speech protection, these forms of communication
156 Id. at 57; see also id. at 77.
157 Id. at 79.
158 Indeed, as originally formulated, the political speech principle would even allow for
the restriction of "private" scientific research as well as of much literature and art. See id. at
84. As is well known, Meiklejoh's model was enormously influential with the Warren
Court. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT.
REv. 191. What is particularly interesting for purposes of the present examination, however,
is that Meiklejohn's focus on the listener and on the importance of free speech for democratic
government continued to influence the Court even where the Justices were willing to abandon
the political speech principle's exclusion of commercial speech from the ambit of First
Amendment protection. Cases such as Virginia Board of Pharmacy, Bates, Bolger, and
Zauderer all demonstrate a focus on the importance of the availability of information about
the stream of commerce for democratic self-governance regarding economic affairs. In other
words, not only was the focus on the content of the speech a consequence of the pressure to
distinguish precedent as described above, but it was also a result of the Court's general parti-
ality to Meiklejohn's view of the First Amendment and its relation to self-government. With
the rise of free speech justifications based on individual autonomy, then, we would be well
advised to revisit the reasons for conventional commercial speech doctrine's near-exclusive
focus on the listener. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
159 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245, 256. Although Meiklejohn expanded his view of First Amendment protection in part as a
response to critics, the germ of this expansion can be found in the closing lines of the publica-
tion of his lectures. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 150, at 89 ("I suggest that we
pay heed to the saying[] ... of Epictetus, 'The rulers of the state have said that only free men
shall be educated; but Reason has said that only educated men shall be free."').
160 See Meiklejohn, supra note 159, at 256-57.
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contribute to democratic government and thus should fall within the pro-
tected zone.
Other proponents of the political theory of the First Amendment, how-
ever, have been less willing to follow Meiklejohn's expansive interpretation
of the political speech principle. Both Bork and BeVier have rejected
Meiklejohn's later views on the grounds that such an enlargement of the
scope of the First Amendment cannot be limited on principled grounds and
will lead to the inclusion of virtually all speech. 161 In his 1971 article, Judge
Bork adhered to the narrower view that the First Amendment protects only
"criticisms of public officials and policies, proposals for the adoption or re-
peal of legislation or constitutional provisions and speech addressed to the
conduct of any governmental unit in the country." 162 The free speech prin-
ciple, according to Bork, protects only what one might loosely call the po-
litical process, that is, discussions about concrete legislative proposals as
well as the closely related issue of the current performance of government
institutions.
163
Professor BeVier, on the other hand, would extend protection to much
of the nonpolitical speech that the Court has held to be within the amend-
ment's reach, but she would do so out of institutional concerns about craft-
ing rules that implement the political speech principle effectively, not out of
concern for speech that lies beyond that principle. 164 For example, to pre-
vent the chilling effect on political speech, the difficulty of teasing out the
political from the nonpolitical in mixed utterances, and the risk of majori-
tarian bias on the part of juries, BeVier argues the Court is justified in pro-
viding some measure of protection to libel and to some art and literature.
65
The Court should not, however, abandon all attempts to limit the sphere of
161 See BeVier, supra note 151, at 316-17; Bork, supra note 151, at 27.
162 Bork, supra note 151, at 29. Bork would further exclude from protection speech ad-
vocating violation of the law or the violent overthrow of the government. See id at 29-30.
163 Although Judge Bork has more recently expressed the view that commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment, that change in position appears as an exception to his
earlier defense of the narrow political speech principle due to particular evidence about the
colonial practice regarding commercial advertisements. See Robert H. Bork, Activist FDA
Threatens Constitutional Speech Rights, 11 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER No. 2 (Washington Le-
gal Foundation, Jan. 19, 1996). Because of the prominence of Bork's 1971 piece and the ab-
solute position it takes on the spectrum of political speech principles, it will briefly be dis-
cussed as it stood before the recent change.
164 See BeVier, supra note 151, at 322-3 1.
165 See id. at 347-52 (discussing libel); id. at 357 (discussing art and literature). Professor
BeVier's main example is Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which, in her view,
was correctly decided not because advocacy of unlawful activity should be protected based on
substantive First Amendment principles, but because "tlhe Brandenburg rule responds to
pragmatic and institutional concerns more successfully" than alternative approaches to such
speech. See id. at 341.
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protection to political speech, and should not place all literature and art
within the ambit of the First Amendment. As for commercial speech, Pro-
fessor BeVier believes that it should be excluded from protection because
"the proposals of commercial transactions are so far removed from the con-
text of political debate that the public's keen interest in the messages is to-
tally irrelevant to first amendment values." 166  In addition, she argues,
commercial speech cases do not present the institutional concerns about im-
plementing the political speech principle that would allow for an overpro-
tective rule based on strategic concerns. In each of the commercial speech
cases decided by the Court, the advertiser, in BeVier's view, could easily
have cast any political commentary expressly as such to avoid regulation
and to come clearly within the political speech principle.167 Indeed, the
Court, according to BeVier, did not even attempt to present the commercial
speech doctrine as a prophylactic rule for the protection of political speech,
but instead focused squarely on the importance of commercial information
to private decisionmaking, which is not a protected value under the political
speech principle.
168
Due to the lack of direct evidence of the Framers' understanding of the
amendment, 169 political speech advocates draw on structure and principle in
support of their basic position. As a structural matter, the Constitution must
protect political speech because such speech is essential to the functioning
of a representative democracy.1 70 If citizens are to govern themselves, they
must be free to arrive at their own beliefs about issues of public policy and
free to cast their votes according to their best lights. Indeed, the necessity of
this kind of freedom for a functioning democracy led Judge Bork to argue
that "[f]reedom for political speech could and should be inferred even if
there were no first amendment. ' 171 As a matter of principle, Judge Bork ar-
gued, no other values regarding speech can be derived from the Constitution
in a way that would justify judicial invalidation of legislative value choices.
Moreover, other values purportedly served by the Amendment would not
166 Id. at 353.
167 See id. at 354-55.
168 See id. at 355.
169 For Robert Bork's recent views regarding the Framers' intent, see Bork, supra note
163.
170 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 150, at 27 ("The principle of the
freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program of self-government."); BeVier,
supra note 151, at 309 ("The constitutional establishment of a representative democracy im-
plies certain conclusions about the type of speech the amendment must protect from abridge-
ment."); Bork, supra note 151, at 23 ("Mhe entire structure of the Constitution creates a rep-
resentative democracy, a form of government that would be meaningless without freedom to
discuss government and its policies.").
171 Boric, supra note 151, at23.
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justify privileging speech over many other forms of activity that serve the
same goals. Self-realization (whether of the speaker or of the listener), for
example, would be served by a host of other activities from price fixing to
playing sports, and there is no principled route for judges to select some but
not others as central to that goal. 172 The frequently acclaimed "safety-
valve" function of speech is grounded, according to Judge Bork, in pedes-
trian considerations of "expediency or prudence," and it is thus similar to a
host of factors regarding social safety and tranquility that are best weighed
by the political branches of government in the exercise of their general
managerial responsibility.
173
The political theory of speech, then, comes in three variations: Meik-
lejohn's expansive model, BeVier's strategic model, and Bork's and Meik-
lejohn's initial strict model. On closer inspection, it appears that only the
last model is incompatible with First Amendment protection for commercial
and professional speech, and that the first and second can and should be
viewed as bringing commercial as well as professional speech within the
Amendment's scope.
The expansive model of political speech embodies a conscious move
beyond the preservation of the core parliamentary process to the protection
of the integrity of the relevant input into that process. Indeed, the expansive
view goes even further to hold that citizens must not only have access to in-
formation as input for their private calculus about the public good, but that
they must also be exposed to thoughts, beliefs, and ideas about the human
condition in order to develop the critical faculties necessary to perform that
calculus. Without this form of individual self-realization, the democratic
process would not achieve its goal of self-determination but would only
serve as a mechanical form of aggregating individual, ill-formed conclu-
sions.
Once the value of individual self-realization is recognized as a prerequi-
site to a meaningful democratic process, however, the argument that com-
mercial and professional speech do not serve the values of the First
Amendment seems weak. At the heart of self-realization lies the power to
reach one's own understanding of what is just and good, and to participate
in the decisions affecting one's liberty and well-being based upon one's
values and view of the world.174 Both commercial and professional speech
assist in that endeavor. As Martin Redish has most prominently argued with
172 See id. at 25.
173 See id. at 25-26.
174 See IsAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY: AN INAUGURAL LECTURE
DELIVERED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF OxFORD 25-29 (1966) (reprinted in Oxford at The
Clarendon Press).
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regard to commercial speech, this aspect of self-realization is as much im-
plicated in the realm of "private" decisionmaking in the market as it is in
"public" decisionmaking in the political arena.175 Quite apart from the non-
commercial aspects of advertising, which may contain ideas, criticism, and
aesthetic offerings as relevant to personal development as news, arts, and
literature, basic information about the availability of products and services
enables citizens to develop an awareness of the choices they have. Not only
will individual market decisions thereby be better informed, but the oppor-
tunity to make decisions in the light of full information will itself serve as a
lesson in democracy. 176 Finally, because the free flow of information about
175 Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, supra note 127, at 430; Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 596-611.
176 Cf. Rotunda, supra note 147, at 1098 ("The state was really using the advertising pro-
hibition in Virginia Pharmacy to implement hidden policy decisions that Virginia citizens
should have decided by free and open debate."). Professor Vincent Blasi, who rejects the idea
that commercial speech comes within the First Amendment as a matter of free speech princi-
ples, also rejects the suggestion that commercial speech be given protection as a prophylactic.
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 484-89 (1985). Blasi argues that recognition of the antipaternalism principle with
regard to commercial speech would ultimately lessen citizens' appreciation for free speech
principles, because the Court has not and will not adhere to the antipatemalism principle with
regard to commercial speech. See id. at 484. Blasi points to the fact that courts routinely cen-
sor commercial speech when it is misleading and that the Supreme Court has endorsed (in
dictum in Central Hudson) restricting truthful, nonmisleading speech because it may lead lis-
teners to act against the public interest. See id. at 487-88. Once the antipaternalism principle
has been violated with impunity in the area of commercial speech, similar violations of the
principle may be feared with regard to noncommercial speech. See id. at 488-89. Blasi thus
essentially opts for a two-tier theory of speech, under which some forms of speech (including
commercial speech) are not protected at all, while all others receive full protection. It is not
immediately clear, however, why a two-tier theory would provide for a better prophylactic
against tyranny in pathological times than a more nuanced theory that recognizes different
degrees of legitimate regulation for different kinds of speech. In essence, Blasi suggests that
raising the costs of doctrinal spillover (by increasing the difference in treatment of speech in
various categories) will render judges less willing to shift speech from one category to an-
other. It is unclear as a matter of strategy, however, whether the added protection from the
increased costs of spillover outweighs the greater damage that results when spillover ulti-
mately occurs in such a two-tier system. Indeed, it might be said that a large second tier of
unprotected speech, increases the danger that more speech will be placed into that category.
For example, when political speech critical of the government was suppressed with judicial
approval earlier this century (at a time when commercial speech received no protection at all),
Judge Learned Hand had no difficulty doing so by adding to the nonprotected tier speech that
does no more than counsel a violation of the law. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F.
535 (S.D.N.Y) (Hand, J.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). I would suggest, in contrast to
Blasi, that the most important safeguard against doctrinal spillover is a clear definition of, and
good justification for, the doctrinal categories that are to be kept distinct. Respect for free
speech principles, whether on the part of judges or citizens, is unlikely to erode if the protec-
tion afforded to any given category of speech is properly calibrated to reflect its social role.
For a discussion of the role of categories in First Amendment analysis generally, see Frederick
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the marketplace will render both available and prohibited options more con-
spicuous, the protection of commercial speech will enable citizens to mobi-
lize in favor of, as well as against, allowing certain commercial transactions
to take place. 177 Commercial speech thus appears to further the goals of the
expanded political speech principle and to come within the protection of the
First Amendment. Similarly, professionals provide individuals with access
to information that enables the latter to come to important decisions affect-
ing their lives. Professionals assist individuals in understanding threats to
their well-being that may require collective action to change rights and re-
sponsibilities in society. Indeed some professionals, such as attorneys, take
an active part in assisting in the vindication of existing legal and constitu-
tional rights in courts and other government fora. Professional speech thus,
too, would appear to fall within the expanded political speech principle.
Professor BeVier's strategic model similarly should accommodate the
constitutional protection of commercial and professional speech. BeVier
does not offer a substantive view of where prophylaxis should end and rules
must accord with principle as opposed to strategy. With regard to literature,
art, and the sciences, for example, BeVier explains that the inclusion of all
but obscenity within the realm of protection is too generous and that the
Court should not abandon efforts to "draw the line of protection in terms
that are relevant to the political speech principle."'178 Having recognized the
problem of chilling effects, mixed utterances, and majoritarian bias, the
strategic model does not guide courts in ascertaining when a given state-
ment bears no relation to citizens' conception of liberty or to other aspects
worthy of consideration in the political process. Even from the point of
view of citizens concerned about the political process, it is not clear, for ex-
ample, why a truthful statement about the price for prescription drugs
should be subject to complete suppression when uttered as a proposal for a
commercial transaction and protected only when conveyed as general in-
formation. That a statement bears the characteristics of a proposal seems to
provide neither a substantive reason for the irrelevance of the statement to
the political process nor a valid proxy for that conclusion. While a proposal
arguably tends to indicate the speaker's concern not about the political pro-
cess and collective deliberation, but primarily about profit,179 BeVier, as
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265
(1981)•
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 765 (1976) ("And if [commercial speech] is indispensable to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.").
178 BeVier, supra note 151, at 357.
179 See Baker, supra note 124, at 2139-68.
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well as the Supreme Court, have rightly eschewed the notion that the pres-
ence or absence of a profit motive is relevant to whether speech implicates
First Amendment values. 18° And although Professor BeVier does not spe-
cifically discuss professional speech, such speech, too, cannot be excluded
from protection based on the general judgment that it bears no relation to
citizens' conceptions of liberty or other concerns that are relevant to the po-
litical process. To be sure, professionals tend, in general, to speak about
matters that are of personal interest to their clients, but that does not rule out
the possibility that individuals take political action based on the knowledge
gained from consulting with a professional about an issue that was initially
of a particularly personal concern. As a result, even on a strategic model,
commercial and professional speech should be protected.
The strict model Bork developed in 1971 has been frequently criti-
cized. As Redish and Shiffrin, for example, have noted, although the cur-
rently available evidence on original intent about the First Amendment is
sparse, Bork's mode of inquiry ignores the little original evidence that does
exist. First, the text, when read in light of the Fifth Amendment, singles out
some realm of "speech" for special protection, leaving other forms of liberty
subject to deprivation of due process of law. Redish therefore rightly con-
cludes that "[w]hether or not the constitutional language must be read to
provide absolute protection to speech, there can be little doubt that it was
intended to provide greater protection to speech than to conduct."182 Ac-
cordingly, as a matter of interpreting the constitutional text, complete ag-
nosticism about whether speech or conduct is protected by the First
Amendment is simply misplaced. Second, the Framers were motivated by
at least one specific concern: the rejection of prior restraints. This concern,
albeit raised with regard to restraints of the press, did not appear to vary
with the topic of the speech, and was certainly not limited to an abhorrence
1SO See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding that New York's prohibition on the receipt of money for stories
about one's own crimes violated the First Amendment); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.
at 761 (holding that speech is protected even if "carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit");
BeVier, supra note 151, at 353 & n.249 (noting the well established principle that profit is
irrelevant to questions of free speech).
181 Others before me have criticized Bork's view as incomplete. The following works
offer the most systematic rejections of the narrow political speech principle. See Kent Gre-
enawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 645, 734 n.344; Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 596-611; Steven Shiffrmn, The First Amendment and Eco-
nomic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv.
1212, 1232-39 (1983); see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 119, 120 (1989) (arguing that one need not identify a single reason, or even one reason
that is unique to speech, to justify special protection of speech).
182 Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 600.
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of prior restraints only on speech that was strictly limited to the political
process as, indeed, Bork himself has more recently acknowledged. 183 Thus,
instead of considering only first principles about a representative democracy
to ascertain the kind of speech that is protected by the Constitution, any sub-
stantive theory of the First Amendment must take account of the American
reaction to the British experience with prior restraints.
Moreover, the rejection of Meiklejohn's expanded version of the politi-
cal speech principle on the ground that it fails to account for the distinction
between self-realizing speech and conduct is misplaced. To be sure, con-
duct may also serve the value of self-realization, but since the text of the
First Amendment favors at least some speech over conduct, "we need not
find a logical distinction between the value served by speech and the value
served by conduct in order to justify protecting only speech. 184 Indeed, the
challenge of justifying the distinction between self-realizing speech and ac-
tion can be turned back on the strict principle of political speech itself. A
narrow political speech principle suffers from the analogous failure to ac-
count for the distinction between political speech (which it protects) and
political conduct (which it does not). Some forms of conduct, such as, for
example, working for a unit of government, working in a regulated industry,
or working in a sector of the economy that is not currently being regulated
as it should be, serve to create an awareness of the quality of government
officials and government regulation and, thus, would appear to further the
political speech principle as any speech about the conduct of government
officials would. 185
193 See Bork, supra note 163; Benjamin Franklin, An Apology for Printers, reprinted in 2
WRrrINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 172 (1907) (defending free speech principles in connec-
tion with printing an advertisement for voyages to Barbados); Shiffin, supra note 181, at
1234-35 (citing David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455,
463-64 (1983)) (noting that prior restraints were regarded as an interference regardless of the
political character of the publication). To be sure, to the extent that there may be a difference
between the protection afforded by the speech and press clauses, reliance on this history may
be less warranted as a matter of interpreting the speech clause, but Bork's 1971 argument was
based on first principles, not on any textual difference between the various clauses of the First
Amendment.
184 Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 600.
185 Professor Redish presses this point, noting that "there are countless actions-such as a
bombing... to protest oppression ... --that can be thought to convey very significant politi-
cal messages." Id. at 599. These actions, though political, would not, however, support or
promote the legal process of self-government in a representative democracy. But there are
other actions, also discussed by Professor Redish, see id. at 600, that are both political in
character (at least in the sense in which Bork uses that term) and consistent with a peaceful
process of self-government. Thus, working in an industry that is currently regulated by the
government or may be in need of regulation would further the attainment of knowledge about
governmental actors that Bork sees as relevant to the political process. Similarly, working for
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The political models of the First Amendment, then, do not provide good
reasons for excluding commercial or professional speech from constitutional
protection. A strict theory of political speech is historically unfounded and
does not seem justified on the basis of first principles. Any strategic con-
siderations for protecting nonpolitical speech developed to account for the
discrepancy between current court decisions and the strict political model
would apply to commercial and professional speech. Finally, insofar as the
political speech principle presents a viable interpretation of the First
Amendment, that is, on the expansive theory of political speech, it should
include commercial and professional speech within its reach, contrary to the
claims of its principal advocate. Commercial and professional speech
serves to educate the citizenry, is integral to the workings of self-
government, and may even itself form part of a lesson in democracy.
186
Reconciling commercial and professional speech with the viable prong
of the political speech doctrine, however, fails to justify the state's ability to
restrict certain commercial and professional speech, when it could not
similarly restrict other speech. If commercial and professional speech fall
within the political speech principle because they aid the process of educat-
ing citizens and fostering their autonomy, the justification for special re-
strictions on commercial and professional speech must lie beyond the politi-
cal speech principle. If the expansive and strategic political speech models
shield seditious libel from being banned despite the fact that the content of
such speech is antithetical to democratic government, why not protect
commercial speech that challenges the idea of informing consumers or pro-
fessional speech that challenges the fundamental assumptions of the profes-
sion? For the answer to our basic question, then, we must look elsewhere.
a governmental unit would further the process of acquiring and, ultimately, disseminating in-
formation about the quality of government officials.
186 Cass Sunstein's "Madisonian conception" of the political speech principle is at once
more generous than Meiklejohn's and Bork's original positions and more selective in its cov-
erage than Meiklejohn's later theory. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 151, at 18-23. Professor
Sunstein would place at the core of First Amendment protection all speech that is "both in-
tended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue," id. at 130
(italics omitted), and, next, recognize a lesser degree of protection for other forms of expres-
sion, including commercial speech, see id. at 155. Because many of the same criticisms that
are raised with regard to the political speech principles discussed in the text (and some that are
discussed with regard to the cultural critique discussed in the previous section) may be applied
to Sunstein's theory, the text has focused on some of the original archetypes of the political
speech principle without providing a specific response to Professor Sunstein's version of the
principle. For the most recent critique of Sunstein's theory and a related First Amendment
theory that also places commercial speech at the margins of constitutional protection but is
based more specifically on the importance of dissent, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT,
INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999).
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D. Liberty
The fourth major theme running through foundational commercial
speech scholarship focuses on the protection of reasoned communicative
interactions between rational, autonomous individuals who treat each other
with dignity and respect. On this view, the basic argument against commer-
cial speech is, unsurprisingly, that commercial speech does not attain this
goal and that it is therefore beyond the Constitution's protection.
Professor Baker's paradigmatic challenge to the constitutional standing
of the commercial speaker begins by re-calibrating First Amendment theory
to reflect the value of self-expression of the autonomous individual." 7 Only
so understood can the First Amendment promote self-realization, truth dis-
covery, political participation, and a healthy balance between stability and
change.188 In a nutshell, his well-known thesis is as follows. First, "as long
as speech represents the freely chosen expression of the speaker while de-
pending for its power in the free acceptance of the listener, freedom of
speech represents a charter of liberty for noncoercive action." 189  Next,
Baker argues that our society has separated individual values of persons,
which are pursued in the private sphere, from the pursuit of profits, which is
the goal of every enterprise. 190 And because Baker views the latter as the
necessary structural consequence of our market society, in which the value
of a good is its exchange value, he concludes that only the former is a mani-
festation of individual freedom.19' The Constitution nonetheless protects
the profit-seeking press (under the Press Clause) not for the reasons that
speech is protected, but for instrumental reasons, that is, to provide a coun-
terbalance to the government by securing a source of information free from
government control.1
92
187 See C. EDwIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989)
[hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY] (discussing commercial speech); C. Edwin Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1976)
[hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech] (arguing that because of existing economic struc-
tures, commercial speech does not serve the interests of individual liberty that the First
Amendment was designed to protect).
188 See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 187, at 7.
189 Id.; see also BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 187, at 197.
190 See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 187, at 196, 200-02.
191 See id. at 197-206; Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 187, at 9-14 (describing
commercial speech in modem America); cf Richard M. Alderman, Commercial Entities'
Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 731, 760-61 (arguing
that the speech of commercial entities is by its very nature commercial and should be classi-
fied as such).
192 See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 187, at 30-32.
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Baker has been criticized for limiting the value of free speech to that of
self-expression and thereby ignoring audience-based values.193 Indeed,
Baker himself says that "the liberty theory focuses on the speaker and the
speaker's choice to speak, not the listener and the usefulness of the con-
tent."'194 Baker's approach might be modified to incorporate audience val-
ues by positing that an audience could only be interested in the expressions
of sincerely-held beliefs by fellow autonomous individuals. 195 Speech that
ultimately results from market considerations might be said to be of no
communicative value because it is not the product of a rationally autono-
mous individual's attempt to communicate something to another person.
On this view, the commercial speaker is driven by impersonal market
forces, any "informational value" is merely an illusion, and any correspon-
dence to objective reality is purely accidental. 96
The existence of press freedom, however, makes it difficult to argue for
this kind of incorporation of audience-based values. If the press is to be
protected for the instrumental value of providing citizens with information
that is free from government control, then it must be valuable for the audi-
ence to receive information that has been disseminated for purposes of
profit. 197 If that is the case, however, then commercial speech's communi-
193 See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 619-22; Shiffrin, supra note
181, at 1243.
194 BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 187, at 197.
195 This theory of audience interests would add to Baker's basic argument that the lis-
tener only has the right that the government not interfere with the speech of a willing speaker.
See, e., Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 187, at 8.
Even this view would have to distinguish this form of control of the actor by an out-
side force from that of the politician by a primary concern about being elected to office. Cf
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, supra note 127, at 621 ("[I]f we accept Baker's analysis,
what protection do we give to the political candidate who tailors his public positions to what
he thinks will lead to his election... ?"). Baker responds to this challenge by suggesting that
politicians are not primarily concerned with maximizing electoral support and that politicians
are otherwise motivated to speak their mind truthfully. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Scope
of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 996 n.102 (1978).
197 To be sure, the business of the press is communication, and therefore any manipula-
tion of wants and desires will be in the service of stimulating greater need for communication.
See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 187, at 30. But this should not render such ma-
nipulation any less objectionable than Baker argues it to be in the context of the commercial
distribution of products. In both cases, one would expect the relevant producers to seek the
stimulation and creation of wants and desires that are easily satisfied. In both cases, the driv-
ing force would be profit, not the substantive value of communication. To the extent that a
criticism of commercial speech is based on the evils of the market, then, such skepticism
should carry over to the profit-seeking press generally (and not just to the influence of com-
mercial advertising)..
Baker argues that the press is specifically protected by the Press Clause for the instru-
mental reason of safeguarding an information source that is not controlled by the government.
The Press Clause thus, in his view, serves a fundamentally different function than the Speech
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cation of valuable information is not purely accidental, and the audience's
interest in receiving that information ought to be protected. Thus, either the
profit motive is not thoroughly corrupting or the existence of the profit mo-
tive does not decrease the value of the speech to the audience. Either way,
however, the reason for treating commercial speech differently from other
speech motivated by a desire for profit cannot be based on the profit motive
itself if the audience is to be taken into account.
19 8
As with the other foundational approaches to commercial speech, this
last theory appears insufficient to distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial speech or to account for the Court's different treatment of the
two. Along with the other approaches discussed in this Subpart, Baker's
does not justify either excluding commercial or professional speech alto-
gether from the realm of constitutional protection, nor does it provide rea-
sons for regulating commercial and professional speech in ways that would
be unacceptable in the case of noncommercial, nonprofessional speech. A
second group of theoretical approaches, however, which are based largely
on a contextual examination of the function of speech, will point the way
toward the theoretical framework that will be explored in Part IV. They will
be discussed briefly in the following Part.
III. FUNCTIONAL APPROACHES TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In contrast to the foundational theorists, who approach the question of
commercial speech based on first principles of economics, culture, democ-
racy, or liberty, a second group of scholars focuses primarily on the function
of speech. 99 Some view commercial speech as inextricably linked with,
and thus subordinated to assisting in the consummation of, a material trans-
action. Others urge a distinction between the ordinary use of language for
communicating ideas by means of presentation and persuasion, and the use
of language in the context of a commercial transaction, where language im-
Clause. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 187, at 225-49; Baker, Commercial
Speech, supra note 187, at 29-34. Baker's theory in this sense bears some resemblance to
Blasi's "checking function" of speech, except that Baker would apply this theory only to the
interpretation of the press clause. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 187, at 233. Re-
gardless of the foundation of the protection, however, any recognition of press rights ulti-
mately entails the idea that profit-motivated speech is of value to the audience.
199 Cf MARTIN H. REDIsH, FREEDOM OF EXPREssION: A CRIIcAL ANALYSIS 64
(1984); Smolla, supra note 130, at 782. But compare Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
641-43 (1951) (finding a profit motive relevant), with Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397
(1967) (noting the irrelevance of a profit motive).
199 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 144; Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 14-
25 (1979); Smolla, supra note 130.
[Vol. 147:771
COMMERCIAL SPEECH, PROFESSIONAL SPEECH
mediately affects the norms and conditions that characterize the relationship
between speaker and listener. Each of these functional visions shall be
briefly addressed in turn.
A. The Centrality of the Economic Transaction
The transactional approaches are not a fundamental reconception of the
communicative action. They observe, instead, that the communication is
inextricably intertwined with a regulable economic transaction, such as a
contract between buyer and seller. Communication that falls within the Su-
preme Court's definition of commercial speech is viewed as bound up with
that transaction, so that little reason exists to preclude the government from
regulating such ancillary speech.200 Professional speech, in contrast, would
unlikely be viewed as ancillary to an economic transaction. One might ar-
gue that certain speech, such as medical advice, should be viewed as ancil-
lary to the performance of a particular material service, such as a medical
procedure. This would not provide much guidance, however, for the treat-
ment of professional communications that are divorced from all material
transactions other than payment for the advice rendered. Professional
speech in the latter case, such as medical or legal consultations, are quintes-
sential professional communications regardless of their further connection
to a material service. A theory of professional speech must function without
regard to the connection with an underlying material transaction, because, at
its core, professional speech encompasses communications that have no
more connection to a material transaction than does a newspaper that is sold
at a stand. With regard to commercial speech, however, the transactional
arguments cannot be ignored.
Professors Jackson and Jeffries present the most categorical transac-
tional argument, suggesting that because the government can prescribe drug
prices, it should be able to forbid advertising of prices as well.201 According
to Jackson and Jeffries, since the significance of commercial speech lies ex-
clusively in its relation to the contemplated transaction, the government
ought to have the same power to regulate commercial speech that it has over
the transaction itself.2°2 Indeed, Jackson and Jeffries argue that the power to
200 Several scholars have remarked that the regulation of commercial speech is permissi-
ble only because of its connection to the underlying transaction. See, e.g., Smolla, supra note
130, at 780 ("Because government has virtually unchecked constitutional power to regulate
transactions, government may legitimately claim some special prerogative to regulate speech
about transactions."). Those discussed here have proceeded from this intuition to craft a par-
ticular vision of constitutional protection of commercial speech.
201 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 199.
202 See id. at 35-36.
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regulate the transaction is greater than, and includes, the lesser power to
regulate any communication about the transaction.203 Thus, the Constitution
should allow the government to refrain from outlawing the sale of a par-
ticular product, while prohibiting advertising for that product.
Jackson and Jeffries's greater-includes-the-lesser argument ultimately
depends on their subscription to the political speech principle. This depend-
ence becomes evident when one proceeds from the opposite assumption,
that is, that the First Amendment cannot be limited to the political sphere. If
the First Amendment cannot be limited to the political sphere, or if com-
mercial speech has value beyond its effect on the underlying transaction,
then suppressing commercial speech does more, not less, than restricting the
underlying transaction. This seeming tautology bears emphasis only be-
cause the greater-includes-the-lesser rationale is frequently criticized with-
out prominently identifying that the real source of the disagreement is
whether the First Amendment protects only political speech. Professor Re-
dish, for example, stresses that "the fallacy of [this] rationale as a justifica-
tion for speech suppression can be demonstrated by examining its conceiv-
able application in the noncommercial speech context."204 In that context,
advocacy of unlawful conduct is protected under the Supreme Court's
Brandenburg v. Ohio20 5 decision, even where the government "actually has
prohibited such conduct, by making it criminal. 20 6 Redish then states cate-
gorically that "no reason exists to believe that the logic is somehow more
compelling as a rationale for commercial speech regulation than for non-
commercial speech regulation." 207 If, however, Jackson and Jeffries were
right to conclude that the First Amendment protects only political speech
and that the only value of commercial speech lies in its significance to the
underlying transaction, then it might, indeed, make sense to apply their ra-
tionale in the commercial speech context while, at the same time, reject it in
the political speech context. Similarly, Redish points to the text of the Con-
stitution, which protects speech more than it protects conduct.208 Here, too,
the decisive premise is that commercial speech lies within the realm of First
Amendment protection. And, when Rotunda criticizes the regulation of
speech (as opposed to conduct) because it adds an unknown cost of re-
stricting speech or because it obscures the legislature's accountability for
203 See id. at 35.
204 Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
589, 599-600 (1996).
205 See 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
206 Redish, supra note 204, at 600.
207 Id.
208 See id. at 601 & n.56.
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substantive policy choices,2 0 9 he, too, is arguing from First Amendment
premises. Without recognizing commercial speech as significant apart from
its effect on a transaction, its suppression would not be an added cost. The
recognition that commercial speech is valuable to the autonomous delibera-
tion and self-realization of the citizen is the nub of the disagreement with an
argument like the one Jackson and Jeffries present. It is a disagreement not
about logic, but about the premise of the First Amendment. With regard to
First Amendment premises, however, the political speech principle, as dis-
cussed above, does not justify placing commercial speech beyond the reach
of the First Amendment.
Professor Farber, too, seizes upon the link between commercial speech
and the underlying transaction, but he affords the government far less regu-
latory leeway than do Jackson and Jeffries.z2 0 Farber observes that contract
liability frequently attaches to communication without raising First
Amendment concerns, and he argues that "[s]imilar to the language of a
written contract, the language in advertising can be seen as constituting part
of the seller's commitment to the buyer."21 1 To Farber, advertising, as part
of this contractual function, should be subject to regulation without special
scrutiny. Because the language of advertising performs an additional, in-
formative function, which implicates the core concerns of the First Amend-
ment, the task becomes one of distinguishing between government rules that
regulate the contractual function of language, and those that impinge on the
informative purpose of advertising. To this end, Farber offers the following
test: "A justification for regulating the seller's speech relates to the con-
tractual function of the speech if, and only if, the state interest disappears
when the same statements are made by a third person with no relation to the
transaction."
212
Government regulation backed by justifications that meet this test
would be judged under the standard of United States v. O'Brien213 on the
209 See Rotunda, supra note 147, at 1081-83; see also Redish, supra note 204, at 601;
Matthew L. Miller, Note, The First Amendment and Legislative Bans of Liquor and Cigarette
Advertisements, 85 COLuM. L. REv 632, 643 (1985).
210 See Farber, supra note 144, at 374.
211 Id. at 387.
212 Id. at 388-89.
213 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The court held that where speech and nonspeech elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, an incidental burden on speech is justified if it is
within the power of the Government; if it furthers a substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest. Id. at 377.
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grounds that contractual regulations are unrelated to the suppression of ideas
and are concerned, instead, with the regulation of conduct.214
Farber's contract-based approach is attractive, especially because it dis-
criminates between different kinds of regulation of speech uttered in a
commercial context. The Supreme Court's various formulas triggering the
commercial speech doctrine risk being either too narrow,215 in that we con-
ceive of much modem advertising as doing more than strictly proposing a
216commercial transaction, or being vague and too broad, in that they con-
template diminished protection whenever speech is classified as commer-
cial, even where the state's reason for regulation is based squarely on what
David Strauss calls the "persuasiveness of the speech. 2 17 Farber's test, in-
stead, asks about the government's reasons for regulating the communica-
tive interaction, thus weeding out government regulation based on imper-
missible motives.
218
214 See Farber, supra note 144, at 389 ("[C]ommercial speech is somehow more akin to
conduct than are other forms of speech."). Farber retains the label of commercial speech to
refer to the kind of speech that can be regulated under his model, even though his model does
not pick out the object of the regulation---that is, the speech. Instead, his model identifies the
nature of the regulation by looking to its justification. His test does not distinguish commer-
cial from noncommercial speech, but does distinguish between regulation aimed at the con-
tractual function of the speech and regulation aimed at the noncontractual aspect of the
speech.
215 Cf Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973) (defining commercial speech as speech that does "no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction").
216 Cf Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62
(1980) (defining commercial speech as speech that "propos[es] a commercial transaction" or
"relateTIs] solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience").
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLM. L.
REV. 334, 334 (1991); see also Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986). For a good discussion of ways to define commercial speech,
see Thomas W. Merrill, Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The
New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 205, 228-34 (1976). Merrill discusses de-
fining commercial speech as (1) speech proposing a commercial transaction, (2) speech that is
of interest only to a nondiverse consumer audience, and (3) speech about a brand name or
product. Merrill concludes that the best approach is a refinement of the third definition, lim-
iting commercial speech to "speech referring to a brand name product or service that is not
itself protected by the first amendment, issued by a speaker with a financial interest in the sale
of the product or service or in the distribution of the speech." Id. at 254; cf Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (discussing characteristics of commercial
speech).
218 By focusing on the purpose of the regulation, as opposed to the type of speech to
which the regulation applies, Farber's test reflects the Court's approach in Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International. See 431 U.S. 678, 701 & n.28 (rejecting the application of com-
mercial speech standards because regulation was not aimed at any "commercial aspect of
the... advertising"). Farber's test was also cited with approval by Justice Stevens in Bolger.
See 463 U.S. at 82-83 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Because significant speech
so often comprises both commercial and noncommercial elements, it may be more fruitful to
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Farber, however, does not suggest why the contractual function of
speech eliminates its First Amendment protection. Instead, he simply posits
that the reason "appears to be that the use of language to form contracts is
not the sort of 'speech' to which the first amendment applies." 219 He adds
only the following to explain the distinctive characteristic of commercial
speech:
The unique aspect of commercial speech is that it is a prelude to, and therefore
becomes integrated into, a contract, the essence of which is the presence of a
promise. Because a promise is an undertaking to ensure that a certain state of
affairs takes place, promises obviously have a closer connection with conduct
than with self-expression.
2 2 0
Although Farber's "intuitive belief that commercial speech is somehow
more akin to conduct than are other forms of speech 221 is compelling in the
sense that issuing a promise seems different from publishing a novel, the
nature of that difference remains to be fleshed out. The next Subpart ex-
plores one possible basis for this intuition.
B. The Different Uses of Language
Commercial speech, as Professor Farber has noted, differs systemati-
cally from noncommercial speech in that it is inextricably bound up with a
commercial transaction. It either proposes a commercial transaction or pro-
vides the context within which an agreement regarding a commercial trans-
action is supposed to take place. The paradigmatic case, of course, is the
offer of sale, which upon acceptance by the buyer with the proper consid-
eration becomes a legally binding commitment on the part of the offeror. If
the conventional rules for entering into a contract are satisfied, offerors can-
not argue that enforcement of the contract violates their rights to free
speech. The offeror not only communicates to the offeree but also appeals
to a set of rules that impose rights and responsibilities when certain condi-
tions, some of which are based on speech, are met.
focus on the nature of the challenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communi-
cation."). A concern for weeding out restrictions aimed at certain aspects of speech would not
be unusual in First Amendment analysis. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.02[2] (1994); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public
Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CI. L.
REV. 413 (1996); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1260-70 (1995).
219 Farber, supra note 144, at 387.
220 Id. at 389.
221 Id.
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The notion of doing things with words goes back to the philosopher J.L.
Austin, who, most notably in his famous lecture series in 1955, distin-
guished between performative utterances (which he also called "illocution-
ary acts") and non-performative utterances (which he termed "locutionary
acts").222 Austin's classic examples of performative utterances (or perfor-
matives, for short) are naming a ship, taking a marriage vow, making a will,
or entering into a bet.223 In each case, the utterance of statements achieves
more than communicating a message to the audience. Given the right con-
text and satisfaction of prerequisites, uttering the words "I name this ship
the Queen Elizabeth" not only communicates facts about the world, but also
changes the relation between that object and those apprehending it (if only
22in a relatively minor way).224 Similarly, under the proper circumstances,
uttering the words "I will" not only states a proposition, but changes the so-
cial relation, including the legal rights and responsibilities, of the parties at a
wedding ceremony. The same is true for stating, under the appropriate cir-
cumstances, "I hereby bequeath my house to you" or "I bet you a dollar for
your nickel that you're wrong." Each of these acts is performed in the me-
dium of language and accomplishes something that seems different from
what statements such as descriptions or reports achieve. One need only take
the first-person singular declarative statement of a promise and compare it
to the third-person report of the statement to witness the illocutionary di-
mension of the statement change. Performatives also tend to be neither true
nor false, at least in the ordinary sense of those terms. By contrast, a per-
formative may be unsuccessful, such as in a situation where no convention
exists that recognizes the utterance as constituting a particular act, where the
application of an existing convention to the circumstances at hand is inap-
propriate, or where the procedure for invoking the convention has not been
followed properly. A performative may also be insincere (even though it
triggers the convention and its consequences), if the person issuing the per-
formative did not have the proper intention with regard to the utterance.
225
222 J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS wrrH WoRDs (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962). The idea
goes back even further to Wittgenstein, who had already noted: "Words are deeds." L.
WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 46e (P. Winch trans., 1980).
M See AUSTIN, supra note 222, at 5.
224 The utterance communicates some facts, though perhaps not as the literal "meaning"
of the sentence. In addition to naming the ship, the sentence implicitly conveys, for example,
the speaker's perception of the fact that the object being named is a ship. This may or may
not be the speaker's intention. Cf AUSTIN, supra note 222, at 47-52 (regarding presupposi-
tions).
225 The distinction between these two kinds of problems with the performance of an illo-
cutionary act is not absolute. Insincerity may in certain cases render the act itself unsuccess-
ful, depending on the convention.
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It turns out, however, that these characteristics do not sufficiently dis-
tinguish so-called performative utterances, such as making a bet or giving
an order, from other types of utterances, since descriptive utterances ulti-
mately seem to be governed by similar principles. For example, conven-
tions assign meaning to particular series of sounds or characters (by pro-
viding a common language); a descriptive statement can be inappropriately
invoked (such as saying "All of John's children are bald" when John, in
fact, has no children); and descriptive sentences may be properly, yet insin-
cerely, invoked (such as saying "The cat is on the mat" without the belief
that it is, regardless of whether it, in fact, is or is not).226 The observation
that uttering a descriptive statement is as much a performative as uttering
one of the "classic" (for lack of a better word) performative utterances, such
as naming a ship, was perhaps Austin's greatest insight in this area.
The insight that even descriptive statements and pure assertions have
illocutionary force has dissuaded legal scholars from seeking to harmonize
principles of linguistic philosophy with those of free speech. Kent
Greenawalt, for example, who in discussing criminal law has produced a
sustained treatment of the relevance of different uses of language to the law
of free speech, focuses not on illocutionary acts but on what he calls "situa-
tion altering utterances.'2 27  These utterances "purport to change th[e]
world," and often "actually alter the normative world, shifting rights or ob-
ligations or both."228 Although "many of [Austin's] early and striking ex-
amples, such as the wedding vow and the christening of a ship, have the
situation-altering aspect' 229 that Greenawalt wants to consider, Austin's
226 See AUSTIN, supra note 222, at 50-52; see also JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN
ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 157-62 (1969). Similarly, the statement "You feel
good today," is simply an inappropriate descriptive, since, regardless of its truth, people are
not able to make definitive pronouncements about other people's emotions. See J.L. AUSTIN,
Performative Utterances, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 220-39 (J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock
eds., 1966). One might argue that the falsehood of a sentence is due to the fact that the con-
vention surrounding the sounds has been inappropriately invoked, such as saying "The cat is
on the mat" when it is not. But this kind of inappropriate invocation is not the same as the
inappropriateness that can attach to the invocation of the naming statement "I hereby name
you the Queen Elizabeth." The naming statement can be neither true nor false, but can be in-
appropriate by, for example, lacking a referent (such as, there being no ship at hand) or lack-
ing a necessary convention (such as, there being no procedure by which people standing be-
fore ships name them). Austin appears not to have distinguished between statements and the
act of stating, which caused him to view the true/false distinction as converging with the fe-
licitous/infelicitous distinction. See SEARLE, supra, at 29 (discussing this distinction).
227 KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 59 (1989). For
a study with a similar focus, see FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1993), examining utterances such as fighting words and hate speech.
228 GREENAWALT, supra note 227, at 59 (footnote omitted).
229 Id. at 58.
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analysis and terminology have ceased to be useful for Greenawalt because
"Austin also includes among performative utterances 'I apologize' and 'I
bid you welcome,' and he speaks of 'conclude' and 'argue' as being per-
formative verbs." 23°  Utterances such as these, Greenawalt concludes, "do
not change the world in the significant way that ... characterizes situation-
altering utterances."
231
In creating an alternative taxonomy of situation-altering utterances to
distinguish between speech acts that are protected by the free speech princi-
ple from those that are not, Greenawalt examines his own intuitions about
whether listeners and speakers would commonly perceive an utterance as
altering their social, moral, or legal environment. Only "significant
change[s] in the environment," however, count in that enterprise. 232 For in-
stance, although every assertion changes the speaker's and the listener's
situation because the speaker espouses the asserted proposition, this kind of
alteration does not suffice for purposes of Greenawalt's principle. Espe-
cially in light of the fact that the free speech principle was designed to pro-
tect precisely this sort of interaction, an utterance must do more than merely
make an assertion to forfeit protection. Among the utterances that effect
significant changes in the environment, and thus deserve Greenawalt's
"situation-altering" label, are offers, orders, permissions, and threats.
"Among the most important situation-altering utterances" are agreements
and promises, which affect people's moral obligations "even if they are not
legally binding." 233 To ascertain whether a particular speech act qualifies as
a situation-altering utterance, Greenawalt essentially inquires into the ordi-
nary "meaning" of the utterance.234 If the utterance properly conveys an of-
230 Id. (footnote omitted). Greenawalt portrays Austin's inclusion of assertions in the
category of performatives as an indication of Austin's doubt of his own theory. But Austin's
conclusion that assertions are performatives seems, to the contrary, to be the major point of
his discovery, as he himself appears to acknowledge. See AUSTIN, Performative Utterances,
supra note 226, at 251.
231 GREENAWALT, supra note 227, at 58.
232 Id. at 61.
233 Id. at 63.
234 This is not to say that Greenawalt locates requests, orders, threats, or other situation-
altering utterances in the meanings of sentences, which would be questionable as a matter of
basic interpretation. The meaning of a sentence (that is, its propositional content) is, instead,
to be distinguished from the meaning of the utterance of the sentence. The utterance, which is
the act of saying a sentence, can take on meanings that depend on more than the propositional
content of the sentence itself. Thus, for example, to say "Can you pass the salt?" means one
thing when said during a neurological exam and another when said at the dinner table. The
polite request does not inhere in the meaning of the sentence, but in the meaning of the utter-
ance of the sentence under certain conditions. See JOHN R. SEARLE, ExPRESSION AND
MEANING 30-57 (1996). The details of how the meaning of an utterance may be formally
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fer, threat, or promise, for example, it is less protected by the principles of
free speech.
As an alternative to focusing on the specific meaning of the communi-
cation itself, it may prove helpful to examine the broader context of the
communication and, in particular, the relevant relationship that is implicated
by the utterance. As an initial matter, such an analysis promises to provide
a fuller understanding of the special characteristics of professional commu-
nications, which Greenawalt's approach appears to miss. For example,
having set his aim on the meaning of the utterance, Greenawalt concludes
that "[i]f a doctor tells George he has measles, she gives him information
about what is already present; her comment does not itself change the actual
circumstances of George's life., 235 The statement, then, does not qualify as
a situation-altering utterance and would, according to Greenawalt's general
theory, be fully protected. This view, however, comes up short in explain-
ing the existence of medical malpractice suits, which may be based on pre-
cisely such factual statements, if they are made within the doctor-patient
relationship. Greenawalt might answer that free speech justifications are
diminished when the statement is false or when it amounts to encouraging
the patient to commit a crime,2 36 but the fact that such a statement is ana-
lyzed for its falsity (or its manifestation of an encouragement to commit a
crime) indicates instead that the statement is subject to special First
Amendment principles.237  Accordingly, even where the protection of a
analyzed are not at issue here. The point made in the text is simply that Greenawalt decides
whether an utterance has a situation-altering effect based solely on its meaning.
235 GREENAWALT, supra note 227, at 59.
236 In discussing encouragements to commit crimes, Greenawalt mentions in passing that
he "assume[s] that lawyers and doctors, for example, may be penalized for advising clients
and patients that committing some crime is the best way to solve their problems." Id. at 128
n.23.
237 To be sure, the Supreme Court has noted that although "there is no such thing as a
false idea[,] ... there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Within fully protected discourse, however, even
false speech is afforded a measure of protection out of an abundance of caution to avoid
chilling protected speech. The constitutionally permissible prohibition of false commercial
speech, then, must be justified by the commercial character of the speech, not by its falsity
alone. Cf Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amend-
ment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1194 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Commercial Speech] (not-
ing that false and harmful speech is usually protected by the First Amendment); Frederick F.
Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter,
64 VA. L. REV. 263, 294 (1978) [hereinafter Schauer, Language] (noting that "the commercial
speech doctrine does not grant 'strategic' protection to factual falsity as the New York Times
principle does for defamatory speech" (citation omitted)). It is therefore too simple to end the
inquiry by noting that "[flalsehoods and deceptive speech do not contribute to the free flow of
information and have long been regulated whether or not the speech is labeled 'commercial."'
Rotunda, supra note 147, at 1081 n.3 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; Konigsberg v. State Bar,
1999]
828 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
statement is sometimes thought to vary with its meaning, it is not the
meaning that is doing the work for purposes of free speech principles. In-
stead, the statement, apart from its specific meaning, is not governed by or-
dinary free speech principles because of the peculiar characteristics of the
communicative relationship. 238 As the next Part will attempt to show, the
Court may be viewed as implicitly relying on the specific nature of the
communicative relationship between speaker and listener as a justification
for the communication's regulation. This aspect of the communication is
common to both commercial and professional speech.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF BOUNDED SPEECH PRACTICES
In a series of First Amendment cases that will be discussed in this Part,
the Supreme Court may be viewed as giving constitutional status to its per-
ception of the social relationship between various interlocutors. Communi-
cative interactions are not seen as abstract exchanges of views and ideas
between persons about whom nothing is known, but instead, as context-
dependent interactions with purposes that can be judicially ascertained with
a reasonable degree of confidence. Instead of employing a fixed set of gen-
eral First Amendment rules that are universally applicable, the Court has
crafted particularized modes of analysis to sustain and protect the various
speech practices involved. On the one hand, the Court welcomes govern-
ment regulation as partially constitutive of the communicative interaction,
that is, as assuring that communications that are dependent on predefined
communicative goals remain within the boundaries of that discourse. On
the other hand, the Court rejects government prescriptions as unconstitu-
tional when they infringe on the integrity of an established framework for
discourse.
A. The Listener-Based Model of Discourse
The Supreme Court's First Amendment doctrine is usually rife with
rhetoric about the importance of preserving the ability of speakers to ex-
press themselves and communicate their views, however unorthodox, to
whomever might listen. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
23 9 Cohen v. California,240
366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961)). Falsehoods are only regulated in special circumstances, one
of which I attempt to describe in this Article.
238 Because Greenawalt focuses on the meaning of the communication rather than the
relationships that envelop the speaker, neither fiduciary relationships nor relationships be-
tween buyers and sellers figure prominently in his book.
239 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
240 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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Terminiello v. Chicago,24 1 and National Socialist Party of America v. Vil-
lage of Skoki'e, 242 are classics in that regard, but even cases such as New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan
243 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
244
which acknowledge the importance of the "public debate" of which the
speaker's speech is only a part, stress the preeminent value of the "Ameri-
can privilege to speak one's mind.' 245 When the Court emphasizes the First
Amendment rights of speakers, its focus is usually on the unbounded nature
of the public debate within which the speech takes place.246 The soapbox
orator and lone pamphleteer come to mind, disseminating their views about
matters of public concern to whomever chooses to stop and listen. In these
unstructured communications about public issues, speakers advocate their
cultural or political norms in an attempt to support their particular vision of
a community.247 No vision of the community is privileged, and no rules of
civility or respect for commonly shared values are imposed. Not only is
every individual free to choose his or her own system of beliefs that is free
from government coercion,248 but each individual may decide what to put
forth for discussion and how to present that contribution most effectively.
249
Protected public debate, then, excludes neither profanity, nor exaggeration,
nor heterodoxy.
Accordingly, whether the purpose of public debate is truth-seeking,
self-expression, self-government, or a combination thereof, its central fea-
ture is that interlocutors may communicate across personal, communal, and
241 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
242 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam).
243 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
244 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
245 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On
the distinction between participants, audiences, and bystanders in First Amendment law gen-
erally, see T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 519 (1979).
246 On the concept of public discourse and the First Amendment, see generally Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic De-
liberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603 (1990) and Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Post on Public Discourse Under the First Amendment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1738
(1990).
247 On creating communities both within and in opposition to governing law, see gener-
ally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1986).
248 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("[No
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion ....").
249 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,310 (1940).
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cultural divides. Values and norms may be proposed regardless of whether
they are (or ultimately will be) shared by speaker and audience. Although a
minimum of shared background norms is required for such discourse to be
meaningful, that is, for speaker and listener to understand what is being
communicated, even background norms are subject to revision in debate.250
Public debate occurs among persons (and across communities) with diver-
gent belief structures and cultural norms and allows for the continual prob-
ing of shared and diverging views. Freedom of speech in this realm, then,
provides us with "the possibility of using speech to create new identities."
251
Legitimately derived norms may be imposed as constraints on action,
but a liberal society attempts to preserve a separate sphere of deliberation
about the validity of the norms themselves.252 Unless speech incites imme-
25diate violence,  public debate is limited only by the decentralized mecha-
nism of libel actions to protect individuals from bearing the burden of the
culpable dissemination of defamatory facts.254 Beyond that, neither refined
discourse nor respect for national symbols is required. Even the most fun-
damental of values underlying our constitutional structure, such as that of
orderly nonviolent political change, may not be imposed as a constraint on
public discourse.255 As the Court succinctly stated: "The First Amendmentrecognizes no such thing as a 'false' idea."25 6
250 Cf JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MuLTIPLICrrY 40 (1995) ("[T]he norms of rational ac-
ceptability of constitutional recognition are themselves questioned in a piecemeal fashion, in
the course of [critical public] discussion [of the constitutive charters of contemporary socie-
ties].").
251 Post, supra note 246, at 631; see also Schauer, Language, supra note 237, at 283-85
(discussing the constraints and opportunities inherent in the use of words to express new or
unconventional concepts).
252 Cf BERLIN, supra note 174, at 131-34 (discussing the concept of positive liberty);
CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 134-41 (1996) (explaining political liber-
alism's norm of rational dialogue); JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty in THREE ESSAYS 5-21
(Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1859) (distinguishing restraints on speech from those on action).
But cf MICHAEL HALBERSTAM, TOTALITARIANISM AND THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF
POLITICS (forthcoming 1999) (challenging the notion that political liberalism promotes delib-
eration in the public sphere).
253 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969).
254 On public discourse and defamation, see Post, supra note 246, at 646-47. For an
analysis of the values preserved by defamation law and a discussion of a possible alternative
distribution of burdens, see Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1321 (1992).
255 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
19-22 (1971); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49.
256 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)); see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loathe ....").
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In marked contrast to the public debate cases, the commercial speech
doctrine disclaims significant reliance on the speaker-based model and in-
stead focuses on the listener.257  With respect to commercial and profes-
sional speech, the importance of the speaker is eclipsed by an emphasis on
the listener's interest in receiving certain "information." 258 In these cases,
the Court finds itself able to stand in the shoes of the speaker and listener
and definitively assess the communicative enterprise in narrow, functional
terms. This conception of speech does not eliminate the speaker as a con-
stitutionally relevant actor259 but focuses, instead, on a substantive vision of
the communicative project with the result that the cognizable interests of
speaker and listener are harmonized. In the case of commercial speech, it is
this harmonization, in part, that allowed Justice Stevens to write that "the
same interest that supports regulation of potentially misleading advertising,
namely the public's interest in receiving accurate commercial information,
also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides con-
stitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading
commercial messages.
' 260
Thus when, as in the case of commercial speech, the Court speaks of
listeners' interests, the Court appears to have in mind a paradigm quite dif-
257 See supra Part I; see also Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government
Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5, 20 (1989) (differentiating between a
free speech model in "traditional" areas and a model for commercial speech).
As Professor Schauer rightly points out, the Court's focus on "information" cannot
literally mean that commercial speech is protected because of the information it provides; eve-
rything we do provides a source of some sort of information. See Schauer, Commercial
Speech, supra note 237, at 1193 n.50. For a theory that is based on weighing speakers' inter-
ests against those of listeners and the conclusion that in the case of commercial speech the
listeners' interests in informed decision making trump those of the speakers in self-
actualization, see Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Re-
placing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1093 (1991).
259 Contrast the Court's treatment of the listener and speaker in such cases as First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972), Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280
(1981), and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), in which the speaker disappears from
the realm of constitutional concern. The refusal to recognize a right of the speaker in these
cases may be the result of a prudential decision that the recognition of the speaker's independ-
ent First Amendment rights is unnecessary to the decision of the case, see Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
775-76, or of a more principled decision that the speaker does not enjoy any First Amendment
protection as a matter of constitutional law, see Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762. Whether pru-
dential or principled, however, these cases, in contrast to the professional speech cases, for
example, are marked by the ultimate focus on the listener, the disappearance of the speaker as
a constitutionally recognized actor, and the lack of judgments about the nature of the dis-
course that takes place between the speaker and listener.
260 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,496 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Kennedy, Thomas, & Ginsburg, JJ.).
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ferent from the quintessential public discourse that is usually invoked by the
speaker-based model. Mention of listeners' interests indicates a notion that
the discourse is bounded by a project that can be defined ex ante. To be
sure, the Court just as easily could have described this communicative rela-
tionship between listener and speaker from the point of view of the speaker,
and indeed, four members of the Court recently took issue with the Court's
selection of "the consumer's interest as the exclusive touchstone of com-
mercial speech protection." 26, Nonetheless, the Court usually reserves its
speaker-based rhetoric for cases in which protection is extended to discourse
about which the Court is generally agnostic. The speaker-based model is
eschewed by the Court in cases, such as those involving commercial and
professional speech, where the Court feels that it is able to assess authorita-
tively the substantive project of the communication. Thus, with regard to
these communications, the Court's focus on the listener, albeit perhaps un-
necessary, indicates that the State is not, and need not be, agnostic about the
common interests of the speaker and listener. Implicit in the Court's lis-
tener-based rhetoric in these decisions is the view that the speech within
certain relationships, such as those between buyer and seller or between
physician and patient, lies beyond the traditional conception of unbounded
public discourse, because it takes place as part of a predefined communica-
tive project.
261
In resting its conclusions on this conception, the Court is ultimately re-
sorting to an interpretation of social practice or, as Professor Post once put it
in a different context, to "constitutional sociology." 263 Speech regarding a
commercial transaction differs from unbounded public debate, in which
speakers and listeners are free to construct and challenge cultural back-
ground norms, use language in novel ways, and attempt to construct new
identities through speech. When speech turns to a commercial transaction,
the relationship between speaker and audience is transformed from an ex-
ploration of each other's opinions and beliefs into a strategy of striking a
261 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 606 (1997) (Souter, J. dis-
senting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.).
In this sense, the communicative project of commercial speech bears resemblance to
Professor Habermas's notion of strategic action. See JORGEN HABERMAS,
NACHMETAPHYSiSCHES DENKEN 68-75 (1988). Hannah Arendt seems to have a similar dis-
dain for end-directed communicative action. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON
175-81 (1958) (discussing the connection between action and speech).
263 Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT.
REV. 169, 200. See generally ROBERT C. POST, CONsTrrUTIoNAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995) (interpreting constitutional law in terms of systematic
social ordering).
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264bargain that is ultimately objectified in a material transaction. Certain as-
pects of the communicative freedom of public debate cannot be preserved in
the context of a commercial transaction because the premise of a commer-
cial transaction is that of a socially (and legally) objectified event about
which the parties are deemed to have reached a common understanding. A
contract, then, does not leave much room for cultural differences or diverg-
ing beliefs about the nature of the transacted deal. By entering into a com-
mercial transaction, buyer and seller are deemed to share the background
norms and community values that make the exchange possible. Indeed, a
commercial transaction could not occur without rules, such as rules gov-
erning whether a legal transfer of ownership of a piece of tangible property
has occurred.265 This social (and ultimately, legal) practice, in turn, gives
speech within the relationship special significance and places it beyond the
principles of abstract public debate.
266
This conclusion should not be understood to reduce such communica-
tion to "conduct" or "action," or to imply that such speech simply is pro-
tected "less" by the First Amendment. Instead, the recognition of a bounded
speech practice should entail only the conclusion that government regula-
tion, although content-based, may facilitate the speech practice by helping
ensure that communication within these relationships satisfies the high de-
gree of intersubjectivity that is necessary to make the social interaction pos-
sible at all. Government regulation both reflects and reinforces the common
understanding about the content and purpose of the communication that
speaker and listener must share in order for the particular speech practice to
exist. Viewed in this way, the Supreme Court's treatment of commercial
speech parallels its treatment of professional speech.
264 Although the relationship between buyer and seller may be viewed as the reflection of
complex social arrangements, these relatiois are objectified in the commercial exchange by
virtue of the transaction's focus on the exchange of value of goods and services. See KARL
MARX, DAs KAPrrAL 49-60 (B. Kautsky ed., Kroener Verlag 1957). Regardless of whether
or not the more complex underlying social relations could theoretically be appreciated despite
the exchange, as a matter of social (and legal) practice, they are lost in the objectified transac-
tion.
265 These rules may therefore be called "constitutive" rules, since their fulfillment makes
the legal event occur. See SEARLE, supra note 226, at 33-42 ("Constitutive rules constitute
(and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on the rules.").
266 See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in EXPRESSION
AND MEANING, supra note 234, at 18-20 (discussing rules of extra-linguistic institutions); G.J.
Wamock, Some Types of Performative Utterance, in ESSAYS ON J.L. AusTIN 69, 70 (Isaiah
Berlin et al. eds., 1973) (same).
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B. Speech in the Professions
Professional advice that is sought by a client pertains to a predefined
understanding between the interlocutors about the nature of the ensuing
communicative interaction. The professional is understood to be acting un-
der a commitment to the ethical and intellectual principles governing the
profession and is not thought of as free to challenge the mode of discourse
or the norms of the profession while remaining within the parameters of the
professional discussion. Without this precommitment to a defined dis-
course, it indeed would be impossible to seek the advice of a professional in
a meaningful manner. In other words, whether the relationships are ones of
trust, such as those between lawyer and client or doctor and patient, or are
merely common material enterprises, such as those between buyers and
sellers, their presence triggers a contextual First Amendment review that is
specifically centered around the social relation, as opposed to an abstract
review such as that traditionally applied to the street-comer speaker.
The medical and legal professions, for example, have long been subject
to licensing and supervision by the State "for the protection of society, 267
and the Court has indicated that such regulations would be upheld if they
"have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to prac-
tice" the profession.268 Although the Court has generally held that restric-
tions on the practice of a profession must not violate constitutional provi-
sions such as the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, the Supreme
Court and lower courts have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours
of a professional's freedom to speak to a client.269 Accordingly, courts have
267 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889); see also Barsky v. Board of Re-
gents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (noting that the State maintains regulatory authority over the
practice of medicine).
268 Schware v. Board of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,239 (1957).
269 Cases and commentary regarding professional speech have generally focused on the
First Amendment rights of professionals to advertise their services. See generally Fred S.
McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered
Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1985). Beyond that, the Court
has repeatedly recognized the basic First Amendment right to consult an attorney and, con-
versely, the right of a third party to refer someone to an attorney. See United Transp. Union v.
State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) ("[C]ollective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful
access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection of the First Amendment.");
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) ("We hold that
the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments gives [the union] the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its mem-
bers in the assertion of their legal rights."); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377
U.S. 1, 5 (1964) ("It cannot be seriously doubted that the First Amendment's guarantees of
free speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the
lawful purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them
.... ); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (holding that the NAACP's legal ac-
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failed to develop a general method for reviewing restrictions on professional
speech. The few cases that have reviewed such restrictions in light of First
Amendment challenges, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,27 Rust v. Sulli-
van,271 and SEC v. Lowe,272 however, may be read as having applied a con-
textual approach centered around the social roles of speaker and listener.
In the Supreme Court, the most sustained discussion about speech in the
professions has centered around physicians' speech on the subject of contra-
ception and abortion. The First Amendment aspect of these decisions has
frequently gone unappreciated, in part due to the Court's obvious focus on
whether the patient was exercising a fundamental right and in part due to the
Court's own statements implying that a physician's constitutional rights are
to be subsumed under the rights of the patient to receive treatment.2 73 Prop-
erly viewed, however, these decisions bear significantly on the First
Amendment protection of professional speech.
Dissents in the early contraception and abortion cases of the 1960s first
noted the First Amendment protection of a physician's right to advise her
patient about devices, medicines, and cures that the physician believed
might be beneficial.274 Without much discussion or response from the Court
tivities are "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments"). But see Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335
(1985) (rejecting a First Amendment claim regarding legal representation before an adminis-
trative agency as "inseparable" from the due process claim and noting that the former was
without "independent significance"). First Amendment review of restrictions on the substance
of the communication between professional and client, in contrast, is seldom addressed.
270 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
271 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
272 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
273 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 ("Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation
may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's posi-
tion.'); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604-05 n.33 (1977) (noting that nothing in prior abor-
tion case law "suggests that a doctor's right to administer medical care has any greater
strength than his patient's right to receive such care"); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
197-99 (1973) (striking down a state abortion statute because it "substantially limited" a pa-
tient's "right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician's best judg-
ment and the physician's right to administer [care]"). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-
66 (1973) (recognizing the "right of the physician to administer medical treatment according
to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compel-
lingustifications for intervention").
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., joined by Stewart,
J., dissenting).
Had the doctor defendant here.., been convicted for doing nothing more than ex-
pressing opinions to persons coming to the clinic that certain contraceptive devices,
medicines or practices would do them good and would be desirable, or for telling
people how devices could be used, I can think of no reasons at this time why their
expressions of views would not be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, which guarantee freedom of speech.
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majorities, these dissents noted categorically that a physician could not be
sanctioned for expressing opinions and beliefs about a potential course of
treatment. 5 Two decades later, in Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians & Gynecologists2 76 and City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Repro-
277ductive Health, Inc., the Court struck down governmental interference
with the exchange of information between doctor and patient. At issue were
requirements that physicians inform women seeking abortions about the
State's position on abortion, potential services as alternatives to abortion,
and certain characteristics of the fetus at the time of the contemplated abor-
278tion. The Court struck down these requirements because (1) they were
"designed not to inform ... but rather to persuade," and (2) "a rigid re-
quirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases, irre-
spective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes upon the discretion
of the pregnant woman's physician and thereby imposes [an] undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket., 279 The Court found that these rigid mandates
were "contrary to accepted medical practice," 280 could "infringe upon [the
physician's] professional responsibilities," 281 and that "[a]ll this is, or comes
close to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the profes-
sional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures ... the dia-
logue between the woman and her physician. ' 282 Without basing its holding
on the First Amendment, the Court struck down these requirements because
they burdened, without sufficient justification, a woman's ability to obtain
an abortion.
283
Id. at 529 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "If all the appellants had done was to advise people
that they thought the use of contraceptives was desirable, or even to counsel their use, the ap-
pellants would, of course, have a substantial First Amendment claim." Id.; see also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513-15 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The right of the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights seems so
obviously within First Amendment rights as to need no extended discussion.... Of
course a physician can talk freely and fully with his patient without threat of retalia-
tion by the State.... The State has no power to put any sanctions of any kind on
him for any views or beliefs that he has or for any advice he renders. These are his
professional domains into which the State may not intrude.
Id.
275 Perhaps due to the focus of these decisions, the dissents did not attempt to reconcile
their broad statements with the unchallenged existence of malpractice suits.
276 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
277 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
278 See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760-61 (elaborating on the informed consent provision).
279 Id. at 762 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 763.
282 Id.
283 See id. at 771-72.
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The Court substantially retreated from Thornburgh and Akron in Casey,
when it rejected an argument that a similar informational requirement im-
posed by the State of Pennsylvania was unconstitutional as well. Attempt-
ing to retain the central holding of Roe, while recalibrating the abortion bal-
ance to allow for greater expression of the State's interest in averting the
abortion, the plurality retreated from the breadth of its earlier holdings that
had prohibited the State from intervening in the informational dialogue be-
tween physician and patient.
2 4
To the extent Akron and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when
the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and
those of childbirth, and the "probable gestational age" of the fetus, those cases
go too far, are inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an important inter-
est in potential life, and are overruled.
285
With regard to the more specific claim about the infringement on physi-
cians' First Amendment rights, as noted above, the lead opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter tersely concluded:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are impli-
cated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information man-
dated by the State here.
286
As noted above, we should approach this brief pronouncement with
some caution and refrain from concluding lightly that the plurality meant to
appeal to the kind of rationality review used for economic regulations under
the Due Process Clause. Casey's main focus on the constitutional protec-
tion of the abortion procedure itself did not permit a wide ranging discus-
sion of First Amendment issues. Without committing to a particular test,
the plurality appears to have imported a more stringent rationality review
with some consideration of the First Amendment values "implicated" in the
communications between professional and client. Ultimately, it left the de-
velopment of a coherent framework for the analysis of professional speech
for another day.
284 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
285 Id. at 882.
286 Id. at 884. For a similar shorthand formulation in state court, see People v. Jeffers,
690 P.2d 194, 198 (Colo. 1984) (en banc), upholding a felony conviction for the unlawful
practice of medicine where an individual knowingly recommended, prescribed, and adminis-
tered medical treatment without a valid license, and noting that "[tihe practice of medicine
itself is not protected by the first amendment," and that "[t]herefore, reasonable regulation of
medical practice does not conflict with first amendment protections."
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Indeed, the Chief Justice's opinion, which spoke for four members of
the Court, did not refer to the First Amendment and simply noted that the
information requirement "is rationally related to the State's interest in as-
suring that a woman's consent to an abortion be a fully informed deci-
sion. 287 Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach thus echoed the due process
analysis elaborated by Justice White's dissenting opinion in Thornburgh.
There, Justice White had argued against "the possibility that the Constitu-
tion provides more than minimal protection for the manner in which a phy-
sician practices his or her profession or for the 'dialogues' in which he or
she chooses to participate in the course of treating patients." 218  Thinking it
"clear that regulation of the practice of medicine, like regulation of other
professions and of economic affairs generally, was a matter peculiarly
within the competence of legislatures," Justice White concluded "that such
regulation was subject to review only for rationality.
28 9
Justice White's rationality review, as adopted by four members of the
Court in Casey, fails to give professional speech its due. At a minimum,
professional speech should be accorded no less protection than commercial
speech. Neither the subject matter of the speech, nor the preexisting under-
standing between physician and patient about the boundaries of the conver-
sation, nor the fact that physicians are paid for advice that they render based
on a public body of knowledge, should suffice to deprive professional
speech of protection under the First Amendment. None of the arguments
based on economics, culture, democracy, liberty, or the centrality of any
physical or economic transaction suffices to displace protection for a com-
municative exchange that would otherwise be covered by the First Amend-
ment. Indeed, as compared to commercial speech, we might even expect
the deeper relationship between physician and patient to lead, at least in
some cases, to protection beyond that afforded to commercial speech.
287 Casey, 505 U.S. at 967 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Stevens and Blackmun would have struck
down the information requirement as unconstitutional without expressly discussing the First
Amendment question. See id. at 917 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 936 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
288 Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 746,
802 (1986) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Casey, 505
U.S. 833.
289 Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955)). Williamson was decided
when commercial speech was still subject to only rational basis review, and it is somewhat
unclear why Justice White, who appears to have accepted Virginia Pharmacy Board's protec-
tion of commercial speech, would so cavalierly cite Williamson for a proposition that had
been disavowed by the Court 10 years before hearing Thornburgh. Perhaps, though, the cita-
tion was not intended to appeal to precedent for analyzing commercial speech under rational
basis review, but simply as a reference to the standard governing rational basis review.
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1. Identifying Professional Speech
The issue of when speech should be considered to have taken place in a
professional setting is well illustrated by SEC v. Lowe, which concerned an
SEC order prohibiting the publication of a securities newsletter by a former
investment adviser who had lost his license due to fraudulent conduct.
290
The various opinions issued in that case also underscore the relationship
between the commercial speech doctrine and the constitutional protection of
professional speech. As did the court of appeals in Casey, the court of ap-
peals in Lowe analyzed the case as involving commercial speech.291 When
Lowe reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court analyzed the SEC's
restriction as the regulation of a profession.
292
Discussion about the relevant standards used was fairly extensive. The
Second Circuit assumed that the commercial speech doctrine could serve to
analyze restrictions on speech in the professions293 and the court was di-
vided mainly over whether the speech at issue fell within the commercial
(and hence, professional) sphere.294 The discussion regarding whether the
speech was commercial focused primarily on the content of the publication
instead of the relationship between Lowe and his readers.295 Writing for the
majority, Judge Oakes relied on Central Hudson's second definition of
commercial speech, "'expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience,"' 296 and held that the definition encompassed
290 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
291 See id. at 901 ("That commercial speech is involved leads to no different result."). In
Casey, the court of appeals reviewed the disclosure requirement under commercial speech
standards, noting that "[tjhis case involves commercial speech, and the clinics do not dispute
this point." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991).
292 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 190 (1985) ("We ... review ... with a particular
focus on the legislative history describing the character of the profession that Congress in-
tended to regulate.").
293 See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 900 n.6 ("[Wihether we view this case as one involving com-
mercial speech or the regulation of the professions, the [Act] does not conflict with the First
Amendment.").
294 See id. at 905 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
295 See id. at 900 (noting that commercial speech must be distinguished "'by its content'
(quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977)) (citations omitted)); id. at 906 (Brieant,
J., dissenting) ("Enough has been said concerning the contents of the Lowe newsletters to
demonstrate that they do more than 'propose commercial transactions."'). Although the ma-
jority acknowledges the district court judge's analysis, which was based on the distinction
between personal and impersonal investment advice, see id. at 895-96, and the dissent men-
tions in passing that the advice contained in the newsletter was not "individualized" and was
"immediately known to all" upon publication, id. at 903-04, this mode of analysis is not de-
veloped further in the opinions of the judges on appeal.
296 Id. at 900 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
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Lowe's sale of advice about the value of securities and the wisdom of pur-
chasing or selling securities.21 7 Judge Brieant, in his dissent, thought that
publication of the newsletter differed from the activities of an investment
adviser, much as the dissemination of a health care publication differed
from the practice of medicine. 29 Noting that the Supreme Court's commer-
cial speech doctrine was "confined to naked advertising" 299 and arguing that
the newsletter went beyond this narrow category by including "expression
of fact and opinion implicating... 'substantial individual and societal inter-
ests', 300 Judge Brieant was of the opinion that the newsletter did "more
than 'propose commercial transactions"'301 and was entitled to "full First
Amendment protection.
302
This debate, although understandable in light of the Court's commercial
speech rhetoric, misses the point of the protection and regulation of profes-
sional speech. Even true investment advice, which both the majority and
the dissent agreed could be regulated, does not always consist of proposing
a commercial transaction. To be sure, investment advisers might suggest
purchasing securities from the adviser, but core regulable investment advice
also would presumably include advice about the value of securities or the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, even when
those transactions would take place between the client and third parties who
have no financial or other relation to the adviser. That kind of communica-
tion is not captured by the phrase "propose a commercial transaction,"
30 3
since it is not a proposal to engage in a commercial transaction with the
speaker or the speaker's agent.30 4 Similarly, although a professional might
be viewed as engaged in the transaction of selling his professional advice,
one must, of course, distinguish between the offer of professional services,
which is akin to a commercial proposal,305 and the actual presentation of the
297 See id. at 900-01.
298 See id. at 903 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
299 Id. at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
300 Id. at 906 (citation omitted) (Brieant, J., dissenting).
301 Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
302 Id. at 906; see also id. at 907 ("[A]ppellees do seek to report 'newsworthy facts' and
make 'generalized observations' about economic and fimancial conditions as well as recom-
mending stocks and issuers.").
303 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
3 Cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that commercial speech is "speech in-
tended and used to promote a commercial transaction with the speaker" (emphasis added)).
305 Cf. McChesney, supra note 269, at 69 (discussing the promotion of professional
services).
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professional advice, which is no more a "commercial transaction" than is
the actual writing or reading of a book or newspaper that is available for
sale. The simultaneity of the production and consumption of the speech in
the case of professional advice should not obscure the fact that this commu-
nication is distinct from that of advertising the professional advice.
The debate in the court of appeals is reminiscent of the Supreme
Court's commercial speech decisions prior to Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,306 because it turned
on whether the newsletter contained either different or additional informa-
tion from the investment advice Lowe provided as a registered adviser. But
both the Investment Adviser's Act of 1940307 and common sense indicate
that the crucial difference lies elsewhere. The Act defines "investment ad-
viser" as one
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either di-
rectly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to
the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a rsgular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities.
The statutory exemption relevant in Lowe did not focus on the content
of the advice, but on its form and context, excluding "the publisher of any
bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of
general and regular circulation." 309 The majority reveals its contrary focus
on content, however, when it attempts to pick up on this latter formulation
of the exemption but transforms the exemption by noting that Lowe "is not
prohibited from publishing a newspaper of general interest and circula-
tion. '310 The exemption, however, says nothing about the content of the
publications or their particular "interest" to readers, but exempts "financial
publications" as long as they are of general and regular "circulation." The
last sentence of the Second Circuit's opinion, which summarizes the hold-
ing, appears to highlight the law's true concern, but does so without expla-
nation: "What [Lowe] is prohibited from doing is selling to clients advice
and counsel, analysis and reports as to the value of specific securities or as
to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling or holding specific
306 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
307 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 21 (1994).
308 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11).
309 Id.
310 SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 902 (1984) (emphasis added), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181
(1985).
1999]
842 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
securities." 311 It is thus the existence of a professional/client relationship
that triggers the SEC's legitimate regulatory authority.
By contrast, both Judge Weinstein in the district court 312 and Justice
Stevens in the Supreme Court,3 13 focused expressly on the difference in the
relationship between the speaker and the audience when comparing the tra-
ditional business of investment advisers to the business of disseminating a
publication of regular circulation. The Supreme Court3 14 and the district
court315 both read the statute narrowly in light of the First Amendment con-
cerns that would be raised if the Act were extended to cover Lowe's news-
letter. Both courts held that the Act did not reach the publication of imper-
sonal investment advisory material. 16 As Justice Stevens explained in the
opinion of the Court:
As long as the communications between petitioners and their subscribers re-
main entirely impersonal and do not develop into the kind of fiduciary, person-
to-person relationships that were discussed at length in the legislative history
of the Act and that are characteristic of investment adviser-client relationships,
we believe that the publications are, at least presumptively, within the exclu-
sion and thus not subject to registration under the Act.
317
Justice White, writing separately because he was unwilling to read the
statute narrowly, put the majority's statutory holding into constitutional
terms. Justice White noted that although speech and the press could not be
subject to restrictive licensing schemes, Lowe's status as a professional in-
troduced a feature that allowed for government regulation, and it was in-
cumbent on the Court "to locate the point where regulation of a profession
311 Id. (emphasis added).
312 See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The offer of defen-
dants to their subscribers to provide current information by telephone goes beyond impersonal
communication. It creates dangers of personal advice. The SEC may reasonably deny this
right to publishers barred from giving personal advice."), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
313 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985) (focusing on "[tihe content of the publi-
cations and the audience to which they are directed").
314 See id. at 210 n.58 ("[L]t is difficult to see why the expression of an opinion about a
marketable security should not also be protected [by the First Amendment].").
315 See 556 F. Supp. at 1370.
316 The District Court upheld the SEC's order insofar as it enjoined the provision of per-
sonal advice in a telephone hotline open to subscribers of the newsletter, see id. at 1371, and
this portion of the district court's order was not challenged in the Supreme Court, see Lowe,
472 U.S. at 186.
317 472 U.S. at 210. The cautionary use of "presumptively" simply avoided the issue of
whether the exclusion would reach an investment adviser's newsletter to clients with whom
the adviser had a trust relationship. See id. at 210-11 n.59 ("However, the Commission does
not suggest that this 'practice' [of advising several clients through the newsletter] is involved
here, thus, we have no occasion to address this concern.").
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leaves off and prohibitions on speech begin." 318  Seizing the analogy to
commercial speech and embracing the view that it is the special relationship
between professional and client that allows the government to regulate
communications within that relationship, he wrote:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exer-
cise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual needs
and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profes-
sion. Just as offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the regu-
lable transaction called a contract, the professional's speech is incidental to the
conduct of the profession.... Where the personal nexus between the profes-
sional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising
judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he
is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate
regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it
becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First
Amendment's command ....
We need not accept Justice White's paradigm of the speech/conduct
distinction, 32 nor do we need to subscribe to his narrow conception of ra-
tionality review as outlined in Thornburgh in order to agree with him that
speech in the professions may be regulated because of the relationship of
trust between professional and client, that is, because they have established
a special relationship beyond that between strangers discussing politics on
the street comer.
The threshold determination for enforcement of professional norms will
therefore be whether the speech is uttered in the course of professional
practice and not merely whether the speech was uttered by a professional.
The State's permissible interest in licensing physicians is limited to prac-
ticing physicians and does not allow the State to require a license as a pre-
requisite for a physician to speak about medicine outside the context of pro-
fessional practice. As Justice Jackson noted in Thomas v. Collins, "the state
may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license,
318 Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
319 Id.
320 For the classic articulation of the speech/conduct distinction, see THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). "The whole
theory rests upon the general proposition that expression must be free and unrestrained, that
the state may not seek to achieve other social objectives through control of expression, and
that the attainment of such objectives can and must be secured through regulation of action."
Id. at 115; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESsION 311
(1970) (noting that the distribution of commercial handbills is among the "activities [that] fall
within the system of commercial enterprise and are outside the system of freedom of expres-
sion" (emphasis added)); id. at 405 ("Communication also tends to become action as the
speaker assumes a personal relation to the listener, deals with him on a face-to-face basis, or
participates in an agency or partnership arrangement.").
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but ... it could [not] make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging
persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought. 321 Similarly, a
plaintiff in a malpractice case must demonstrate that the challenged advice
not only was issued by a physician, but that it was conveyed in the context
of an established physician-patient relationship.
322
Justice Stevens's and Justice White's opinions in Lowe point to a view
of professional speech that bears significant similarities to the Court's view
of commercial speech, although not for the reasons discussed by the Second
Circuit. Both Justice Stevens and Justice White emphasize the importance
of the relationship to a client for whose benefit the State may regulate the
communication. This is not far from the Court's examination of commer-
cial communications with the interests of the listener in mind. Indeed, the
Court remarked that professionals' interests may be subordinated to those of
their clients when it noted in Casey that "[w]hatever constitutional status the
doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context
it is derivative of the woman's position. 323 As in the case of commercial
speech, the focus on the listener in professional speech would again be,
strictly speaking, misplaced, because a professional's interest in communi-
324cating to a client should be constitutionally relevant. Nonetheless, the fo-
cus on the listener would point to the existence of a professional-client dia-
logue as a bounded speech practice in which the communicative project can
be defined ex ante. Here, too, and perhaps even more obviously than in the
case of commercial speech, government regulation may facilitate the exis-
tence of the speech practice, because meaningful medical advice can only be
gained when the patient is assured that the physician providing the advice
remains true to the precepts of the profession. Government regulation and
licensing of the profession as well as the legal enforcement of professional
norms thus may assist in establishing the trust that patients can place in their
physicians.
2. Regulating Professional Speech
Although the Court has said even less about the extent of permissible
regulation of professional speech than about identifying the category of such
communications, it would seem that the scope of permissible regulation of
the physician-patient dialogue must be determined with a view to the nature
321 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
322 See Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hosp., 557 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (App. Div. 1990).
323 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
324 Cf Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478-80 (1997) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting that the listener's interests should not be made the sole touchstone of
the constitutional analysis of commercial speech).
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of the underlying relationship. Apart from the recognition of a predefined
communicative project, the physician-patient relationship is marked by an
imbalance of authority. Patients seeking the help of a physician tend to lack
the knowledge to evaluate their own medical condition or to understand
fully the various treatment options apart from their careful presentation by
the physician.325 They are not privy to the discourse of medical science and
are not usually in a position to rely on their own evaluation of the best
course of action independent from their encounters and discussions with
physicians. To varying degrees, patients will "suspend their critical facul-
ties and defer to physicians' opinions."3 26 Although patients may get a sec-
ond opinion, the social practice of seeking treatment from a physician, or
even a second opinion, is not a general unbounded scholarly investigation,
but the placing of trust in, and the recognition of the authority of, one or
more physicians. Undoubtedly as a result of this imbalance, the social
practice surrounding medical care and advice includes the recognition that
physicians assume certain fiduciary responsibilities in the context of this
relationship. 327 A physician generally must act in the patient's best inter-
est32' and is expected to use his best judgment, as Robert Goldstein has said,
to bring "general knowledge to bear on the unique circumstances of a par-
ticular client in the context of a professional helping relationship." 329 Phy-
sicians avoid conflicts of interest and act in paternalistic ways, such as
withholding information from patients where "communication of
the... information would present a threat to the patient's well-being."
330
Permissible regulation may track these concerns.
325 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The average patient
has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to
whom he can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision."); id. at 782
("His dependence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of
contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject.").
326 Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the
Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 226 (1994); see also
CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONsENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN
PsYCHIATRY 3-5 (1984) (explaining the need for informed consent).
327 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782 ("The patient's reliance upon the physician is a trust
of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arms-
length transactions.").
328 Clinical trials raise difficult ethical problems, in part, because the individual patient in
the control group may not be receiving the treatment that the physician would think best under
the circumstances. Yet, this is an exception that proves the rule. Physicians feel the need to
justify such "treatment" and must therefore obtain the informed consent of participating indi-
viduals.
329 Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking Pro-
cess, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 787, 862 (1996).
330 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
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The recognition that speech in the physician-patient relationship may be
regulated in a manner that speech outside that context cannot, does not
mean that restrictions on professional speech do not raise First Amendment
concerns. To the contrary, Rust v. Sullivan indicates that professional
speech is an important, albeit bounded, communicative realm that is worthy
of constitutional protection.331 In upholding the regulation that physicians
employed by federally funded family planning services could not discuss
abortion as a method of family planning, the Court in Rust, as noted in the
Introduction, did not hold that the government may dictate what federally
funded physicians may say. The Court noted that with regard to traditional
spheres of free expression, such as public fora and public universities, the
Constitution demands government neutrality with regard to speech even
when the government funds the institution, and that a similar argument
might be made that "traditional relationships such as that between doctor
and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Gov-
ernment regulation, even when subsidized by the Government." 332  The
Court ultimately found it unnecessary to address that potential argument be-
cause the physician in Rust was acting as a service provider in a federally
defined program instead of as a traditional physician.333
The implications of Rust and Casey may seem contradictory at first
blush, in that professional speech may seem both more and less protected
than nonprofessional speech. The content of speech by a person standing on
the street comer generally is not subject to regulation absent a compelling
interest. Casey suggests that the content of professional speech, in contrast,
generally is subject to "reasonable regulation" by the State when it takes
place without federal support.334 When the government chooses to employ
the street-comer speaker and the physician, however, Rust implies that the
government can dictate the speech of the former but not of the latter.
An initial reply might point out that this view overstates the State's
ability to regulate government-funded speech outside the professional
realm. Rust itself noted that government funding of a public forum is sub-
331 See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
332 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
333 See id. (observing that the relationship was not "sufficiently all encompassing so as to
justify an expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice"). In other
words, the Court's reference to "comprehensive medical advice" should not be read as a refer-
ence to advice with regard to all medical issues but instead as a reference to advice from a
full-fledged physician acting as such. Even physicians practicing a limited specialty provide
comprehensive professional services in the sense that they offer full advice within the realm of
their professional expertise and provide the patient information about the limitations of their
practice.
334 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("Advertising, like all public ex-
pression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.").
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ject to a principle of neutrality. 335 Thus, when the government chooses to
fund the street-comer speaker's own speech, as opposed to employing the
speaker as a government spokesperson, the government may not impose
viewpoint restrictions on the recipient of the funds.336 Only when the gov-
ernment employs an individual as its mouthpiece may the government dic-
tate what its spokesperson will say. Applying this view to the physician
would appear to indicate that the physician is protected from government
censure under Rust only when the physician is merely "subsidized" by the
government, that is, when the physician's own speech is funded by the fed-
eral fisc. 3 37 Rust arguably says nothing about a full-fledged government
employee who happens to be a physician, and thus the opinion possibly
suggests that the government's full-fledged employee, that is, the family
planning counselor disseminating the government's family planning advice,
may be compelled to follow a government script. Accordingly, it might be
claimed that the contradiction is illusory.
This initial reply points to the resolution of the tension, but it is not yet
complete. The problem lies in distinguishing the circumstances in which a
government-funded physician may be said to have become the govern-
ment's mouthpiece from those in which the government essentially must be
viewed as funding the physician's own speech. To be sure, there is no
question that the President may fire the Surgeon General for making public
statements that the President determines to be contrary to public policy or
even plain politics. The fact that the Surgeon General is a physician makes
no difference, because in speaking about public health issues, the Surgeon
General is not acting within the traditional doctor-patient relationship that
defines the bounded discourse of the profession. It is far less certain, how-
ever, whether a government physician treating a patient at a Veterans Af-
fairs hospital could be dismissed on the basis that the physician provided
professionally sound advice with which the President disagreed on political
grounds. Although Rust does not address the question of a federally em-
ployed (as opposed to a subsidized) physician, it does suggest that the phy-
sician's status as a federal grantee or full-time federal employee does not
determine whether the neutrality principle should be held to apply. Instead,
Rust focused, once again, on the listener, asking whether the physician-
patient relationship was "sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an
335 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 199-200.
336 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding that a public university's refusal to fund a religious student newspaper violated the
First Amendment).
337 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.
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expectation on the part of the patient of comprehensive medical advice."
338
Again, the focus on the listener is a proxy for the recognition of a deter-
mined social practice that is protected by the First Amendment. As Rust
notes, the expectation must be "reasonabl[e].,, 339  The First Amendment
protects not the individual listener's subjective desire for information, but
the practice of the profession.340 In light of the Court's discussion in Rust, it
is indeed doubtful that the government could employ a physician to serve in
the traditional capacity of a physician and nonetheless dictate the physi-
cian's speech to his or her patient. When the government employs a profes-
sional to provide advice to clients, the government will be subject to the
neutrality principle, unless the government has sufficiently extracted the in-
terlocutors from the social practice that ordinarily provides the context for
the advice.
The notion of funding a bounded speech institution is therefore both
similar to, and different from, the concept in Rosenberger of funding "pri-
vate" speech. It is similar to funding private speech in the sense that the
speaker enjoys a degree of autonomy from the government despite the gov-
ernment funding; the government is funding speech that is ultimately con-
trolled by the speaker, not the government. In both situations the govern-
ment is funding a preexisting speech practice that is not defined by the
government. Government funded medical advice is different from the
speech in Rosenberger, however, in that the latter was truly private, in the
sense that the government had no legitimate claim on the content of the
funded speech. The students in Rosenberger were in complete control over
the content of the speech and were at liberty to "us[e] speech to create new
identities., 341 The treating physician, in contrast, is acting in a "public" ca-
pacity even when not funded by the government. The physician's speech is
public in the sense that the physician is not permitted to use speech in novel
ways or to challenge the basic institution of the medical dialogue between
physician and patient. Despite this "public" function of the speech, how-
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Cf International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Mhe inquiry [into whether certain gov-
ernment property constitutes a public forum] must be an objective one, based on the actual,
physical characteristics and uses of the property."); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720,
737-38 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If our public forum jurisprudence
is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective characteristics of Government
property and its customary use by the public may control the case.").
341 Post, supra note 246, at 631; see also Schauer, Language, supra note 237, at 283-85.
At least this was the assumption on which the Court appears to have been operating in decid-
ing the case.
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ever, the physician retains a measure of independence from the government
when the government employs the physician to act as a professional.342
Rust and, although to a lesser extent, Rosenberger may thus be read to
suggest that in funding a bounded speech institution, the government will be
held to funding the entire institution unless it extracts the actors sufficiently
from their traditional roles. This extraction would be necessary to put eve-
ryone on notice that the government-funded speaker is not acting in his or
her traditional role within a particular speech institution. Thus, a federally
funded physician cannot be given a script, although a federally funded fam-
ily planning official can. To be sure, the government may fund physicians
expressly for a particular specialty and thus limit the procedures that they
may perform. Such limitations are entirely compatible with the conscien-
tious practice of the profession. The government may not, however, pro-
hibit a government physician from providing the truthful medical advice
that a conscientious private physician, who practiced a limited specialty,
would nonetheless provide. Thus, the State may decide that its physicians
will not perform a certain procedure, but it must not prevent a government
physician (acting as a physician instead of as an official family planning
counselor) from advising a patient about the possibility of obtaining such a
procedure elsewhere and of the nature of the limitations on the physician's
343practice.
342 For valuable discussions of a context-dependent obligation of government neutrality
in funding speech, see David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 743-47 (1992) (arguing for
government neutrality in funding of, inter alia, professional fiduciary counseling); Robert C.
Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996) (drawing a distinction between speech
within public discourse and speech within government's managerial domain, and suggesting a
presumption of neutrality in subsidies of speech within the former realm); Jessica A. Roth, It
Is Lawyers We Are Funding: A Constitutional Challenge to the 1996 Restrictions on the Le-
gal Services Corporation, 33 -ARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 107 (1998) (arguing for the applica-
tion of public forum analysis to government restrictions on funding of Legal Services Corpo-
ration lawyers); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112
HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) (arguing that a coherent approach to speech funding cases must take
account of institution-specific decision making).
343 These same issues are at stake in the current round of Legal Services Corporation liti-
gatioh. See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999); Legal Aid Soc'y v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998). According to the principles discussed in
the text, the government would not violate the First Amendment by limiting the legal services
for which it pays, as long as private attorneys might similarly limit their practice and none-
theless ethically fulfill their professional roles. This view would reject, on the one hand, the
argument that the First Amendment is entirely inapplicable in this context and, on the other,
the contention that the government has created a public forum for the private expression of
ideas and therefore is compelled by the First Amendment to fund the litigation of every claim.
Instead, a view centered on the social practice at issue, that is, the legal profession, would rec-
ognize that when the government funds professional services, the First Amendment is impli-
cated and requires that restrictions respect the integrity of the profession.
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C. Commercial Speech
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil itself was, of course, also a case about the speech of professionals. 344 At
issue was the restriction of pharmacists' advertising, and Virginia defended
the law as a regulation of professional practice.345 The Court recognized the
pharmacists' special "expertise" and professional relationship with physi-
cians and customers, but did not see how the ban on price advertising fur-
thered Virginia's interest in professionalism. 346 The State had argued that
price advertising would lead to price competition, which, in turn, would lead
to a reduction in the professional services that pharmacists could afford to
provide to their customers. The Court rejected the notion that the advertis-
ing ban directly affected Virginia's goal in professionalism, because the
provision of a certain level of services could be regulated directly without
an advertising ban.347 Similarly, the ban did nothing to ensure that the
pharmacist would respond to the reduced competition by maintaining pro-
fessional standards. The ban thus unnecessarily infringed upon speech
without any promise of success. Having dismissed the fit between the
regulation and Virginia's asserted goal, the Court abandoned further consid-
eration of the professional speech aspect of the case.348 Due to the posture
of Virginia Board of Pharmacy, that is, the project of reconsidering Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen,349 the premium was not on explaining why commercial
speech could be restricted by some invocation of (or analogy to) regulating
speech in the professions, but, instead, on why commercial speech that did
nothing more than offer product X at price Y could not be suppressed en-
tirely. The posture of the case thus appears to have skewed both the major-
ity and the concurrence's conclusions, and we are left with little more than
the ipse dixit of "greater objectivity and hardiness" to justify the regulation
of truth and deception in commercial speech.350
The Supreme Court's superficial commercial speech rhetoric thus has
obscured the deeper connection between commercial and professional
speech as well as what appears to be the theory motivating the First
344 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
345 See id. at 750-51, 766.
346 Id. at 767.
347 See id. at 769 ("The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards
one way or the other.").
348 Indeed, the Court expressly refused even to consider the implications of its holding
for commercial advertising of other professionals, such as lawyers or physicians who "do not
dispense standardized products." Id. at 773 n.25.
349 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
350 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
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Amendment protection of relational speech institutions. To be sure, the re-
lationship between physician and patient and the duties attendant to that re-
lationship are substantially deeper than those between vendor and purchaser.
Nonetheless, in both situations, it is the relationship that defines the dis-
course within which both speakers and listeners have rights under the First
Amendment.
1. Identifying Commercial Speech
The determination whether certain speech takes place within a particu-
lar bounded speech practice or beyond will differ depending on the particu-
lar speech institution involved. For example, as discussed above, when ex-
amining regulations of the learned professions, the inquiry will largely focus
on whether the professional communicated personal or impersonal advice to
the listener. Publication of advice for indiscriminate distribution generally
will defeat a conclusion that the advice was rendered within the profes-
sional-client relationship, although confining the communication to a pri-
vate conversation will not necessarily entail the conclusion that such a rela-
tionship was established. Justice White's definition in SEC v. Lowe
succinctly captured what is perhaps the essential aspect of a communication
that takes place within the professional-client relationship.35 1 As with any
351 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J. & Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("One who takes
the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
client in the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances is properly viewed as en-
gaging in the practice of a profession."). For a critique of this view and the suggestion that the
line between specific and general advice (as a matter of substance, as opposed to the identity
of the addressee) is a preferable marker for when First Amendment considerations may arise,
see SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 902 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), and
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985
Sup. CT. REv. 93, 140. Justice White's definition, however, resonates with the case law con-
cerning the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., State Bar v. Cramer, 249 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Mich. 1976) (holding that the advertisement and distribution to the general public of forms
and documents used to obtain a divorce would not amount to the practice of law, but that per-
sonal advice, individual preparation of documents, and filing documents in court are consid-
ered to be aspects of professional practice).
"[Flunctionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others
that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the professional
judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and philoso-
phy of law to a specific legal problem of a client."
Id. at 13 (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5
(1969)); see also New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (App. Div.),
rev'd, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967) (reversing the lower court's holding that publication of a
legal self-help book amounted to the practice of law); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d
913, 919 (Or. 1975) (holding that the distribution of do-it-yourself divorce kits does not con-
stitute the practice of law, but personal contact with customers in the nature of consultation,
explanation, and advice would constitute such practice).
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other definition, however, it will only be as good as it reflects current social
practice. For example, although current social practice may be defined with
reasonable hope of accuracy, the Supreme Court of Michigan cautioned that
"any attempt to formulate a lasting, all encompassing definition of 'practice
of law' is doomed to failure 'for the reason that.., such practice must nec-
essarily change with the everchanging business and social order."'
352
With regard to the regulation of commercial speech, the question of
what is considered part of the bounded discourse is more difficult to answer,
because we cannot rely on the relatively clear consideration of whether the
speaker is reasonably understood by the interlocutors as applying consid-
ered judgment to the listener's particular circumstances for the benefit of the
listener. To the contrary, most commercial speech today occurs in the im-
personal realm of mass communication.
Neither of the Supreme Court's specific proposals in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission will suffice to define
353commercial speech. The fact that speech is "related solely to the eco-
nomic interests of the speaker and its audience"3 54 does not suffice to ensure
that speaker and listener are engaged in a predefined speech practice. Un-
less there is a preexisting understanding (whether through an explicit
agreement or a traditional social practice) between speaker and listener, the
determination that a particular conversation only relates to a certain subset
of a person's interests does not justify legally confining the discussion to
that limited realm. At the other extreme is the Court's suggested definition
of speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."
355
This definition is undoubtedly too narrow, because advertising can do much
more and yet retain a core of commercial speech. The fact that speech in-
cludes discussions of matters of general public concern and debate, for ex-
Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relation-
ship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. This is the essence of legal
practice--the representation and the advising of a particular person in a particular
situation.
Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 998 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So.
2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1974) (holding that distribution of divorce kits to the general public consti-
tutes the practice of law). On the unauthorized practice of law generally, see Deborah L.
Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Un-
authorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981), and Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse
ofOccupational Licensing, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 6 (1976).
352 Cramer, 249 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 287 N.W.
377, 380 (Mich. 1939)).
353 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
354 Id. at 561.
355 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
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ample, does not preclude the regulation of such speech as commercial. 56
Enlarging the definition to include all speech that proposes a commercial
transaction (whether or not it does more) would come much closer to the
mark, but would still contain the implication that the communication itself
must constitute the proposal.
A more explicit reliance on the professional speech parallel would sug-
gest a focus on whether the speech is issued between speaker and listener
within their relationship as vendor and consumer, that is, whether the speech
specifically pertains to the audience as potential customers. Under this
view, the question would be whether the speech is directed at inducing the
audience to purchase a particular product or service from the speaker. At
times, this examination will depend on an extensive investigation of both
the content and context of the speech in question. Following Rust v. Sulli-
van,357 the touchstone of the inquiry would be the perception of the reason-
able person receiving the communication, but there probably would be little
difference between that standard and that of a reasonable, third-party ob-
server. The question would be whether a person, knowing all the relevant
facts, would reasonably understand the communication to be directed at the
audience as potential consumers.
Two cases, Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC358 and Scientific Manufacturing
Co. v. FTC,359 illustrate the basic importance of context. In both cases, the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") issued orders against
the dissemination of false or misleading brochures containing "scientific in-
formation" about the ill effects of using aluminum cookware. In Scientific
Manufacturing, the brochures were widely sold and distributed by an unor-
thodox scientist and his company who were not "engaged in any way or in-
terested materially in the manufacture, sale or distribution of cooking uten-
sils of any sort."360 Some of the brochures had been obtained by the Perma-
Maid Company, which was in the business of manufacturing, selling, and
distributing cooking utensils made from other metals. That company's sales
force distributed the pamphlets to its prospective customers. Although the
cease and desist order was upheld against Perma-Maid,361 it was set aside
with respect to the Scientific Manufacturing Company,362 the producer of
356 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 61, 68 (1983) ("Advertisers
should not be permitted to immunize false or misleading product information from govern-
ment regulation simply by including references to public issues." (citation omitted)).
357 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
359 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941).
359 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941).
360 Id. at 641.
361 See Perma-Maid, 121 F.2d at 284.
362 See ScientificMfg. Co., 124 F.2d at 644.
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the brochures. The court in Scientific Manufacturing rejected the FTC's ar-
gument that the Federal Trade Commission Act allowed the Commission to
enjoin the distribution of material that misleads the purchasing public. 363 In
light of the serious First Amendment concerns raised by the Commission's
broad interpretation of the statute, the court concluded that the Commis-
sion's power extended only to "the unfair acts of traders in the affected
commerce." 364  The author of the brochures "dealt in opinions and no
more," and allowing the Commission to enjoin the dissemination of such
material on the basis of its falsehood would install "the Commission ... [as
the] absolute arbiter of the truth of all printed matter moving in interstate
commerce, even where scholars in the particular field of knowledge were in
wide disagreement. 3 65 The identical speech, in other words, could be pro-
hibited when issued by the seller of the underlying (or a competing) good in
the context of a sales transaction or promotion, but could not be prohibited
when issued by someone who was not so connected to the purchasing pub-
lic.
366
A connection to a particular brand would not always be necessary in or-
der to classify certain speech as commercial. Central Hudson, for example,
viewed non-brand-specific advertising by a monopolist as commercial,367
and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. recognized more broadly that "a
company with sufficient control of the market for a product may be able to
promote the product without reference to its own brand names." 368 Simi-
larly, a campaign by an industry association directed at inducing the audi-
ence to purchase its members' products need not- mention the members'
brand names to qualify as a commercial advertisement.
369
Two additional FTC investigations make clear, however, that questions
concerning the commercial nature of generic advertising are not susceptible
to precise, formulaic solutions. In the first investigation, the FTC regulated
as commercial speech a publication campaign by the National Commission
on Egg Nutrition ("NCEN") that denied the existence of scientific evidence
363 See id.
36 Id. at 643.
365 Id. at 644.
366 See id. at 644-45 ("The same opinion, however, may become material to the jurisdic-
tion of the [FTC] and enjoinable by it if, wanting in proof or basis in fact, it is utilized in the
trade to mislead or deceive the public or to harm a competitor.").
367 See 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (holding that the advertisements of an electric utility
company in a noncompetitive market were commercial speech).
368 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 n.13 (1983).
369 See id. ("That a product is referred to generally does not... remove it from the realm
of commercial speech.... [A] trade association may make statements about a product with-
out reference to specific brand names.").
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demonstrating a link between the consumption of eggs and an increase in
the risk of heart disease.370 The Commission's decision was upheld by the
Seventh Circuit.371 Because NCEN was a private nonprofit corporation,
composed of representatives of various egg producers, and because "[t]he
clear purpose of the statements in issue [was] to encourage the consumption
of eggs by allaying fears the public may have about their high cholesterol
content, 3 72 the court treated the communication as commercial speech de-
spite the fact that the campaign was undertaken by a trade association, was
not brand specific, and took a position with regard to a genuine contro-
versy.373 The court noted that the commercial speech doctrine was
"not... narrowly limited to the mere proposal of a particular commercial
transaction but extend[ed] to false claims as to the harmlessness of the ad-
vertiser's product asserted for the purpose of persuading members of the
reading public to buy the product. 374
In the second investigation, the FTC struggled much more with the
question whether an advertising campaign that was not brand-specific and
took a position on an issue of general debate was to be classified as com-
mercial speech.375 The subject of the investigation was an advertising series
entitled Of Cigarettes and Science, which was issued by the R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company and discussed the procedures and results of scientific in-
quiries into alleged links between cigarette smoke and various ailments.
376
The campaign did not refer to any particular cigarette brand and simply was
signed "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company." The administrative law judge
had originally ordered the case dismissed on the basis that the campaign did
not involve commercial speech, but the Commission, over the objection of
its chairman, reversed.377 In remanding the case to the administrative law
judge, the Commission dismissed Chairman Oliver's argument that the
campaign's direct comment on an issue of public concern sufficed for the
370 See FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1975),
(finding that because "NCEN was organized for the profit of the egg industry .... the pro-
nouncements ... were advertisements"), appeal after remand, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977).
371 570 F.2d at 165.
372 517 F.2d at 488.
373 See id. at 490.
374 570 F.2d at 163.
375 In re RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 113 F.T.C. 344 (consent order); 111 F.T.C. 584
(1989) (show cause order); In re RI. Reynolds Tobacco Co., FTC Docket No. 9206 (Mar. 4,
1988) (order of remand).
376 See In re R.J. Reynolds, FTC Docket No. 9206, at 3 (Mar. 4, 1988) (describing the
advertisement as a discussion of "scientific hypotheses").
377 See id. at 20, 26-55.
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conclusion that the campaign was not commercial in nature.378 Whether the
speech was promotional in nature had to be examined in light of the history,
form, and context of the campaign. The Commission suggested the rele-
vance of such factors as whether the advertising made reference to a specific
product, concerned an attribute of that product, was paid for by the seller of
the product, and appeared to serve the speaker's economic interests in the
sale of the product. But the Commission did not limit itself to these factors.
The order of remand expressly authorized the administrative law judge to
examine
whether [the advertising] was paid-for, where and in which publications it was
disseminated, whether it was placed in editorial space (such as an [op-ed]
page) or advertising space in the publication, whether it was prepared as a let-
ter to the editor, whether it was sent to representatives of the media for selec-
tion on merit by editorial boards, and to whom it was disseminated outside the
media[;]...
... whether it was targeted to consumers or legislators; whether it was in-
tended to affect demand for Reynolds' cigarettes or brands or to affect par-
ticular legislative or regulatory proposals; whether the advertisement was sub-
jected to copy testing or to review by focus groups and, if so, the nature of the
questions used in the copy tests or focus group sessions; and the results of
those procedures both in terms of what they showed and what changes, if any,
Reynolds made in response to those showings[; and any e]vidence relating to
the message(s) Reynolds itself intended to convey through the advertisement[,
as well as] ... Reynolds' share of the cigarette market ....
If we follow Rust and take the perceptions of the reasonable recipient of
the speech as the touchstone for deciding whether the communication is
commercial, or even if we simply attempt an objective evaluation of the
communication from a third-party perspective, the Commission's reliance
on the corporation's intent (to the extent that this concept makes sense)
would retain relevance not so much as an independent factor, but as an indi-
cation of the likely perception of the speech by the listener or neutral ob-
server. The relevant point here is not that any particular test is valid, but
simply that the list of factors demonstrates the difficulty that even an agency
with expertise in regulating advertising has experienced in the attempt to
define precisely the parameters of promotional advertising. This accords, in
turn, with the Supreme Court's refusal in Bolger to identify a limited set of
factors for the classification of advertising.380 As these decisions make
378 Cf id. at 45-48 (Oliver, Chairman, dissenting) (arguing that according to Supreme
Courtprecedent, R.J. Reynolds's communication was not commercial speech).
3V See id. at 18-19 (order of remand). R.J. Reynolds ultimately withdrew the campaign,
thereby precluding a final decision on the part of the Commission or any reviewing court.
380 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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clear, the legal concept of commercial speech follows the social practice of
the bounded discourse between the speaker and listener as vendor and con-
sumer. The description of the boundary is as much an enterprise in sociol-
ogy as it is one in constitutional law.
2. Regulating Commercial Speech
If professional and commercial speech are viewed as bounded speech
institutions, then regulation of speech that pertains to the relationship be-
tween professional and client, or buyer and seller, should be permissible
even when content- or viewpoint-based, insofar as it preserves the respec-
tive institution. The boundaries of the discourse thus may be policed, but,
conversely, as long as the speaker remains within the boundary of the insti-
tution, the speaker would be engaged in protected speech.
Regulations protecting consumers from false or deceptive advertising,
even when based on prophylactic rules that generalize about the impact of
certain categories of communication, are proper means by which the gov-
ernment fosters the speech institution. Even the prohibition on advertising,
or the suggestion to a client to pursue an illegal course of conduct, may fall
within this rationale. The dialogue between buyer and seller, or profes-
sional and client, takes place as part of a social exchange that involves fun-
damental agreement on governing background norms. Such a dialogue is
not about creating new identities or challenging each other's values and
norms. Indeed, in the medical context, the Hippocratic oath and the rule of
professional responsibility of the American Medical Association contain
express pledges to practice one's profession within the realm of legally
available remedies and to work for legal change where medicine and law
diverge.381 Viewed from the internal point of view of the speech practice,
such regulation may be understood as furthering, not detracting from, First
Amendment values.
According to this view, Central Hudson's quantitative approach to
commercial speech regulation is misguided in that it simply lessens the
protection afforded commercial speech as compared to noncommercial
382speech. A more qualitative approach would instead examine the impact
of a given regulation on the bounded discourse of the affected speech prac-
tice. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico is
381 See COUNCIL ON ETFIcAL AND JUDIcIAL AFFAIRs, American Medical Association
Principles of Medical Ethics, in CODE OF MEDICAL ETIcs xiv, xiv (1996) (requiring doctors
to respect the law but encouraging change where necessary).
3 2 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980); see also supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Central Hudson
decision).
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the most egregious violation of this qualitative principle, since the reasons
for restricting the speech in that case were to hinder, not protect, the com-
municative relationship between advertiser and audience.383 The restriction
articulated in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.384 on the dissemina-
tion of information about activities, such as gambling, that are lawful in an-
other state similarly would not be justified in terms of protecting the con-
sumer or the integrity of the discourse, unless, perhaps, some argument were
made that gambling was addictive in a manner that significantly altered the
relationship between the vendor and the purchaser such that the former in-
curred a special duty of concern with regard to the latter. In both Posadas
and Edge Broadcasting, the reason for keeping the information from poten-
tial consumers was not based on a concern about such information coming
from any seller, but simply on a desire to keep such information from the
audience as a general matter.
A more difficult case is Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.385 Due to the
quantitative nature of the Central Hudson test, the prohibition on defense
attorneys' solicitation of accident victims within thirty days of an accident
appeared easily defensible. The State's interest in protecting the reputation
of its attorneys indeed would strike many as "substantial," and the prohibi-
tion on soliciting accident victims within thirty days of the trauma would
appear to lessen the view of attorneys as ambulance-chasers. Under the
qualitative approach of Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willing-
boro,386 Carey v. Population Services International,387 and City of Cincin-
nati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,388 however, it is initially unclear what
"commercial" harm Florida's regulations were aimed at preventing. 389
There was no evidence, for example, that accident victims who received di-
rect mailings from attorneys within thirty days of the accident perceived
such contacts as coercive due to the recipients' temporary state of emotional
vulnerability, 39 which would, indeed, have raised a consumer protection
383 478 U.S. 328 (1986); see also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing
the prohibition of truthful speech in order to suppress demand).
3 509 U.S. 418 (1993); see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing
the prohibition on advertisements for lotteries by broadcast stations licensed in states where
lotteries are illegal).
385 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding a Florida rule against soliciting accident victims
within 30 days of an accident); see also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (noting that
the Court did not use a consumer protection rationale in upholding this speech restriction).
386 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
387 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
388 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
389 For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part I.
390 Even this justification of the regulations would have been questionable, since the re-
striction operated solely on plaintiffs' attorneys and did not preclude defendants' attorneys
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concern specifically related to the commercial aspect of the speech. What
makes this case difficult, however, and not plainly wrong, is that the profes-
sional duties of attorneys as vendors of services cannot be examined apart
from the ethics of the profession itself. Moreover, in contrast to Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, in the case of regulating attorneys, the Supreme Court
undoubtedly thought itself to be peculiarly able to evaluate whether the re-
strictions reflected legitimate professional norms. It was thus the conflu-
ence of the bounded speech paradigm and the Court's peculiar status within
the speech practice being regulated that led to a decision allowing substan-
tial regulation on the basis of little evidence of harm.
391
Drawing on the connection between commercial and professional
speech, one must consider further the possibility that certain restrictions on
the government's selective funding of speech may apply to the commercial,
as well as the professional, realm. If the same principles discussed above
with regard to professional speech392 are to govern commercial speech, this
might mean that a state-funded vendor could not be precluded from provid-
ing truthful information about its products or the services it offers for sale.
The State could indeed deny advertising funds to a government vendor, as it
could with regard to a physician, since a failure to advertise is compatible
with the conscientious practice of each trade. Physicians and shopkeepers
do not universally engage in advertising, and they may practice their trade
conscientiously without doing so. A government vendor, however, may be
shielded from having to follow a script for answering questions about prod-
ucts in the way a government spokesperson would not.
from contacting accident victims immediately following an incident. Thus, even on the asser-
tion of a consumer protection rationale, the regulation is subject to a charge of underinclu-
siveness.
391 The Court in Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), was even more explicit in
drawing on an attorney's professional role when it extended a lawyer's duties beyond the
courtroom. The Court held that attorneys' out-of-court speech relating to their own pending
cases could be prohibited when there was a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to
the fair administration ofjustice. Id. at 1075. Noting that "[ain attorney's duties do not begin
inside the courtroom door," and that "[t]he role of attorneys in the criminal justice system
subjects them to fiduciary obligations to the court and the parties," Justice Kennedy concluded
that "[a] court can require an attorney's cooperation to an extent not possible of nonpartici-
pants." Id. at 1043, 1057 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In upholding the standard of material
prejudice, the majority noted that "[1]awyers representing clients in pending cases are key
participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the
precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct." Id. at 1074.
See discussion supra notes 332-39 and accompanying text.
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D. 44 Liquormart and the Power to License Liquor Dealers
The view of commercial and professional speech put forth in this Arti-
cle would help to resolve a curious discussion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island about the inability of a state to condition the receipt of a liquor
license on the promise not to advertise. 393 In Section VI of his plurality
opinion,394 Justice Stevens first disposes of the greater-includes-the-lesser
argument by noting that "banning speech may sometimes prove far more
intrusive than banning conduct," since communicating knowledge about an
activity is often more valuable than engaging in the activity itself.395 Rely-
ing on past opinions, Justice Stevens explains that "a State's regulation of
the sale of goods differs in kind from a State's regulation of accurate infor-
mation about those goods."396 He then adds a brief paragraph on the ques-
tion of licensing.
That the State has chosen to license its liquor retailers does not change the
analysis. Even though government is under no obligation to provide a person,
or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that conferral of the bene-
fit may be conditioned on the surrender of a constitutional right. See, e.g.,
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm 'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594
(1926). In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), relying on a host of
cases applying that principle during the preceding quarter century, the Court
explained that government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially his interest in
freedom of speech." Id., at 597. That teaching clearly applies to state attempts
to regulate commercial speech, as our cases striking down bans on truthful,
nonmisleading speech by licensed professionals attest. See, e.g., Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S., at 355; Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).f
97
According to one view, the licensing question is identical to that re-
garding whether the "greater" ability to forbid the activity includes the
"lesser" power to forbid communications about the activity. One might say
that the government's authority to license liquor dealers is much like its
authority to license movie theaters in that the power concerns actions in-
stead of speech. In the case of the movie theater, the licensing power per-
tains not to the content of the movies but to other concerns, such as the ob-
servance of occupancy limits and fire codes. In the case of liquor dealers,
393 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
394 This portion of Justice Stevens's opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,
and Thomas. See id. at 508-14.
395 Id. at 511.
396 Id. at 512; see also discussion supra note 204 and accompanying text (examining this
debate).
37 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 513.
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the licensing power could be viewed as directed at the observance of such
things as the required age of customers and any limitations on the quantity
of certain sales, not at the speech of the dealers. Conceiving of the govern-
ment's licensing authority in this way, the argument based on the licensing
power adds nothing to that based on the "greater" power to ban the activity.
The ability of a state to license an activity is at most the ability to forbid that
activity, since it entails the power to forbid the activity under certain cir-
cumstances. Thus, if the power to prohibit the activity entirely does not suf-
fice to suppress advertising, then neither should the power to place limita-
tions on the exercise of an activity by requiring vendors to obtain a license.
Citations to Perry and Frost would have been superfluous to make this
point.
Justice Stevens's introduction of Perry and Frost, therefore, must signal
a somewhat different concern. If the argument about licensing liquor deal-
ers adds anything to the discussion of the greater-includes-the-lesser argu-
ment, it must relate to some recognition of the State's ability to license not
only the actual sale of liquor, but also all of the other activities of a liquor
dealer, that is, a liquor dealer's speech as well as actions. With this recog-
nition in mind, the rebuttal of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument no
longer serves to dispose of the argument that the State's power to license
liquor dealers' words and deeds also entails the separate power of the State
to prohibit altogether certain words, such as price advertising. According to
this view, the greater power may indeed be greater than the lesser power,
and is certainly no longer different "in kind," since both relate to the regula-
tion of speech.
Having raised the licensing argument, however, the plurality fails to put
it to rest. Perry is unhelpful here. The cases applying the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine during the quarter century before Perry (and since) gen-
erally concerned situations in which a beneficiary of government largesse
was required to relinquish what otherwise would have been a constitutional
right to engage in certain action or speech in the recipient's "private capac-
ity." Perry itself is illustrative of this aspect of the doctrine. The petitioner
stated a successful First Amendment claim by alleging that a college board
of regents failed to rehire him based on his public disagreement with the
board about its education policies.3 98 Perry does not address the extent to
which the State can control a public educator's speech in the classroom.
Although Perry appears to preclude the State from withholding liquor li-
censes from applicants who, in the past, privately had voiced unorthodox
opinions about alcohol consumption, Perry says nothing about withdrawing
398 See 408 U.S. at 598.
1999]
862 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
liquor licenses from dealers who, in their capacities as liquor distributors,
advertise the price of their product or promote certain uses of alcohol of
which the State disapproves.
Perhaps because Perry is inadequate to dispose of the licensing argu-
ment, the plurality invokes the professional speech analogy. To be sure, it is
unhelpful to note that the "teaching [of Perry] clearly applies to state at-
tempts to regulate commercial speech,, 399 because, as just discussed, Perry
does not address the question about the licensing of liquor dealers' speech.
Nonetheless, the reference to the "speech by licensed professionals" does
make sense (and does confirm the suspicion that the plurality was concerned
with the argument based on the State's ability to license the speech of liquor
dealers), since professionals are subject to licensing not only of their deeds,
but of their words as well. Thus, in the case of professionals, we confront a
situation in which the State has the power to license speech, yet may not
prohibit speech altogether. Bates v. State Bar400 and Virginia Board of
Pharmacy,401 however, do not explain why that is so, nor do they explain
why professional speech should serve as an analogy for commercial speech.
Without an argument like the one fleshed out here about the permissible
scope of government regulation of professional speech, the licensing argu-
ment, as a justification for government prohibition of price advertising by
licensed liquor dealers, would indeed remain a formidable challenge. An
argument based on the recognition of bounded speech institutions, in con-
trast, supplies the link as well as the limitation on the government's licens-
ing authority. Insofar as the power to license liquor dealers includes the
power to license their speech, it derives from the power to regulate the
bounded speech institution which entails only such regulation as is neces-
sary to preserve the speech institution itself. The government may neither
suppress the speech entirely nor remodel the institution to its liking.
E. Tobacco Advertising and Physician Counseling
The notion of bounded speech practices may elucidate the analyses of
two recent initiatives restricting commercial and professional speech. The
first is the effort by the Food and Drug Administration, several states, and,
now, the Congress, to limit tobacco advertising.40 2 The second is the con-
399 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 513.
400 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
401 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
402 See generally Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996) (issuing
regulations governing the access to and the promotion of nicotine and tobacco products to
children and adolescents).
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flict surrounding the alleged medicinal uses of marijuana, which has arisen
by virtue of certain state referenda 403 that are contrary to federal drug pol-
icy.404 In both cases, the quantitative view of commercial and professional
speech provided in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission4 5 leads to the erroneous conclusion that the First Amendment
is of little moment in these matters, whereas a more qualitative approach in-
dicates the necessity of accommodating real constitutional concerns.
If applied with respect to tobacco advertising, Central Hudson would
demand that the restrictions materially advance, and be reasonably tailored
to advance, a substantial government interest. If preventing gambling by
Puerto Rico residents, and assisting states in preventing their citizens from
playing out-of-state lotteries each suffices to justify the restriction of com-
mercial speech, the reduction of the number of smokers should be deemed
"substantial" in this calculus as well. If we accept the government's claims
about the individual health consequences and the public health costs of to-
bacco consumption, then the government's interest in reducing the inci-
dence of smoking would easily seem substantial. The central question, then,
under Central Hudson would be whether a ban on tobacco advertising (or a
more limited restriction) furthers that goal and is reasonably tailored to do-
ing so.
Both in Central Hudson and Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,406 the Court was quick to recognize the con-
nection between advertising and demand. To be sure, Central Hudson in-
volved a monopoly and therefore precluded consideration of the argument
that advertising is aimed solely at inducing consumers to switch brands.
Neither Posadas nor Central Hudson confronted the argument that in a
"mature" market advertising affects only brand choice without raising over-
all demand. But courts of appeals since then have considered these addi-
tional arguments and nonetheless still have confirmed the connection be-
tween advertising and overall demand, at least in the case of alcohol
advertising. 407 And, as long as the connection between advertising and de-
mand does exist, a ban (or a lesser measure that is not fatally plagued by
403 See, e.g., Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West
1997) (attempting to ensure that "patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use
marijuana for medicinal purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to
criminal prosecution or sanction").
404 See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994).
405 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
406 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
407 See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1996); Dunagin v.
City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane).
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underinclusiveness) would undoubtedly "materially advance" the goal of
reducing the incidence of smoking.
The main point of contention, as a matter of law (as opposed to fact),
would be whether the ban was reasonably tailored to advancing that goal or
whether the restriction infringed on substantially more speech than neces-
408sary. One might initially object to a ban on tobacco advertising by noting
that if the government wishes to end smoking, or wishes to reduce its
prevalence, then it must regulate the primary behavior before turning to a
restriction of speech. In response, however, the government might cite rea-
sons counseling against a total ban: the addictiveness of the product, the
substantial population of current addicts, and our country's experience with
prohibition (along with the attendant ills of organized crime and the more
general problem of criminalizing acts that will inevitably be committed by
overwhelming numbers of citizens). By banning advertisements of tobacco
products, the government might respond, it seeks to reduce the incidence of
smoking while avoiding the social ills of a ban on the activity itself. An ad-
vertising ban, according to this theory, would allow current smokers to con-
tinue their habit, and others to begin smoking, as long as they are acting on
their own independently conceived desires and beliefs, as opposed to an
"artificial" demand that may have been created or stimulated by commercial
producers. Thus, the government would answer, a ban on advertising en-
hances liberty more than a restriction on the underlying behavior, because
with the former, the primary behavior remains legal for those who autono-
mously choose to engage in it.409 Although the plurality in 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island found that Rhode Island's .ban on liquor price advertis-
ing was more restrictive than necessary (on the theory that the desired goal
of dampening price competition and thereby increasing the price of alcohol
could have been achieved directly by the imposition of a tax or a fixed
minimum price), 410 here, the less speech-restrictive approach would be quite
difficult to administer and could lead to substantial societal problems. At
least for this particular situation, then, Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico411 would be revived and the regulation would
not be viewed as violating the First Amendment.
408 See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,479-80 (1989).
409 Cf MILL, supra note 252, at 122.
There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so or-
dering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on
their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their
inclinations for interested purposes of their own.
Id.
410 See 517 U.S. 484,489 (1996).
411 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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The qualitative view of commercial speech regulation, by contrast,
would require a justification more specifically connected with the commer-
cial aspect of the speech. Because the argument (so far) is not based on po-
licing the boundaries of the communicative project between buyer and
seller, it is not an argument about commercial speech, but instead, one that
addresses the general interest of the government in keeping information
from the public. Thus, to use Daniel Farber's test: "[T]he state interest
[does not] disappear[] when the same statements are made by a third person
with no relation to the transaction.'A12 Consequently, the hypothetical justi-
fication cannot be reconciled with the Court's holding in City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc.,413 since the government seeks to cure a problem
that is posed equally by both commercial and noncommercial speech, even
though the government only banned commercial speech.
If we are to consider arguments specific to commercial speech we must
look elsewhere. Policing the boundaries of the commercial communication
would justify controlling for false and misleading messages and for propo-
sitions of transactions that are contrary to law. As an initial matter, the gov-
ernment could assert, as it has, an interest in keeping advertising of tobacco
products away from children, since children may not legally purchase the
product. Restrictions properly tailored to furthering that goal would be con-
stitutional. Moreover, an argument might be put forth that with regard to
children, or even adults, tobacco advertising (or at least the type of adver-
tising that exists to date) is false or misleading because it understates the
hazards associated with the use of tobacco. The federally required warning
labels would not necessarily defeat such a view if studies of consumers' un-
derstanding of such advertising established that a false or misleading mes-
sage had nonetheless been conveyed. If copy testing would demonstrate
that, despite warning labels, consumers fail to learn from any given adver-
tisement that consumption of the product is associated with severe addiction
and health risks, then such advertising could be banned. Tobacco advertis-
ing would have to be modified properly to convey the risks associated with
consumption of the product.a14
412 Farber, supra note 144, at 388-89. Justice Marshall made a similar point in a different
context, when he noted in Pickering v. Board'of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), that the
school board's dismissal of the teacher on account of the teacher's critical letter to a newspa-
per would have to be reversed, since "the interest of the school administration in limiting
teachers' opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly greater than its inter-
est in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the general public." Pickering, 391
U.S. at 573.
413 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
414 Indeed, some courts have ordered a manufacturer to engage in "corrective advertis-
ing" to counteract the past conveyance of misleading impressions even where the manufac-
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Finally, on this qualitative view, the specific element of addiction (as
opposed to mere vice activity) arguably alters the social relationship be-
tween the buyer and vendor and imposes certain fiduciary-type obligations
on the vendor because of the autonomy-reducing impact of the advertised
goods. In other words, because of the addictive nature of the product, the
vendor stands in an augmented power relationship with regard to the pur-
chaser in a manner that is categorically different from vendors of other
products that purchasers may freely refuse to buy. Whether the addictive-
ness of a product is (or should be) considered to have this kind of impact on
the social relationship between a vendor and purchaser is, of course, subject
to debate, but this kind of justification may fall within the qualitative view
as being peculiar to commercial speech and as maintaining the integrity of
the communication.
The second initiative of relevance here is state action to remove state
law liability for certain consumers and suppliers of marijuana when the drug
is ultimately consumed pursuant to a physician's recommendation. 41 5 The
federal government opposed the referenda in California and Arizona on the
grounds that no medicinal uses of the drug had been demonstrated and that
the sale and possession of the drug remained illegal under federal law. The
difficult First Amendment issue raised by this difference between the fed-
eral and state policies is whether the implementation of federal policy in the
form of a restriction on the communication between doctor and patient vio-
lates the First Amendment.
416
If Planned Parenthood v. Casey4 17 were taken at face value, the concern
would seem negligible. To be sure, Casey involved the affirmative disclo-
sure of truthful, clear information and not a limitation on physician recom-
mendations, but the Casey test read literally would require review only for
the "reasonableness" of the policy.418 If a pure due process inquiry was
contemplated, on the theory that physician-patient communications are
"less" protected than political speech, the First Amendment concerns would
turer's current advertising would not, standing alone, be misleading. The principal case on
corrective advertising, Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977), for
example, upheld a requirement that the manufacturer of Listerine disclose in future advertis-
ing the negation of a false claim that the company had made earlier, even where that claim
would no longer be asserted in the future. The company was ordered to include the disclaimer
in its advertising for that product until it had expended a sum equal to the average annual ad-
vertising budget for the product in the past. See id. at 763-64.
415 See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
416 See, e.g., Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding
that "the First Amendment protects physician-patient communication up until the point that it
becomes criminal").
417 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
418 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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be minimal. The connection between federally imposed limitations on phy-
sician-patient discussions about purported medicinal uses of marijuana and
the federal government's desire to prevent the use of that drug for such pur-
poses would presumably pass the rational basis fit analysis and the end, if
viewed as that of preventing the use of an illegal drug, would thus provide
ample justification for a restriction on most discussions about such uses of
marijuana.
If professional speech is viewed as a valuable speech institution, how-
ever, the seriousness of the First Amendment issue comes into relief and the
district court's struggle with the First Amendment issues begins to make
sense. The First Amendment protects the doctor-patient dialogue as an im-
portant forum for the exercise of individual autonomy through the commu-
nication of knowledge that is generally free from government control. At
the same time, however, the First Amendment allows for state regulation of
the physician's statements in order to ensure the integrity of the communi-
cative institution. The district court focused largely on the former, noting
that the First Amendment prevents the government from suppressing physi-
cian speech for the reason that it incites patients to unlawful behavior. The
only exception is when there is reason to believe that such discussions incite
patients to immediate lawless action. 41 9 The court essentially stated the
view that the State must not suppress the communication solely because the
interaction is rationally related to a state of affairs that the government is
otherwise legitimately entitled to prevent or in order to shape the physician-
patient dialogue to accord with the government's preferred public policy.
The district court failed to appreciate, however, that physicians' speech may
be regulated on the basis of content to ensure that the physician abides by
legitimate professional standards. The State, in short, would appear to have
a legitimate interest in policing the adherence of a professional to the duty
to serve the client's best interests, even when that means interfering with
speech, because in the context of professional speech, it is the adherence to
the professional role that renders speech within that institution meaningful.
The significance of the illegality of any given drug, on this view, would be
related (though not identical) to that of the illegality of any given product in
the case of commercial speech. Commercial advertising that suggests an
illegal transaction with the advertiser (or the advertiser's principal) violates
the integrity of the communicative project because the transaction cannot be
legally consummated between the speaker and listener. In the case of phy-
419 See Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 695 ("What physicians may not do is advocate use of
medical marijuana 'where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action."' (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444,447 (1969))).
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sician speech, the professional has a duty to act in the client's best interest,
and the recommendation that the patient do something that has been ren-
dered illegal on account of its ill effects on health would ordinarily appear
to run counter to that duty. In the professional's situation, the incompatibil-
ity of the recommendation with the bounded speech institution need not,
however, derive primarily from the illegality of the ultimate purchase or the
consumption of the drug but is principally due to the ill effects of the use of
the drug.
This approach recognizes that government regulation and First
Amendment protection are not mutually exclusive concepts. Ordinarily,
such as in the case of the traditional public forum, we think of First
Amendment protection as deriving from complete state agnosticism about
the content or purpose of the debate.420  Although public dialogue is, of
course, frequently recognized as ultimately serving self-government or self-
expression, the government as regulator must usually remain agnostic as to
the parameters of the expression and may not step in to police the bounda-
ries. In contrast to the traditional public forum, however, professional
speech and commercial speech appear under a different speech paradigm, in
that content-based government regulation may enhance, rather than com-
promise, the speech practice.421 In the case of professional and commercial
speech, then, this paradigm of First Amendment protection neither pre-
cludes nor allows all content-based regulation of speech. It allows govern-
420 But see, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment, State Activism and State Censorship, 100
YALE L.J. 2087, 2100 (1991) (concluding that the State should act more generally as a "high-
minded parliamentarian" rather than an agnostic, "making certain that all viewpoints are fully
and fairly heard").
421 Similarly, in the public university context, some decisions that nominally restrict
speech on the basis of its content (or viewpoint) might be understood as furthering First
Amendment values when examining the decision from the point of view of the academic in-
stitution and its members. For example, although an outside observer might conclude that a
public university's denial of tenure to professors based on the content of their writings con-
stitutes a restriction on speech, an understanding of the purpose of universities and the goals
and ideals of the social practice would lead to the recognition that tenure decisions based on
academic excellence advance, rather than undercut, First Amendment values. The role that
faithfulness to the social practice plays may be seen in the questions that would be raised if
the power to make tenure decisions were placed in the state legislature instead of the univer-
sity itself. Although the legislature may well make a decision that turns out to be true to uni-
versity practice (and if it did, a tenure denial would not give rise to a First Amendment claim),
the fact that the legislature would be making the decision, as opposed to the actors who are
more deeply steeped in the social practice, would most likely be greeted by a court with skep-
ticism and a more searching review of the legislators' motives. Another example is hate-
speech regulation in a public university. An argument supporting such regulation, whether
ultimately convincing or not, would seem to be more powerful if it attempted to explain that
what may appear to the outside observer as a restriction on speech is, when considered in the
setting of a university campus or classroom and in light of the values and goals of a univer-
sity, ultimately speech enhancing.
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ment regulation of speech on the basis of its content even when such regu-
lation would be impermissible in other contexts, such as the speech of
street-comer speakers or public demonstrators, because (and only to the ex-
tent that) in the professional and commercial speech situations, what nomi-
nally appears as a restraint on speech may be understood as enhancing the
speech practice itself. This paradigm also shields professional speech (and
possibly even commercial speech) from selective government funding
where the government has not extracted the interlocutors sufficiently from
their traditional social roles.
422
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to reveal the significant role that existing so-
cial institutions play in the application of one seemingly abstract legal norm,
the First Amendment, to specific lived situations. The reexamination of the
cases in the area of commercial speech in light of the few existing decisions
on professional speech reveals that the Supreme Court has shed its tradi-
tional agnosticism about the meaning and content of speech in these cases
because the interlocutors occupy determined social roles. Formally, this is
evidenced by a tendency to resort to listener-based rhetoric, which implies a
certain regularity of the framework of the discourse, as opposed to the use
of speaker-based rhetoric, which tends to be invoked in cases in which the
Court remains agnostic as to the relationship between the interlocutors and,
accordingly, as to the function of the communication. Substantively, the
view that the speaker and listener occupy determined social roles with re-
spect to their discourse leads to a focus on the protection of the specific
communicative relationship as opposed to a general prohibition of all con-
tent-based regulation. With regard to these communications, such as dis-
cussions between professional and client, government regulation is not in-
variably destructive of communicative interests, but may indeed foster the
communicative relationship and assist in institutionalizing the bounded dis-
course. Content-based government regulation that assists in maintaining the
boundaries of the discourse is therefore permissible, although similar regu-
lation would not be allowed absent the special relationship between the
speaker and listener. At the same time, where the government has not ex-
tracted the speaker and listener from that relationship, selective government
funding of the discourse is not allowed to compromise the integrity of the
established speech institution.
422 This approach says nothing about generally accepted principles of prohibiting certain
kinds of speech, such as speech that would lead to an immediate breakdown of the social or-
der. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
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This approach of constitutionalizing individuals' professional roles re-
flects a more general approach in First Amendment law (and beyond),
whereby individuals are recognized as situated within social relationships
and institutions that influence the permissible scope of state regulation.
In First Amendment challenges to speech in the context of labor rela-
tions, for example, the Court has imposed duties of fairness and truthfulness
on employers and union representatives in negotiations and elections based
on "the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up
intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a
more disinterested ear.''423 Similarly, in the context of labor unions and pro-
fessional associations, the Court has proceeded on the assumption that it can
assess objectively the interests of speakers and listeners within a confined
realm of discourse, that is, between a union and its members.424 The Court
did not deny that speech about collective bargaining activities or the funding
of such speech amounts to protected activity under the First Amendment.
And, the Court did not declare that silence, or the refusal to fund speech
with which the government disagrees, is categorically beyond constitutional
concern. Instead, the Court drew a distinction between speech that pertains
to a particular relationship between the speaker and the person required to
fund the speech and speech that lies beyond that relationship. Where the
speech pertains to a limited realm of discourse with a preconceived purpose
that may be characterized and assessed apart from any particular conversa-
tion, such as collective bargaining understood as pertaining to concrete ne-
gotiations with employers about working conditions, the "beneficiary" of
423 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). See generally Derek C. Bok,
The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38 (1964) (discussing communication in the context of un-
ion elections); Paul D. Snitzer, Employer Free Speech-The Emergence of a Conflict Between
the Board and the Circuits, 11 LAB. LAW. 247 (1995) (discussing employer predictions and
the First Amendment); Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and
the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995). Professor Baker has re-
cently suggested that a similar approach should govern ordinary political elections. See C.
Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 24-
26 (1998) (arguing for the constitutionality of regulating electoral speech).
424 See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524, 528 (1991) (upholding man-
dated assessments by a teachers' union where such monies were spent on bargaining activities
and professional development, but striking down assessments insofar as they funded a general
public relations campaign to raise the esteem of teachers in the eyes of the public); Keller v.
State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1990) (upholding mandatory bar fees to the extent that they were
used for purposes integral to the regulation of the profession and not for political or ideologi-
cal activities that fell beyond that goal); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222-23
(1977) (upholding a state requirement that every government employee pay union dues as a
condition of employment regardless of whether the individual supported the union's existence
or its specific bargaining activities).
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the communication may be made to contribute to support the speech. As
soon as the communication transcends the bounded discourse and turns to
matters that are less closely linked to the particular relationship between the
member and the union, the government is no longer in a position to act on
its assessment of the value or harm of the speech to the contributor and,
therefore, may not require that a contribution be made.
Indeed, this paradigm was recently extended to the realm of commercial
speech. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,425 the Court drew on
union and professional association cases to uphold a federal requirement
that California fruit growers, handlers, and processors contribute to a ge-
neric advertising campaign promoting their goods. The five-member ma-
jority felt able to describe the purpose of individual and generic advertising
and concluded, over the objections of the farmers, that "it is fair to presume
that they agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by
the generic program.' '426 As in the labor and professional union cases, the
Court discarded any agnosticism about the communication that it may have
had about political speech. The majority forged ahead to characterize the
goals of advertisers' commercial advertising, to define the roles of the in-
terlocutors, and to reach objective conclusions about any speech burdens
that were imposed by the program. Concluding that the burdens were
427minimal, the Court upheld the mandated contribution.
Even newspaper editors have been held to an enforceable professional
obligation to respect the confidentiality of their sources, despite the fact that
this obligation in some sense restricts speech. 8 More dramatically, broad-
casters, who had been subject to access rules since shortly after the regula-
tion of the nascent industry in 1927, and therefore did not enjoy a tradition
of unfettered control over their programming (as newspaper editors did),
were accorded less discretion to reject unwanted contributions.429 In justi-
fying the imposition of a professional duty to avoid the monopolization of
the broadcast medium, the Court again resorted to listener-based rhetoric,
apparently indicating the Court's ability to evaluate the communicative en-
terprise at issue. 43  Finally, confidential commercial credit reporting agen-
425 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
426 Id. at 470.
427 Id. at 477.
428 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect newspapers from a suit for breach of confidentiality).
429 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969).
430 See id. at 390 ("It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broad-
casters, which is paramount."). A similar rationale was recently invoked by Justice Breyer
when he explained the basis for his deciding vote in Turner Broadcasting, a case concerning
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cies have been held to work under a professional duty of truthfulness. 431
Professional traditions also have been a source of First Amendment
protection. The Court has, for example, recognized the special role that
teachers traditionally have played in our society and has shielded the exer-
cise of that function from state political pressure.432 The tradition of edito-
rial control prevented expansion to the print media of broadcasters' duty to
grant access to unwanted submissions, despite the arguably similar condi-
tions of scarcity in the two media. Newspaper editors, in contrast to broad-
casters, were thus held to enjoy the professional privilege of refusing to
print "that which reason tells them should not be published." 33 And, it was
perhaps the difference between the distinctive professional integrity of
newspaper editors, on the one hand, and the indistinct nature of the diverse
group of nonprofit organizations on the other, that has allowed Congress
selectively to fund the activities of the latter, but not of the former, without
offending the Constitution.
434
Beyond the First Amendment, the Court has also based constitutional
rules on its assessment of professional roles. The recent physician-assisted
suicide cases, for example, turned in part on whether the responsible exer-
cise of a physician's profession included assisting a patient in committing
suicide.435 Similarly, in Contracts Clause cases, the Court developed the
cable-casting. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-29 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (arguing that fair competition and balance should be Congress's goals in regulat-
ing cable television).
431 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985).
432 See Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (discussing the impor-
tance of safeguarding academic freedom); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) (same); id. at 261-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (same).
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (internal quotations
omitted). Thus, one might argue that it was due to the different pedigrees of the editorial tra-
ditions of the broadcast and print media that Red Lion did not become a general principle
privileging listeners' rights in all scarce media, as had been advocated by some. See JEROME
A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACcEsS TO MASS MEDIA
319-43 (1973); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644-47 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA L. REv. 1405, 1406 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781,
793 (1987).
434 Compare Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987)
(striking down the selective taxation of magazines based on their content), with Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (upholding a denial of a tax exemp-
tion to organizations, other than veterans' organizations, on account of their lobbying activi-
ties).
4 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 779 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment) (discussing whether "a physician's assistance [in suicide] would fall within
the accepted tradition of medical care in our society"); cf Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstericians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986) (noting requirements that were held
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scope of a corporate director's protected realm of discretion based on its un-
derstanding of the "ordinary practice" of the profession.
436
Recognized social institutions, such as professions, accordingly appear
to attain a constitutional status that, on the one hand, allows the government
to regulate the institution as a means of fostering the existence and integrity
of the institution, and, on the other hand, will protect the institution from
ready destruction at the hands of the State, whether by direct regulation or
by selective funding. These institutions are thus viewed as mediating the
isolated endeavors of individuals and the collective political decision mak-
ing of universalizing government institutions. This type of constitutional
analysis of social institutions, in general, and of bounded speech institu-
tions, in particular, considers individuals not only as abstract, isolated re-
positories of the ultimate sovereignty of the polity, but also as social beings
who live within a web of human and institutional relationships that are
given constitutional consideration as well.
The interaction between existing social institutions and fundamental le-
gal norms is complex and deserves further inquiry. First, the justifications
for taking into account existing social institutions merit exploration. By
drawing on these institutions sub silentio, the Court has failed to articulate a
normative theory for their role in constitutional adjudication. Second, the
question of the interaction and relative pull of the legal norm and the exist-
ing social institution warrants examination. Blind deference to existing so-
cial practices does not reflect their current role in constitutional adjudica-
tion.437 Blind deference would also not be justified if the fundamental legal
norm is to retain any weight. At the same time, however, an understanding
of the social practice can inform our conception of an otherwise abstract le-
gal norm.n3  Finally, and related to the above, is the practical question of
institutional reform, which inquires into the constitutional legitimacy of the
unconstitutional because they infringe "upon [the physician's] professional responsibilities"),
overruled inpart by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
436 See Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, and
Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 433; id. at 430-36.
437 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striling down a prohibition on lawyer
advertising); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 478 (1976) (holding that statutory bans on advertising prescription drug prices violated
the First Amendment); see also Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1054 (1991) (opinion of
Kennedy, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, J.J.) ("We have not in recent years
accepted our colleagues' apparent theory that the practice of law brings with it comprehensive
restrictions, or that we will defer to professional bodies when those restrictions impinge upon
First Amendment freedoms.").
439 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199-200 (1991) (noting that selective funding of
traditional relationships may raise First Amendment concerns that selective funding of other
communicative interactions would not).
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legal reform of existing social institutions. Once the significant role that so-
cial institutions play in the adjudication of seemingly abstract rights is rec-
ognized, attention should be turned to these pressing normative concerns.
